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I.

INTRODUCTION

Even the longest, most complicated, and divisive appellate court decisions do not come
with code books.1 Appellate court decisions increasingly involve complex constitutional,
statutory, or administrative law issues, and include lengthy discussions of case facts,2 findings
below, hypothetical disputes of varying significance to legal issues presented, and discursive and
sometimes tendentious treatment of precedent. Judges sometimes identify their holding with

1

In contrast, legislatures routinely offer contemporaneous materials to assist in the task of statutory interpretation, including
cross-referencing provisions and definitions of terms. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 413, 680-82 (3d ed. 2002). Legislative history also informs
statutory interpretation, and occasionally Congress will give explicit instructions about interpreting legislative history. For
example, following a dispute concerning the meaning of “business necessity” for purposes of § 105 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp.1992)), members of
Congress included a three paragraph memorandum within the Congressional Record. This was then referred to as “exclusive
legislative history,” see 137 Cong. Rec. S 15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), and was later recognized as such within the statute.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(b). In contrast, appellate opinions do not generally include contemporaneously produced
materials designed to assist future courts in discerning which aspects of those opinions are or are not controlling, and where
“judicial history” exists, it is generally considered to be irrelevant to interpretation. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judicial
History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311 (1999) (exploring the parallels and differences between legislative and judicial history).
2
For general statistics on the increasing length of judicial opinions, see RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 112-16 (1985).
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precision, and in so doing, imply that all other aspects of the discussion, however persuasive and
seemingly relevant those discussions might be to the immediate case disposition, are instead
dicta.3 More frequently, however, judges offer looser characterizations, and sometimes none at
all, leaving the task of decoding dicta and holding entirely to the reader.
A judge’s failure to delineate the scope of the holding within an opinion might not be a
disservice to the judicial process. Even punctilious judges arguably should not be allowed the
final word on the extent of their authority to resolve legal issues, and even a judge’s claim to
have produced a holding on a particular issue should perhaps be open to challenge when the
issue seems distant from the central concerns of the case. The failure of a judicial opinion to
supply reliable guidance distinguishing its holdings from its dicta, moreover, poses little
difficulty to the extent that legal actors agree upon the definitions of holding and dicta. With
shared understandings, future courts could be expected to follow a case’s holdings and consider
its dicta only to the extent that such discussions prove helpful.
Although judges and scholars share intuitions that frequently lead them to the same
conclusions in particular case settings, our analysis will reveal the absence of a shared
conceptual foundation for analyzing even modestly complex cases. This deficiency might reflect
the tendency in recent decades of scholars interested in precedent to focus significant attention
on the nature of stare decisis. A considerable literature studies the emergence, scope, and limits
of stare decisis,4 the doctrine through which courts use opinions not merely to resolve cases, but
also to make law in the form of at least presumptively binding precedents.5 Stare decisis plays a
3

A usage note: Like “data,” “dicta” may be used as a collective noun to refer to a mass that may be singular or plural in number.
See generally Dmitry N. Tychinin & Almut Beate Heinrich, On the Correct Use of ‘Data,’ 9 INT’L J. LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT 73
(2004), available at http://www.scientificjournals.com/sj/lca/Pdf/aId/6510 (collecting sources on the proper use of the word
“data”). While the word “dictum” may encompass only a single statement, the word “dicta” may refer to one or more statements.
Thus, we use “dicta” as the analogue to “holding,” which also may refer to one or more statements, and we use “dicta” whenever
referring to the status of one or more propositions as holding or dicta. We use the singular “dictum” only where referring to a
single proposition. Thus, we would say either “this proposition is dicta,” or “this proposition is a dictum.”
4
For a discussion that draws upon a portion of that literature, see infra Part III.A.
5
See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 65
(1993) (“Although horizontal stare decisis creates a strong presumption that prior judicial articulations of the law are correct and
should generally be followed by the rendering court, the rule is far from absolute.”); Abner Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal
Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982))
(positing that “such common law doctrines as stare decisis would presumably constrain courts applying statutes to the same
extent that they constrain courts making common law decisions”); Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New
Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 109 (2003) (observing that “common law precedents enjoy a presumption of
correctness stronger than applied to constitutional cases, but not as constraining as that enjoyed by statutory precedents”). In his
famous Commentaries on American Law, James Kent provided a similar early account of stare decisis. See 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 475 (O.,W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 14th ed. Boston, Little Brown, & Co. 1896) (explaining that “[i]f
a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor it its correctness; and the
community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by
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central role in our common law system, whether in horizontal form, for example within the
Supreme Court and across federal circuit court panels, or in vertical form, for example from the
Supreme Court to lower federal courts and from circuit courts to district courts.6 This scholarly
attention is thus warranted.
As a practical matter, however, judicial analyses of precedent rarely require that courts
test the contours of stare decisis doctrine directly. When stare decisis applies, a court rarely
needs to consider the relatively narrow exceptions to stare decisis. Vertical stare decisis is
generally considered absolute,7 and in the federal appellate system, en banc rehearing is required
before a circuit court can overturn the precedent of a panel or an earlier en banc court. Even the
Supreme Court overturns its precedents only rarely, and it debates the scope of stare decisis even
more rarely.8 In contrast, evaluating a claimed precedent to determine whether an identified
proposition is holding or dicta occupies a great deal of judicial attention. Indeed, before a court
can decide whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to a given case, it must first determine
just what that case purports to establish. Because holdings in prior cases are at least
presumptively binding, while dicta is not, this task requires an understanding of these terms.9
it”).
6
At the federal level, within circuit courts, en banc panels are uniquely empowered to overturn the precedents of three-judge
panels and prior en banc panels. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (listing intracircuit conflict as one of two grounds for granting en banc
review). There are, however, two caveats. First, all circuits recognize that an intervening Supreme Court decision can undermine
a decision of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (1992) (“As a general rule, one three-judge
panel of this court cannot consider or overrule the decision of a prior panel. An exception to this rule arises when an intervening
Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit.”). This, however, is not so much an exception to
horizontal stare decisis as it is a recognition that vertical stare decisis trumps horizontal stare decisis in a lower court to which
vertical stare decisis applies. See infra note 9. Second, some circuits follow a rule that a prior panel decision may be disregarded
in “those relatively rare instances in which authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling,
nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective
mind.” Williams v. Ashland Engr. Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119,
1123 (7th Cir. 1987)).
7
For an article that questions this conventional wisdom, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,
50 DUKE L.J. 503, 519 (2000). While Harrison acknowledges that the Supreme Court has admonished lower federal courts not to
anticipate its own overrulings, see DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), he observes that the
rule is not grounded in the Constitution and suggests that when a lower court determines that a higher court would not adhere to
its own precedent, the obligation to follow vertical stare decisis might not be absolute.
8
For what is perhaps the most recent self conscious exercise among Supreme Court justices considering whether to adhere to or
abandon the controversial decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9
In our judicial system, the general rule is that courts must apply stare decisis to the decisions of courts above them in the
judicial hierarchy. See Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818
(1994) (observing that “longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court
‘superior’ to it”). This is the principle of vertical stare decisis. The force of horizontal stare decisis is not always so strong. The
Supreme Court, for example, may decline to follow precedents of its own, particularly when those precedents concern
constitutional law. See Mark Tushnet, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 945 (1998) (observing that “the Supreme Court acknowledges its power to overrule its own precedents more
readily in constitutional law than elsewhere”). District courts, meanwhile, may decline to follow even precedents of other district
courts in the same district. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003)
(noting that “[a]s a general rule, the district courts do not observe horizontal stare decisis”).

4

While the literature on stare decisis is broad, despite the growing need for a clear
distinction to accommodate increasingly complex opinions, in recent decades the literature on
the distinction between holding and dicta has been comparatively tiny.10 An earlier generation of
scholars, in contrast, devoted considerable attention to the holding-dicta distinction.11 While no
satisfactory definition has yet to emerge, legal scholars have largely turned their attention
elsewhere. The questions whether to apply precedent, and how to construe a particular precedent
in a given case, are intertwined. But they are not the same inquiry. Even an opinion without
precedential value contains a holding. If anything, the more relevant inquiry in most cases is the
one that has been given scant attention among the current generation of legal scholars. Courts
themselves have not filled the theoretical void, and so the American judicial system lacks clearly
defined rules on an important aspect of the process through which judges resolve cases and make
law. Through a loose set of practices that vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and,
perhaps more problematically, from court to court and case to case, judges define such terms as
needed to assist in the task of resolving particular cases entirely on their own.
Despite the absence of any single governing source or universal agreement on how to
define dicta, the legal system does not threaten to devolve into chaos or general incoherence.
Rather, disagreements as to whether a claimed proposition is part of a court’s holding, or is
instead merely dicta, surface in discrete disagreements over particular cases without unraveling
the fabric of the law. There is no denying, however, the importance of understanding—both as a
matter of theory and at the level of practice—how to approach such a central task as sorting
holding and dicta. This query goes to the heart of the business of judging, which itself goes to the
essence of the Anglo-American system of interpreting and makingpositive law. Even if there is
broad agreement on a range of issues related to decoding dicta and holdings, it should not be
10

Indeed, our research revealed only one major law review article in the past fifty years exclusively focused on offering a broad
theoretical treatment of the distinction between holding and dicta. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1997 (1994). We will find much to commend in Dorf’s analysis. See infra Part IV.A. Dorf’s focus, however, is on “the
jurisprudential implications of Article III for determining how federal courts ought to distinguish between the holdings and dicta
of past cases.” Id. at 2025-40, 2049-66. All courts, including courts not bound by Article III, must distinguish holdings and dicta,
and our analysis will be quite general. Dorf emphasizes that courts have not applied the holding-dicta distinction consistently, id.
at 2040-49, and explains the importance of a clear definition of the holding-dicta distinction, id. at 2024-28. We accept his
conclusions on both points and believe that they suggest that a clearer definition of the holding-dicta distinction is necessary.
Dorf himself, however, spends just a few pages on our interest, the practical problem of how to draw a distinction between
holding and dicta See id. at 2040-49. We will conclude that the definition Dorf offers, though inventive and arguably superior to
previously offered definitions, is neither easy to apply nor normatively justifiable. See infra Part IV.A.4.
11
See, e.g., EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 13, at 18-19 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1894); Arthur L.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 180 (1930). For our analysis of the distinctions between
holding and dicta offered by these scholars and others, see infra Part IV.A.2-3.
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surprising that in the cases in which these issues matter most, the conceptual uncertainties that
result from a lack of rigor in categorizing holding and dicta give rise to the greatest practical
difficulties.
One difficulty in developing theoretically satisfying, and operational, understandings of
the terms holding and dicta is that the most commonplace—and frequently cited—definitions of
these terms are problematic in profound ways. Appreciating both why these definitions emerged
and what is problematic about them is essential to our project. Consider, as perhaps the most
prominent illustration, the definition of “Obiter dictum” in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[a] judicial
comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”12 We will argue that the definition is
indefensible,13 and at least inconsistent with the general understanding that alternative holdings
in a case all count as holdings.14 In fact, we will demonstrate that as a core element in the
definition of holding, necessity, is itself not necessary,15 and might not even be sufficient to
ensure holding status to a given proposition.16 The intuition that underlies the definition,
however, is easy to appreciate, because the definition works well for simple cases. In a case in
which there is just one issue, and just one logical argument that can take a court from the facts to
the judgment, discussions that do not lie along that path are unnecessary to the decision and are
therefore dicta.
In this Article, our ultimate aim is not produce a holding/dicta code book, but instead a
straightforward definition of the terms “holding” and “dicta.” Like any legal test, our definition
will leave some gray areas, but we are confident that the definition is both theoretically sound
and functional. It reflects the issues issues for which we are able to achieve relatively clear
resolutions, while also providing a framework for confronting those issues for which competing
policy considerations render the task of providing determinate outcomes particularly difficult.

12

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004).
See infra Part IV.A.3.
14
If a court has two possible means of achieving a disposition, for example if a challenged state law violates both equal
protection and due process, then under this definition, neither basis for striking the challenged law down standing alone would be
a holding. Yet, it cannot be the case that an opinion that strikes down a law on two grounds rather than one expresses no holding.
For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see infra Part IV.A.3.
15
See infra Part IV.A.3 (demonstrating based upon alternative holdings that necessity is not a necessary element in affording
holding status to actually decided propositions).
16
See infra Part IV.B.1 (suggesting that necessity might not be a sufficient condition in affording holding status to unresolved
propositions that are logically required along the chosen decisional path from facts to judgment).
13
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We thus offer not only our recommendations for resolving even the closest conceptual issues, but
also a framework with which scholars can approach such questions even if they do not embrace
our specific conclusions on specific problems. By clearly identifying the issues that the literature
has not directly addressed and the legal values at stake, our analysis will at least allow the courts
to reach their own resolutions of these issues with greater conceptual clarity.
In the course of our analysis, we will categorize the various types of judicial assertions
that can credibly be classified either as holding or dicta using a coherent and comprehensive
logical structure. For example, in addition to considering the problem of alternative holdings, we
will ask whether a court is generally empowered to issue what we term biconditional holdings—
“if and only if” statements rather than mere “if, then” statements—one of several fundamental
questions that to our knowledge has been overlooked in prior discussions of holding and dicta.17
The approach that we offer proves essential not only in ensuring analytical clarity and
consistency, but also in exposing nuances that more impressionistic methodologies have failed to
identify. In addition, using the methodology of rational choice, we consider the emergence of
stare decisis and its role in limiting overreaching by judges in their attempts to transform dicta to
holding. The analysis helps to explore both the function that stare decisis serves and how that
function relates to the proper definition of holding and dicta.
We proceed as follows: Part II relies upon the famous Supreme Court case, Board of
Regents of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke,18 to develop an analytical approach
that we use to classify various judicial assertions as either holding or dicta. Part III explores the
connections between stare decisis and the distinction between holding and dicta, in tailoring
appropriate judicial incentives. We begin Part III with a rational choice model that identifies
endogenous incentives among judges to respect precedent, even when they disagree, and to limit
the scope of opinions. Most importantly, the model exposes the limits of any resulting
endogenous rules or norms, and the importance of meaningful and shared definitions of holding
and dicta in enforcing and in giving content to whatever general limits on judicial overreaching
that the rational choice model helps to identify. Part III then establishes the foundation for our
normative critique of existing definitions of holding and dicta by evaluating the various
17

The closest discussion that we have found to the biconditional statements question is Goodhart, supra note 11, at 180. For our
analysis of Professor Goodhart’s discussion on this point and others, see infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text.
18
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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categories of judicial assertions described in Part II based upon four normative considerations:
constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor.
In Part IV, we evaluate past definitions of holding and dicta and develop our own. While
our analysis in this part accommodates the analytical categories developed in Part II, and builds
upon the positive and normative analyses developed in Part III, the definition of holding and
dicta that we offer is at once straightforward and comprehensive. In Part IV, we propose and
defend the following: “A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path
or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and
(3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”19 While
we provide a careful discussion of each element in our definition, the definition is intended to be
free standing, and to provide the basis for assessing holding and dicta even in most complex
appeals court decisions. In Part V, we evaluate several prominent (and complex) cases,
presenting issues such as the identification of a holding in a balancing test, in light of the
definition of holding and dicta that we offer.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF DICTA

We begin our inquiry with a well known Supreme Court case: Bakke v. Board of
Regents.20 We are aware that this is among the most written about, and contentious, opinions in
modern jurisprudence.21 Our purpose is not to take a position on or even to enter the protracted
debates as to its normative merits. To the contrary, we have chosen the case in part because more
recent Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action make inquiries into what might count as
holding or dicta in Bakke almost purely academic.22 Nor is our purpose to focus on the unique
role of the Supreme Court in developing law and public policy in such divisive matters as
affirmative action, or on the relevance of particular institutional features of the Supreme Court.

19

See infra Part IV.B.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21
For assessments of Bakke and its aftermath, see JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE (1979); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE (1988); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 341 (2001); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative
Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J. 981 (1999); and Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Affirmative Action and
Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 697 (1999).
22
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program
over a constitutional challenge); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down as unconstitutional the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action program).
20
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At least initially,23 we will assume that a single definition of the distinction between holding and
dicta applies to all courts, including trial and appellate courts, and that a single definition applies
to both courts in which single judges hear cases and to courts in which groups of judges hear
cases.
We hope that the familiarity of the case will make our exposition more accessible. We
will, however, focus on features of the discussions that were not the main object of academic
attention in debates on the merits of the rulings. Our aim is to use the case to clarify the
analytical structure of legal reasoning by identifying the relationship between individual
statements in the controlling opinion and the overall argument in that opinion. This approach will
expose a set of problems about what counts as holding and what counts as dicta. Bakke turns out
to be a particularly useful case for exploring the holding-dicta distinction because it touches on
all of these problems, though at points we develop hypotheticals variations on Bakke to explore
problems not directly implicated in Bakke itself. The problems that we set out vary considerably
in the level of analytical difficulty that they present. When the problems that we explore have
easy answers, to simplify our exposition, we will anticipate our ultimate conclusions, even
though a full justification must await the analytical framework that we will develop in Part III.
Other problems, though representing reasoning patterns or structures commonly found in
judicial opinions, turn out to be difficult. While our ultimate goal will be to shed light on these
problems, our immediate goal is simply to identify concrete questions that previous
commentators have not identified, let alone resolved, about what counts as holding and dicta. We
also acknowledge that in setting up our analytical framework, we adopt an admittedly technical
terminology. Our ultimate objective is to provide a workable and nontechnical definition of
holding and dicta that captures our eventual resolution of all the problems that we have
identified.24
A. Bakke
In the contentious series of cases that culminated in the Supreme Court’s tandem rulings
sustaining the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program,25 and striking
23

We will consider the institutional difference between the Supreme Court and ordinary appellate courts, and the relevance to the
definition of holding and dicta infra Parts III.C.3 and IV.B.
24
See infra Part IV.B.
25
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

9

down that university’s undergraduate affirmative action program,26 a central issue for the
deciding courts was to discern the meaning of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.27
In Bakke, the Supreme Court considered Allan Bakke’s challenge to his rejection from the
Medical School at the University of California at Davis. Bakke, who was white, alleged that the
medical school denied him admission based upon race, and he argued that the medical school’s
use of race violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.28 Justice Powell issued an
opinion in Bakke that delivered the Court’s judgment.29
Justice Powell concluded that the medical school’s admissions program violated Bakke’s
equal protection rights, but he concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not prevent the
medical school altogether from considering race in its admissions process. Justice Stevens, with
the support of three others,30 agreed with Powell’s conclusion that Bakke’s rights were violated.
There were thus five Justices altogether who voted that Bakke be admitted. Unlike Powell,
however, Stevens would have held that any use of race in admissions in a state institution of
higher education violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Meanwhile, a separate group
of four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, agreed with Powell that the medical school
constitutionally could consider race,32 and so a total of five Justices, including Justice Powell,
endorsed that proposition. Unlike Powell, however, Brennan would have applied the more
relaxed intermediate scrutiny test to sustain what he determined was a benign race-based
classification.33 Brennan would have determined that applying that test, remedying the present

26

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke is discussed extensively in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314, 322 -25, 328-30, 335, 337, 341, and in Gratz,
539 U.S. at 257-58, 269, 270-75.
28
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-80 (opinion of Powell, J.).
29
Id. at 269.
30
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
31
“Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.” Id. at 418. Justice Stevens,
however, did not reach the Equal Protection Clause issue, arguing that because Bakke should prevail on statutory grounds, there
was no need to consider the statutory issue. Id. at 412-13. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only “insofar as it affirms
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California,” adding that “[t]o the extent that it purports to do anything else, I respectfully
dissent.” Id. at 421. The words “purports to” may reinforce that Justice Stevens believed there to be an argument that some of
Justice Powell’s opinion may have been dicta.
32
Id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun).
33
“[R]acial classifications designed to further remedial purposes must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
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effects of past discrimination substantially furthered an important governmental interest, thus
satisfying intermediate scrutiny, with the result of sustaining the Davis program.34
Because of the multiple opinions and partial concurrences, the most obvious place for
lower federal courts and state courts to begin their search for Bakke’s holding was by considering
whether Powell’s opinion resolved the case on the narrowest grounds, applying the framework
articulated in Marks v. United States,35 and thus counted as the controlling opinion. Indeed, this
question was vigorously litigated after Bakke.36 We believe that Powell’s opinion was the
controlling narrowest grounds opinion in Bakke,37 and the Supreme Court eventually focused on
the Powell opinion, albeit without conclusively resolving the Marks issue.38 Our concern in this
Article, however, is not with Marks and the narrowest grounds rule. Rather, our question is
whether particular statements in an opinion count as holding or dicta, given that the opinion is
controlling. We will therefore assume without further analysis that the Powell opinion is
controlling, and we will place the other opinions aside. In the next section, we will provide a
summary of Powell’s opinion, identifying several propositions of interest to our later analysis,
and we will then analyze these propositions in the sections following.

34

Id. at 362-79.
433 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Marks held that when the Supreme Court decides a case and no opinion commands majority
support, the opinion consistent with the outcome that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds is controlling. See id.
36
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 780-85 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing against the application of
Marks to Bakke and providing an overview of the treatment of the Marks-Bakke issue in the lower courts); Johnson v. Board of
Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply Marks to Bakke); Hopwood v.
Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Marks inapplicable to Bakke); Smith v. University of Washington, 233
F.3d 1188, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Marks to Bakke).
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We believe that Marks did apply to Bakke and that the application is neither difficult nor indeterminate. See MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 130-33 (2002)
(providing detailed analysis). Justice Powell’s opinion was the narrowest ground for both aspects of what he presented as the
Court’s judgment. Powell claimed to have resolved both that state institutions of higher learning are permitted to use race in
admissions, and that the Davis approach, a quota, is not permissible. Under the narrowest ground rule, the relevant question may
be cast as follows: (1) Of the opinions that would allow the use of race, which would be most restrictive in allowing race to be
used? (2) Of the opinions striking down the Davis quota, which would strike down the fewest potential state law affirmative
action programs? In both instances, the unmistakable answer is the opinion of Justice Powell, and his opinion is therefore the
narrowest grounds opinion.
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Before the United States Supreme Court, litigants debated how to apply Marks to Bakke. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at
32-33, 2003 WL 164186, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516); Respondent’s Brief at 15 n.17, 2003 WL 402237, Gratz
(No. 02-516). Once the case arrived there, however, the Marks analysis was beside the point. While Marks analysis binds lower
federal courts and state courts in their efforts to construe fractured Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court itself is only
obligated to give stare decisis effect to its prior majority decisions. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996)
(noting that only four Justices supported the reasoning of a prior precedent). Once the Supreme Court elected to reenter the
affirmative action controversy, one might have expected that in the quest for Bakke’s meaning, all bets were off. Surprisingly,
perhaps, while Justice O’Connor declined to clarify the application of Marks to Bakke, she did not maintain that doing so was
irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s construction of a fractured panel case. Instead, she asserted that the Marks analysis simply did
not matter given that the GrutterCourt agreed with the merits of Powell’s Bakke’s analysis. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
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1. Justice Powell’s Opinion
Justice Powell undoubtedly produced confusion concerning the holding in his Bakke
opinion by making determinations concerning a program other than the one immediately before
the Court. Although Powell found that the Davis medical school’s affirmative action program,
which had set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for specified racial minorities,39 constituted
an illicit quota,40 Powell also suggested that an alternative program used by Harvard University,
which instead used race as one plus factor among many, and which evaluated all files as part of a
combined admissions process, would withstand equal protection scrutiny.41 While the Regents of
the University of California at Davis Medical School (the “Regents”), because they are not an
elected policy making body, had improperly used race to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination, Powell found that the Harvard program permissibly used race instead to promote
its compelling interest in promoting student diversity in institutions of higher education.
To assess what counts as holding and dicta, let us break down the Powell opinion. A
careful reading of Powell’s opinion reveals an attempt to resolve no fewer than the following ten
propositions:
(1) The medical school’s “special admissions program,” which set aside a
prescribed number of seats for disadvantaged students,42 “is undeniably a
classification based on race and ethnic background.”43
(2) “The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons,”44
including non-minorities, or more specifically, whites.
(3) A race classification is permissible only when the classification satisfies the
strict scrutiny test, i.e. when it is narrowly “tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.”45
(4) A desire to help groups of people who have suffered discrimination from
society at large by admitting them on the basis of race “does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like [Bakke].”46
39

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Id. at 315.
41
Id. at 316-18.
42
Id. at 274-76.
89.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 299. Justice Powell used the phrase “precisely tailored” rather than “narrowly tailored,” id., but we have substituted the
latter, more common statement of the strict scrutiny test.
46
Id. at 310.
40
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(5) A desire to improve delivery of health care services to underserved
communities was not sufficiently compelling to justify the special admissions
program, because “there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that
petitioner’s special admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that
goal.”47
(6) The goal of “attainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institute of higher education,”48 and “the
interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions
program.”49
(7) Nonetheless, by focusing on race or ethnic origin alone, the special admissions
program “would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.”50
(8) A program like Harvard’s, in which “race or ethnic background may be
deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet . . . does not insulate the
individual from comparison with all other candidates,”51 would not share this
defect.
(9) Someone rejected under the Harvard plan “would have no basis to complain of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.”52
(10) “[T]hat portion of the California court’s judgment holding petitioner’s
special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be
affirmed.”53
We recognize, of course, that by identifying these ten propositions as representing the
essence of Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, we are necessarily simplifying. Justice Powell made
many more statements than these, which one might parse to determine whether they are holding
and dicta. We focus on these ten statements, however, because each served an important role in
Powell’s analysis, and we believe that the general principles that we develop here could be
applied to any remaining propositions that Powell articulated in the rest of his opinion. Even if
one disputed that these ten statements accurately capture the central assertions that Powell
endorsed in his analysis, doing so would not undermine our project. There will often be
ambiguities about just what propositions a particular opinion endorsed, and where the boundary
47
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Id. at 311-12. Justice Powell stated that this conclusion had First Amendment implications. Id.
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lines of those propositions lie. Determining the extent to which a prior opinion binds a current
court requires both the resolution of ambiguities and a determination of whether propositions
given such resolutions are holding or dicta.54 Both of these are critical aspects of jurisprudential
reasoning, but we are taking up only the latter challenge.
2. Analysis of Justice Powell’s Opinion
The following subsections will analyze Justice Powell’s opinion. We will divide our
analysis into two subsections. The first subsection produces a presumptive definition of holding
(and thus by negative implication, of dicta), counting all “supportive propositions” as part of the
holding. A supportive proposition is one that is necessary or sufficient for the case disposition or
for the disposition of another proposition that itself expresses a holding. Thus, if proposition A is
sufficient for proposition B, and proposition B is necessary for the case disposition, then
proposition A would count presumptively as a holding. This presumptive definition itself reflects
the resolution of two significant problem categories: alternative justifications and alternative
possible justifications. The second subsection considers a variety of additional problem
categories, each representing a possible reason to depart from, or rebut, the presumptive
definition, either by discounting a presumptive holding as dicta or by crediting presumptive dicta
as holding. Constructing a definition that takes the form of a rebuttable presumption makes our
analysis more manageable because it allows us to place aside, at least temporarily, some of the
most difficult (and not surprisingly, more significant) issues. Our ultimate task, however, will be
not only to defend our presumption-based definition, but also to offer satisfactory resolutions to
the more difficult problem categories.
a. A Presumptive Definition
i.

Necessary propositions and sufficient propositions

Let us start by considering the first two propositions together. Statement (1) (the Davis
program is race based) might be categorized as a resolution of a mixed question of fact and law,55
while Statement (2) (equal protection protects nonminorities, including whites) appears to be a
54

See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 64 (identifying a possible ambiguity in Justice Powell’s opinion).
A mixed question of law and fact asks “whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
55
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resolution of a pure issue of law. Resolutions of both types of holdings potentially count as
holdings, though holdings resolving pure questions of law may have broader application in
subsequent cases.56 Statements (1) and (2) are both necessary propositions to the disposition of
the case in statement (10) (the program is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment). A
statement is a necessary proposition to a second statement if the court logically could not make
the second statement while denying the first. On the facts of Bakke, the Court logically could not
have concluded both that the Davis program was not race-based and that the program violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could the Court have concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause does not protect whites while concluding that the program violated the Clause.
The classification of statements (1) and (2) as necessary propositions to the disposition of
the case could not be reached by considering statements (1) and (2) in isolation. Suppose that
Bakke had also claimed that he was a victim of sex discrimination. Statement (1) then would be a
necessary proposition for the proposition that the Davis plan violated Bakke’s right to equal
protection on the basis of race. That proposition in turn would be only a sufficient proposition for
the conclusion that the Davis plan violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the Court could
have found an Equal Protection Clause violation without finding a race-based classification. A
statement is a sufficient proposition to a second statement if the court logically could not make
the first statement while denying the second. Note that in Bakke as written, neither statement (1)
nor statement (2) is a sufficient proposition for the disposition of the case. If, for example, the
court had endorsed statement (1) but rejected statement (2), thus finding that the while the Davis
program is race based, the Equal Protection Clause does not protect whites, the Court would not
have concluded that the program was unconstitutional. As a result, statement (1) is a necessary
but not a sufficient proposition for the disposition.

56

Statement (1) appears to hold that any program identical to the special admissions program counts as a race classification, but
it does not indicate whether other programs considering race count as racial or ethnic classifications. In theory, a subsequent
court might have determined that some differently structured program did not employ a race classification even though it
considered race. For example, a court might have distinguished this holding in Bakke in a case involving an admissions program
in which there was no official policy about affirmative action, but individual admissions officers considered race. Of course,
other cases might well have provided holdings that foreclosed this approach. The line between resolutions of mixed questions of
law and fact and pure questions of law is often fuzzy because mixed questions can usually be restated as questions of law. See
generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions
Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1991) (discussing the difficulties that appellate courts face in deciding how to approach mixed
questions). Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion might have reworded statement (1) in more general terms, specifying that whenever a
particular plan has certain specified features, it would be considered a race-based classification.
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Crediting necessary propositions that a court has actually decided as holdings is
obviously important. A legal system that did not count decided propositions that are necessary to
the disposition as holdings is effectively a legal system without holdings. Thus, we can at least
tentatively conclude that decided propositions that are necessary to the disposition of a case are
holdings, even if those propositions are not sufficient for the result.57 This conclusion helps
explain the visceral appeal of a definition of holding as any statement necessary to resolving the
case, a definition that we shall criticize in detail later.58 But the conclusion does not justify this
definition, and there is a strong argument for presumptively counting sufficient propositions to
the disposition as holdings as well. The sex discrimination hypothetical may make this intuitive.
Suppose that Bakke had raised a sex discrimination claim, and the Court concluded in one line at
the end of the opinion that it did not need to consider that claim. As we have already seen,
statements (1) and (2) would no longer be necessary to the result of the case (nor necessary to a
proposition that itself was necessary to the outcome). Even so, one might well conclude that
statements (1) and (2) should count as holdings even though the unresolved sex discrimination
issue was also before the Court.
ii.

The problem of alternative possible justifications

Statement (4) (remedying the present effects of past discrimination does not justify using
race as a factor in admissions) and statement (5) (improving health services for underprivileged
communities does not justify using race as a factor in admissions) raise the issue of sufficient
propositions directly. These statements are both responses to claims by the medical school that
certain social interests should save the program from being struck down. Under the Court’s
selected test in Statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny), which we will
return to in a moment,59 any proffered interest will suffice to save the program if and only if that
interest is found to be compelling and the program is found to be narrowly tailored to further that
compelling interest.60 Statement (4) appears to reject the claim that remedying the present effects
of past discrimination is a compelling interest. Statement (5) appears to reject the claim that
57

For confirmation of this tentative conclusion, see infra Part III.C.1.
See infra Part IV.A.3. As we have previously asserted, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, as a free standing
requirement, necessity is not necessary and might not be sufficient for a proposition to be classified as a holding. See also infra
Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.1.
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downstream benefits to underprivileged communities can justify an affirmative action program
on narrow tailoring grounds, although the court leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff might
be able to establish narrow tailoring with stronger evidence, even for a similar program.61 Thus,
both statements (4) and (5) respectively imply sufficient propositions (lack of compelling
interest, lack of narrow tailoring) for propositions (the past discrimination argument cannot save
the statute, the health services argument cannot save the statute) that, because a contrary finding
would produce the opposite result, are necessary for the disposition.
This presentation reveals our first problem category, which we will call the problem of
alternative possible justifications. As an alternative to statement (4), Justice Powell might have
concluded that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored to remedying the present effects of past
discrimination, but Justice Powell did not consider that issue. Similarly, as an alternative to
statement (5), Justice Powell might have concluded that benefiting underprivileged communities
is not a compelling interest. The issue is not whether the alternative possible justification has the
status of dicta; after all, Justice Powell said nothing as to its resolution. Instead, it is whether the
potential alternative means of reaching a conclusion through the alternative possible justification
renders the actual means of reaching the conclusion dicta. Eventually, we will conclude that the
answer is “no,” and that the existence of alternative possible justifications does not turn what
otherwise would count as holding into dicta.62
Statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny) also raises the problem
of alternative possible justifications, though in a more subtle way. Justice Powell’s opinion does
not reach a conclusion about whether the Davis program would have failed intermediate scrutiny,

61

Statement (4) is a holding about what courts should do in the absence of evidence on the record about downstream benefits of
diversity. On its own terms, statement (4) does not purport to determine whether a university could rely on the benefits of an
affirmative action program in generating doctors for underserved communities. Thus, while Bakke resolved the question whether
an affirmative action program could be justified by its benefits for those advantaged, it did not resolve whether it could be
justified by its benefits for those not advantaged. It was at least conceivable in Grutter that the Court could have stated that the
University of Michigan Law School, unlike the Davis Medical School, had presented data sufficient to demonstrate that the
challenged affirmative action program significantly promoted access to legal services among minorities and the poor. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Michigan Black Law Alumni Society in Support of Respondents at 21-24, 2003 WL 537217, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (making this argument). The basis for Justice Powell’s rejection of statement (4), unlike that for his
rejection of statement (3), invited the future possibility of such a fact-based distinction.
Interestingly, in Grutter, Justice O’Connor ignores this distinction even though it might have made he r argument more
persuasive. O’Connor states, “Justice Powell rejected an interest in ‘increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved,’ concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances the
program under review was not ‘geared to promote that goal.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306, 310
(opinion of Powell, J.)). This statement mischaracterizes Justice Powell, who stated only that there was insufficient evidence that
the program was geared to promote that goal.
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See infra Part III.C.2.
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had that been the appropriate test. Thus, as an alternative means of justifying the conclusion that
Davis’s race classification was impermissible, Justice Powell might have found that the Davis
program failed intermediate scrutiny. This conclusion would have relieved Justice Powell of the
need to determine whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate test since a
state proffer that fails intermediate scrutiny necessarily fails the more stringent strict scrutiny.
Justice Powell’s opinion can be read as assuming arguendo that the Davis program would pass
intermediate scrutiny. The problem of alternative possible justifications thus arises generally
when an opinion author either explicitly or implicitly makes an assumption that, if successfully
refuted, would provide further justification for the eventual result.
iii.

The problem of alternative justifications

Statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) might at
first appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for any other proposition. Regardless of
whether facts about Harvard’s plan were formally part of the record, Harvard’s plan was not the
plan that the Court was evaluating. This analysis, however, turns out to be simplistic, because it
could be argued that statement (8) and statement (7) (the Davis program hinders genuine
diversity) are both sufficient propositions for the broader proposition that the Davis program fails
narrow tailoring. Although Justice Powell does not explicitly identify statement (7) as responsive
to the narrow tailoring analysis, a demonstration that a program hinders a goal shows a fortiori
that the program is not narrowly tailored to achieving that goal. Identification of a more narrowly
tailored program also may show that the challenged program is not narrowly tailored.
Justice Powell prefaced his comments on the Harvard plan as follows: “The experience of
other university admissions programs . . . demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of
places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end.”63 Powell’s discussion of
the Harvard plan might be seen as sufficient to resolve the constitutionality of the Davis plan.
The discussion of the Harvard plan demonstrated that an alternative plan existed that was more
narrowly tailored than the Davis plan. Thus, even if the Court had not concluded that the Davis
program hindered genuine diversity, which itself was a sufficient basis for concluding that a
program is not narrowly tailored, Justice Powell can be interpreted as having believed that his
analysis of the Harvard plan established that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored.
63

438 U.S. at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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There remains, to be sure, ambiguity about whether Justice Powell actually considered
the existence of a more narrowly tailored plan by itself sufficient to conclude that the Davis plan
was not narrowly tailored. Depending upon how it interprets the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny,64 a future court could argue that, at best, the Harvard plan discussion contributed to
Powell’s analysis only in an informal way. Often, it is possible to identify an argument that
contributes to the analysis in an opinion, without being able to determine definitively whether
that analysis was necessary to or sufficient for some higher-order proposition, and ultimately for
the disposition of the case. Just as our task is not to resolve ambiguities concerning what
propositions an opinion endorsed,65 so too is it not to resolve ambiguities concerning what role a
particular proposition played within the internal reasoning of an opinion writer, where a judge
has not objectively explained how that proposition supports the judge’s argument. The existence
of the ambiguity here would provide sufficient justification for a later judge to determine that
statement (8) is not necessary or sufficient for any other proposition, and we will consider the
statement under that assumption momentarily.66 But for now, we will assume that statement (8)
represents a sufficient proposition for the proposition that the Davis plan was not narrowly
tailored.
Thus understood, statements (7) and (8) present the problem of alternative justifications.
Justice Powell could have justified his conclusion that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored
(a conclusion that itself is not directly represented by any of the ten statements listed above) with
either statement (7) or statement (8), but he chose unnecessarily to consider and endorse both
statements (7) and (8). The previously considered problem of alternative possible justifications
presented a situation in which it might not have been necessary for an opinion author to consider
one of two (or more) statements, but in which we cannot be sure, because we could not know
what the analysis of the unexplored issue would have revealed. With alternative justifications, it
is unmistakable that the opinion author did more than was necessary. Thus, there may be a
stronger case for excluding alternative justifications from the status of holding than there would
be for excluding statements representing alternative possible justifications.67 If we were to accept
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See supra text accompanying note 54.
See infra text accompanying note 88.
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When a judge advances multiple justifications, there is a danger that the judge is doing so because the judge wishes to have
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the simplistic “necessary” definition of holding, alternative justifications would not be
holdings.68 Eventually, however, we will conclude that neither problem by itself should
transform a statement from holding into dicta.69
iv.

Supportive and nonsupportive propositions

Statements (6) (diversity is a compelling interest) and (7) (focusing exclusively on race
would hinder genuine diversity), reflect the two prongs of the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis for
the diversity defense of affirmative action. In constrast, we have seen that Justice Powell used
statement (4) (remedying the present effects of past discrimination does not justify using race as
a factor in admissions) to refute the past discrimination defense by considering only the
compelling state interest prong, and used statement (5) (improving health services for
underprivileged communities does not justify using race as a factor in admissions) to refute the
downstream benefits defense by considering only the narrow tailoring prong. Statement (7) is
like statements (4) and (5), however, in the sense that all three statements articulate propositions
that are sufficient to support a proposition that is necessary to the eventual result. Specifically, by
rejecting narrow tailoring, statement (7) implies the proposition that on the facts of the case, the
state’s proffered goal of promoting academic diversity will not save the program. Thus,
statement (7) (a quota undermines diversity) is sufficient to a proposition (the Davis program is
not narrowly tailored) that is necessary for the ultimate result (striking the program).
Unlike statements (4) and (5), however, statement (7) does not present the problem of
alternative possible justifications. Justice Powell explored the apparent alternative justification
(the compelling interest prong) in statement (6) (diversity is a compelling interest), thus rejecting
the argument that diversity provides no compelling interest as a possible alternative justification
for his result. Thus, statement (7) would appear to have at least as much of a claim to holding
status as statements (4) and (5). Statement (6), in contrast, would appear to have less of a claim
to the status of holding. At least in our stylized presentation, it appears that it would have made
counting alternative justifications as holding, while ignoring alternative possible justifications. For example, one might argue that
alternative justifications invite an intellectual shell game in which a judge who perceives weaknesses in argument A advances
argument B, and perceiving weaknesses in argument B advances argument C. But because none of the arguments needs to be
independently conclusive—instead they are each alternative justifications—the judge does not iron out the wrinkles in any of the
arguments (or reject any or all of the arguments as deficient). This problem is less acute in the context of alternative possible
justifications because there the court has chosen to resolve the issue on one ground, but has not foreclosed the possibility that a
different court selecting a different ground might get to the same judgment.
68
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no difference to the case outcome, or to his need to consider other legal issues, had Justice
Powell skipped statement (6).
More concretely, statement (6) is not a “supportive proposition,” by which we mean one
that is necessary to or sufficient for either the disposition or any other supportive proposition.
Identifying “nonsupportive propositions” like statement (6) is useful because such propositions
can be freely omitted without affecting either the result or the need for a court to determine other
propositions en route to reaching the result. Returning to our earlier hypothetical, if the Court
had concluded that the Davis plan also constituted sex discrimination against Bakke, that would
be a supportive proposition. That determination would not have affected the result, because
absent the discussion the Court would have achieved the same judgment relying solely on race
discrimination. The determination, however, would have meant that the propositions related to
race discrimination could alternatively have been omitted without affecting the result, since the
Court could have relied solely on sex discrimination. But if the Court had concluded that the
Davis plan did not constitute sex discrimination against Bakke, that would be a nonsupportive
proposition, because inclusion of such reasoning would have had no effect on the remainder of
the analysis.
b. Possible Reasons for Deviating from the Presumptive Definition

We will assume for now that a supportive proposition presumptively counts as a holding.
As a result, any proposition that is necessary to or sufficient for either the disposition or for
another holding will itself be a presumptive holding. This assumption will allow us to separate
the analysis thus far, which focused on the relationship between the propositions at issue and
higher-order propositions, including but not limited to the disposition of the case, from the
analysis that follows, which focuses on whether the relationships between or among individual
propositions should alter this initial presumption.
i.

The problem of structured analysis

One argument for crediting nonsupportive propositions as holdings immediately arises,
and this argument also will reveal a potential reason to discount some supportive propositions as
dicta. Even though statement (6) is a nonsupportive proposition, the question of whether an
interest is compelling is part of a legal test. We consider legal analysis to be structured when a
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legal test or legal doctrine, whether adopted in the case itself or in prior cases, identifies what a
party must show to prevail on an issue. Strict scrutiny provides that to defend a certain type of
program (in Bakke, programs that use racial classifications), the government must show both a
compelling interest and that the program is narrowly tailored to that interest. When structured
legal analysis identifies two or more elements, factors, or prongs as required to resolve a
particular issue, there is an argument that a court’s consideration of any one of these should
count as a holding even if that portion of the analysis is nonsupportive, because consideration of
elements of a structured analysis might not seem like a mere aside.70
With unstructured analysis, in contrast, the courts may consider various issues, but there
is no legal test or doctrine that explicitly ties those issues together or requires their collective
resolution. One might imagine a hypothetical Bakke decided in a world in which there was no
such thing as strict scrutiny. The Court might still have been willing to entertain arguments about
issues such as the importance of diversity and whether the Davis program was genuinely geared
to advancing this interest. But those two considerations would not have resulted from any test or
doctrine that identified them as the exclusive issues of interest or as related factors driving the
result on one issue. While common law courts often apply doctrinal tests,71 they also often
engage in case-by- case reasoning in which the import of any portion of the analysis is not
specified in advance. Another example of unstructured analysis might be a case in which a
litigant has made two distinct challenges to a statute, for example under the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and under a parallel state constitutional provision. In such a case, in
contrast to the hypothetical Bakke without a formulated strict scrutiny test, the relationship of
each issue to the disposition of the case would be clear. As with the Bakke hypothetical,
however, there would be no test or doctrine tying the two issues together (after all, if the case had
arisen in a state without such a constitutional provision, the state issue would not even have
arisen), and so we would label the relationship between the two issues to be unstructured.72
70

We recognize that the phrase “a mere aside” is question-begging, and we will defend our conclusions about structured analysis
more rigorously later. See infra Part III.C.4. Our immediate purpose is simply to identify a potential reason for deviating from the
presumptive definition of holding.
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There is a further important distinction within the category of structured analysis,
between ordered and unordered analysis. Even though Justice Powell’s statement of the strict
scrutiny test in statement (3) mentions the tailoring issue before the compelling interest issue, it
might appear that the most natural order for strict scrutiny analysis is to consider the compelling
interest issue first. Lawyers might intuit that one should resolve pure questions of law, such as
whether an interest is compelling, before resolving applications of law to fact, such as assessing
whether a particular program is narrowly tailored to an interest. Moreover, the narrow tailoring
prong requires for its application at a mimimum the assumption of an interest to which the
program will be linked. In contrast, the compelling interest prong does require any understanding
about the program that must be linked to that interest based upon narrow tailoring. Lawyers
might therefore intuit, rightly or wrongly, that because the reverse of the conventional
application of the test would require the following a three step analysis—(1) a presumed interest,
(2) an assessment linking the program to the interest based upon narrow tailoring, and (3) a
determination whether the assumed interest is compelling—the more logical approach is instead
a straightforward two-step analysis in which we first assess whether the interest is compelling
and only then assess narrow tailoring.
The judgment that the strict scrutiny test has a natural order, however, may be based as
much on aesthetics as on logic. The following wording of a strict scrutiny test seems natural
enough and would seem to imply a different order: “The state must prove its challenged law is
narrowly tailored to serve a proffered governmental interest, and further establish that the
proffered interest is compelling.” A requirement that a classification be tailored to serve a
proffered governmental interest, which is then established as compelling seems to differ only in
emphasis from Justice Powell’s requirement that a classification be narrowly “tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.”73 If forced to choose which of the strict scrutiny prongs
comes first, most constitutional lawyers, we suspect, would choose the compelling interest
prong. This intuition, however, appears to be largely a function of custom, and the fact that in the
English language, the wording Justice Powell used happens to be more elegant and compact than
the alternative. We thus recognize that lawyers may disagree about the most natural order of
Amendment, a court must find a violation of one of its clauses. Our tendency, however, is to see this as an example of
unstructured analysis, because there is no doctrinal interdependence between or among the individual constitutional claims and
because these issues are frequently, indeed most commonly, raised in isolation of one another.
73
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many legal tests, not limited to strict scrutiny, and about whether some legal tests are ordered at
all.
Different tests and doctrines lie along a continuum with respect to how strongly or
weakly ordered they are, although individual tests might prove difficult to classify. Atone end of
the continuum lies rigidly ordered doctrine, for which a court is absolutely required to consider
one issue before another. The paradigmatic example is that courts must resolve certain threshold
issues, such as standing, favorably to the claimant before considering the merits of a case.74 If
that is the right end of the continuum, then slightly to the left would be cases in which the
authoritative decisionmaker has definitively indicated that there is a typical, or seemingly
natural, order, but that in an extraordinary case, a court might approach issues in a different
order. An example of this is the general principle that issues of subject matter jurisdiction should
be resolved before issues of in personam jurisdiction, given that a defect in personal jurisdiction,
unlike a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived. The Supreme Court has recognized
this principle but decided that it is not absolute.75 Loosely ordered tests like strict scrutiny are
further to the left of the continuum. And to the far left are multifactor tests where there is no
priority, or interdependence, among the various identified factors.76
Regardless of whether analysis is unstructured, structured but unordered, or structured
and ordered, in the course of its written opinion, a court will necessarily consider the issues that
it addresses in a chosen order. The ordering of issues within a judicial opinion presents an
additional distinction potentially relevant to assessing whether nonsupportive propositions
should be credited as holdings. Sometimes, by the time the court reaches a particular issue in its
opinion, it will be clear, even placing aside any clues from an introductory roadmap that the case
may provide, that because of the manner in which the court has resolved the other case issues,
the resolution of the remaining issue cannot affect the case judgment regardless of how it is
resolved. Although the issue may have been potentially supportive at various points in the case
or on appeal, thus motivating counsel to advance arguments concerning its preferred resolution,
it has become nonsupportive by virtue of the court’s prior resolution of issues that proved
74

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (rejecting the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction),
discussed infra text accompanying notes x-x.
75
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (finding that questions of subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily
should, but need not always, analytically precede questions of personal jurisdiction), discussed infra notes x-x.
76
For a discussion of one such test, see infra Part V.C.
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controlling earlier in the opinion. Of course this is not always the case, and quite frequently, the
court will resolve issues early on in an opinion in a manner that requires the resolution of other
supportive issues to determine the ultimate judgment.77 The distinction that we are drawing is
whether an issue is or is not of continuing relevance, in the sense of potentially affecting the
outcome, by the time a court addresses that issue in its opinion based upon the manner in which
it has already resolved the preceding issues in the same opinion. When issues have continuing
relevance at the point at which the court addresses them in its opinion, there is an argument for
considering the resolution of those issues to constitute holdings, even though in the final analysis
the resolution might prove nonsupportive.
Overlaying the distinction between continuing relevance and no continuing relevance
onto the three-way distinction among unstructured, structured but unordered, and structured and
ordered analyses produces six possible classifications for nonsupportive propositions. In addition
to these six categories, it is possible for a proposition to be absolutely irrelevant in the sense that
nothing would turn on its resolution regardless of the order in which the court considered it
relative to the remaining issues discussed in the opinion. Table 1 places the seven resulting
categories of nonsupportive propositions along a continuum representing the strength of the
presumption favoring, or disfavoring, holding status. Absolutely irrelevant propositions present
the strongest case for disfavoring holding status, or for presuming dicta. The case of an ordered
test where the nonsupportive proposition remains relevant at the point of the analysis where the
court considered it presents the strongest case for crediting nonsupportive propositions as
holdings. If a court must find A and then B in that order to rule for a party, and the court finds A
but then concludes not B, there is a strong argument that A, even though it is ultimately a
nonsupportive proposition, should count as a holding. Because there is a continuum representing
the degree to which tests are or are not ordered, there is also a continuum from “structured but
unordered, continuing relevance” to “structured and ordered, continuing relevance.” For reasons
that we will elaborate later,78 the closer a proposition on this continuum is to being a structured
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A simple example: Finding that jurisdiction or standing is met invites resolution of the supportive issues addressing the merits
of the case.
78
One way to think of this is to recognize that when a test is implicated in a proper case, random factors beyond the control of
the court present the need to apply the test and, as a result, there is little risk that applying the entire test is the product of judicial
manipulation. See infra Part III.C.4.
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and ordered proposition with continuing relevance, the stronger will be its claim to the status of
holding.
The examples in the table are based upon three hypotheticals. The first, the paradigm of
ordered analysis, is a case in which because standing is jurisdictional, the court must resolve
standing in favor of the claimant before it addresses the merits. The second, an example of an
unstructured analysis, is a case in which a plaintiff challenges a statute banning the advertising of
handguns on both First Amendment and Second Amendment grounds; to prevail the plaintiff
needs to succeed on either ground. The third, an example of a structured but unordered analysis,
is a case in which a plaintiff challenges a state’s refusal to honor a gay marriage from another
state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause; to prevail, the plaintiff must establish that the
marriage should count as a “public act” or as a “judicial proceeding” of the other state.79 In all
these examples, we assume that there are no other contested issues in the case.

Stronger claim to holding

Table 1. Types of nonsupportive propositions80
Category

Example

(1) Absolutely irrelevant

In any of the three hypotheticals, the court mentions that Michael
Jordan is the greatest basketball player ever. This could not affect
the outcome of the case regardless of how the court resolved the
other propositions, and would thus clearly have no precedential
value in a subsequent case in which Jordan sues on a contract in
which, for good consideration, he is promised a large bonus if he
establishes a reputation as the greatest basketball player ever.
In the threshold issue hypothetical, the court finds that the plaintiff
does not have standing, but then rules that the plaintiff’s argument
on the merits is correct. The resolution of the merits issue is an
ordered nonsupportive proposition that has no continuing relevance
at the time the court considers the issue.
In the handgun advertising hypothetical, the court strikes down the
statute on First Amendment grounds, but then finds that the Second
Amendment would not provide a basis for striking down the statute.
The latter conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that is part of an
unstructured analysis and that has no continuing relevance by the
time the court considers the issue.

(2) Structured and ordered, with no continuing
relevance

(3) Unstructured, with no continuing relevance
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See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). See generally Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604 (1997) (discussing the applicability of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to the question of gay marriage).
80

This table arranges nonsupportive propositions along a continuum, from weakest presumptive claims to holding status at the
top to strongest presumptive claims to holding status at the bottom. The broken line between rows (4) and (5) signifies that while
we believe that there is a stronger claim to holding for propositions with no continuing relevance but that form part of a
structured and unordered analysis, we recognize that others might instead view the distinction between continuing relevance and
no continuing relevance as more important than that between structured and unstructured, in which case a proposition that is part
of an unstructured analysis with continuing relevance would be entitled to a relatively stronger presumption of holding status.
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(4) Structured but unordered, with no continuing
relevance

(5) Unstructured, with continuing relevance

(6) Structured but unordered, with continuing
relevance

(7) Structured and ordered, with continuing
relevance

In the gay marriage hypothetical, the court finds that the marriage is
a “public act,” and is thus entitled to Full Faith and Credit, and then
concludes that the marriage would not count as a “judicial
proceeding.” The latter conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that
is part of a structured, but unordered analysis and that has no
continuing relevance by the time the court considers the issue.
In the handgun advertising hypothetical, the court rejects the First
Amendment argument, but then strikes down the statute on Second
Amendment grounds. The former conclusion is a nonsupportive
proposition that is part of an unstructured analysis, but that had
continuing relevance at the time the court considered the issue.
In the gay marriage hypothetical, the court finds that the marriage is
not a “public act,” but then concludes that the marriage was a
“judicial proceeding,” and is thus entitled to Full Faith and Credit
Clause protection. The conclusion with respect to “public act” is a
nonsupportive proposition that is part of a structured but unordered
analysis, but that had continuing relevance at the time the court
considered the issue.
In the threshold issue hypothetical, the court finds that the plaintiff
has standing but then rules against the plaintiff on the merits. The
former conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that is part of an
ordered analysis that had continuing relevance at the time the court
considered the issue.

So far, we have considered the problem of ordered analysis only with respect to
nonsupportive propositions. The problem of ordered analysis, however, may also imply that
some supportive propositions, which presumptively count as holding, should instead be
discounted as dicta. The analysis is simpler for supportive propositions, however, because there
is only one category—structured and ordered, with no continuing relevance—that presents an
argument for converting holding to dicta.81 Where a test is ordered, and the court resolves the
first prong of the test in a way that determines the outcome under the test as a whole, there is a
strong argument that the court’s resolution of the second prong should be discounted as dicta
even if it would otherwise count as an alternative justification and a holding. Suppose, for
example, that a court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and yet proceeded to resolve the
merits.82 If the court resolved the merits against the petitioner,83 the resolution of the merits might
81

The other categories at most simply restate the problem of alternative justifications. Consider, for example, supportive
propositions in unstructured analysis with no continuing relevance. In a variation on the handgun advertising hypothetical
depicted in row (3) in Table 1, suppose the court strikes down the statute on First Amendment grounds, but now finds that the
Second Amendment provides an additional basis for striking down the statute. The Second Amendment conclusion is a
supportive proposition that is part of an unstructured analysis, but that has no continuing relevance at the time the court considers
the issue. Whether this proposition should count as a holding or dicta depends entirely on the problem of alternative
justifications.
82
See infra text accompanying notes x-x (discussing hypothetical jurisdiction).
83
For an infamous illustration of a case fitting this paradigm, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), where
having found no diversity jurisdiction, because Dred Scott was not a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under
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be seen as an alternative justification for the petitioner to lose. Nonetheless, the problem of
structured and ordered analysis would provide an argument for discounting the merits resolution
as dicta even if alternative justifications are generally holdings.
ii.

Theproblem of hypotheticals

The analysis so far has provided an interpretation of Powell’s argument that would make
statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) a supportive
proposition, and thus applying our definition, presumptively a holding.84 Even so, there may be
another argument for denying holding status to statement (8). The court’s analysis of the Harvard
plan is counterfactual. Statement (8) can be interpreted as a conditional statement: “If a plan has
the characteristics of the Harvard plan, then it will not hinder achievement of genuine diversity.”
The antecedent of that statement— “a plan has the characteristics of the Harvard plan”—is false
in Bakke, because the Davis plan did not have the characteristics of the Harvard plan. If a
Harvard-like plan were presented in a subsequent case, a lawyer challenging the program might
argue that even if statement (8) formed a part of Powell’s Bakke analysis in a manner that
ordinarily would entitle it to presumptive holding status, the counterfactual nature of the
statement should suffice to rebut that presumption.
We will label this the problem of hypotheticals. Reasoning about actual cases based upon
hypothesized case facts implicating significantly distinguishable cases yet to be presented is not
only not unusual, it is the standard fare of judging. Judges frequently pose hypotheticals about
undecided cases in oral arguments, and analogical reasoning is frequently reflected in published
opinions.85 A judge in Case A might conclude that Case A is sufficiently similar to Case B, a case
with different facts, that they should produce the same result. That poses no problem for our
purposes if the outcome in Case B is already clear by virtue of a prior holding. It might pose a
problem, however, if the outcome in Case B is not resolved, and the judge in Case A anticipates a
result in Case B to facilitate its resolution in the case before it.86 Does an anticipated result of
Article III of the United States Constitution, the Court nevertheless proceeded to reach the merits of the case, striking down the
Missouri Compromise. For a critical analysis of the first holding, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39
(1997).
84
See supra notes 63- 69and accompanying text.
85
Assessments of the usefulness of analogical reasoning in judicial opinions include Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning:
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Emily Sherwin,
A Defense of Analogical Reasoning, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999); and Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993)
86
As an example, suppose a court faces a case involving whether flag burning should receive First Amendment protection. The
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Case B count as a holding about how to resolve those facts, if the anticipation itself forms a
sufficiently integral part of the reasoning that, were it not counterfactual, it would count as a
holding of Case A? Analogical reasoning is undoubtedly important in allowing judges to sharpen
their analyses of factual and legal issues presented on appeal, but this does not necessarily mean
that analogical reasoning creates additional holdings.87
iii.

The problem of biconditional statements

The analogical reasoning problem presents a possible reason for counting statement (8) (a
plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) as dicta even if it is a presumptive
holding, and statement (8) also must count as presumptive dicta if interpreted as a nonsupportive
proposition.88 Either way, the problem of biconditional statements provides an argument for
counting statement (8) as holding. The argument is that even if the propositions related to the
Harvard plan were irrelevant in the formal sense that they did not lead to the case result, they
were relevant in the sense that they articulated a resolution of the central issue of the case. That
issue is the extent to which it is acceptable for government educational institutions to use race as
a consideration. In this sense, endorsement of statement (8) and other statements concerning the
Harvard plan were indeed supportive of the court’s resolution of this issue and were not
hypothetical.
Justice Powell himself came close to justifying the Harvard discussion on this basis.
Countering a complaint89 from Justice Stevens that his opinion had gone further than necessary
court might reason that flag burning should be treated like cross burning, and even though the court might never have considered
cross burning, the court might conclude that cross burning should receive First Amendment protection and therefore that flag
burning therefore should as well. (For consideration of the flag burning-cross burning analogy in the analogical reasoning
literature, see Sunstein, supra note 85, at 759-61.) The question is whether this creates a holding as to cross burning, should that
issue subsequently come before the court.
87
The analogical reasoning in statements (7) and (8) arguably differ from conventional analogical reasoning, because the
statements are being used to address legal questions the resolutions of which arguably require a form of analogical reasoning. An
analysis of the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny demands the identification or rejection of a more narrowly tailored
alternative. See supra note 64. Thus, use of analogical reasoning may be necessary rather than merely sufficient to establish some
higher-order proposition. In the end, though, this argument is a nonstarter. Even if the court must use analogical reasoning to
assess a particular proposition, there would be no requirement that it use any particular analogy.
88
See supra text accompanying note 66.
89
Justice Stevens’s criticism that Justice Powell engaged in an unnecessary discussion demonstrates that the distinction between
holding and dicta not only affects what future courts will consider authoritative in a precedent-setting opinion, but also might
affect the precedent-setting court’s own determination of how much to say. Thus, while some jurists might willingly defend
against accusations of claiming holding status for what is arguably dicta, as Powell appears to have done regarding statement (5),
or happily admit to authoring dicta without making this stronger claim, others might see dicta as something that is best avoided.
See, e.g., Hollister Convalescent Hosp.., Inc v. Rico, 542 P.2d 1349, 1356-58 (Cal. 1975) (referring to “unnecessary and
overbroad dicta,” “ill-considered dicta,” “erroneous dicta,” “panoramic dicta,” and “persistent dicta”); see also infra Part III.B
(arguing that opinions closely tied to the material facts of a case may be normatively preferable to opinions that stray from the
material facts).
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to resolve the case,90 Powell noted that the lower court had rejected the Davis plan on the broad
ground that Davis had considered race at all, rather than on the potentially narrower ground that
Davis had improperly employed race in the form of a quota.91 The reference to the lower court
might obscure the point. Whether a statement in a Supreme Court opinion is holding or dicta
depends on the issue presented to the Supreme Court, not on the issues that the lower court
happened to discuss. 92 If, for example, the lower court had also explored an argument by Bakke
that he was the victim of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari on
this basis, that issue would not be before the Court. Or, if the lower court had itself reached
propositions that count as dicta, the lower court’s decision to do so would not make the Supreme
Court’s decision to repeat or refute those statements holdings. The Supreme Court itself has
stated that it “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.”93
Conceived in its best light, Powell’s point is not so much that the issue of whether race
could be used was resolved in the lower court, but that the issue of whether race could be used
was before the Supreme Court itself.94 Powell’s analysis of the Harvard plan constituted part of
his resolution of this question. Let us now imagine that Powell had organized his opinion
differently. Powell might have started with the question whether race constitutionally could be
considered in admissions decisions, concluding that such consideration was acceptable as long as
race was used as a plus factor rather than as a quota, and then considered how his resolution
90

Justice Stevens noted that, following the California Supreme Court ruling, there was no “outstanding injunction forbidding any
consideration of racial criteria in processing applications.” 438 U.S. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens concluded: “It is therefore perfectly clear that the question whether race can ever be used as a
factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate.” Id. at 411. For a
critique of Powell’s opinion along these lines, see Arval A. Morris, The Bakke Decision: One Holding or Two, 58 OR. L. REV.
311, 326-32 (1979).
91
438 U.S. at 271 n.** (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that the California Supreme Court opinion “left no doubt that the reason
for its holding was petitioner’s use of race in consideration of any candidate’s application”). Justice Powell also emphasized that
the medical school “cross-complained in the trial court for a declaratory judgment that its special program was constitutional.” Id.
That a party sought declaratory judgment in a suit, however, ordinarily would not be thought of as allowing the courts to consider
issues beyond the controversy between those parties. See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)
(noting that jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suits is limited to the actual controversy between the parties).
92
See Morris, supra note 90, at 331 (“If each reason given by a lower court in support of its judgment constituted an issue
properly before the United States Supreme Court, the consequences would be chaos.”). A higher court can choose not to pass on
many propositions made by a lower court. A reviewing court, reaching the same result on a narrower ground as the court below,
has elected to hold off resolution on the broader ground unless and until a case arises that disallows resolution on the selected
narrower ground and that instead demands resolution—in either direction—on the broader ground. Justice Powell’s implication
that he was forced to reach the issue because the lower court mentioned it thus seems unpersuasive. Whether or not he was
compelled to do so, however, does not answer whether Powell overreached in electing to reach the issue arising at the broader
level, specifically whether the use was altogether impermissible.
93
Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956).
94
These are admittedly connected. The issue was before the Supreme Court in part because it had previously been resolved in the
lower court, and also because the Court had granted certiorari on that issue.
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applied to the facts of the Davis plan, concluding that the Davis plan counted as an illicit quota.
Even if the Harvard plan were used as an example to explain the plus factor concept, the
conclusion that race can be used as a consideration and the distinction between a plus factor and
a quota no longer would seem to be as much of a detour.
Our point is not to criticize the internal organization of Powell’s opinion, but rather to
recognize that in that opinion, Justice Powell effectively created a test for whether use of race in
admissions decisions is constitutional. While subsequent commentators unmistakably
extrapolated the test from Powell’s analysis,95 surprisingly, the observation that it was a test did
not appear to factor into anyone’s analysis of whether the discussion of the Harvard plan was
holding or dicta.96 Tests, of course, are ubiquitous in law,97 and we have already seen that
statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny) adopted a test to be applied to
affirmative action plans. A court’s decision to formulate a test may present two distinct
problems, which we will refer to as the issue of biconditional statements and the issue of
breadth.
We will first consider biconditional statements. If we accept the proposition that equal
protection condones some benign use of race, we might imagine a boundary that divides
permissible from prohibited methods of using race. According to the Bakke Court, the Davis
quota plan was on the wrong side of that line. Powell could have made clear that the Davis
program was on the wrong side of the line without making clear exactly where the line was. 98
For example, he might have written, “A quota will never be narrowly tailored to the goal of
improving diversity. Whether a race classification other than a quota, such as Harvard’s plus
factor plan, can be narrowly tailored is a question for another day.”

95

See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative
Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 924 (1983) (noting that Justice Powell distinguished between programs that used race as a plus
factor and those that used race to justify quotas).
96
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the prior literature assessing the holding-dicta distinction in Bakke).
97
See Fallon, supra note 71,at 67 -73 (offering a typology of eight different kinds of tests in constitutional law).
98
Those who joined the Stevens opinion in Bakke would have held that any use of race violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and thus indicated that the Davis plan was far from the boundary line for the permissive use of race. See supra note 31.
Justice Powell, in contrast, elected to inform courts and relevant state actors that in his view, the Davis plan was sufficiently close
to the boundary line that with some modifications, Davis could salvage its affirmative action program. Had Powell been unable to
make that proffer, it is at least conceivable that he might have preferred to endorse the Davis plan in full, rather than risk
signaling that any use of race—including the Harvard plan which he endorsed—was illicit. See infra note x and accompanying
text.
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Such an opinion would have endorsed the proposition “if quota, then not narrowly
tailored,” but it would have said nothing about the inverse99 proposition “if not quota, then
narrowly tailored” (or, what amounts to the same thing, “if instead a plus factor approach, then
narrowly tailored”). Justice Powell’s opinion, however, endorsed both the proposition, in
statement (7) (focusing exclusively on race would hinder genuine diversity), and its inverse, in
statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder attainment of diversity). The test that Powell
created is thus the biconditional statement “if and only if a quota, then not narrowly tailored.”
The biconditional statement issue is whether this statement counts as a holding, assuming that
statement (7) would count as a holding, in which case statement (8) should count as a holding as
well.
iv.

The problem of breadth

Powell’s endorsement of the quota test also presents the related but analytically separate
problem of breadth. Powell might have described the facts of the Davis plan, and concluded,
based upon the aggregation of those facts, that the program failed narrow tailoring. This
presumably would have produced a holding—“if a program is just like the Davis program, then it
is not narrowly tailored”—but the holding would be extremely limited. That might be the
narrowest possible proposition that would support the judgment, but Powell also might have
made some other generalizations in between this level of generality and the level of generality
that he ultimately chose. For example, Justice Powell might have singled out schools that have
racial quotas but that do not also ensure a minimum number of places for applicants with other
qualities.100 Alternatively, Powell might have endorsed only the proposition that “if a race-based
quota is used in a graduate admissions program, then it is unconstitutional,” leaving aside the
question of race-based quotas at other educational institutions. In sum, Powell could have chosen
narrower reasoning than he apparently selected without affecting the ultimate case judgment.
The question is whether a judge’s decision to endorse a broader proposition than necessary in
99

The implication “if not p, then not q” is the inverse of the statement “if p, then q.” The inverse is thus the contrapositive of and
logically equivalent to the converse (if q, then p). See, e.g., http://www.jimloy.com/logic/converse.htm (last visited September 2,
2004) (discussing the definition of converse, inverse, and contrapositive).
100
Powell disliked the Davis program because racial minorities were singled out for special treatment, unlike those with
“exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.” 438 U.S. at
317 (opinion of Powell, J.). Powell’s opinion suggests that it might have been sufficient to sustain the program had Davis singled
out additional groups for reserved places that are not open to the general applicant pool. Whether or not this is a satisfactory
reading of Bakke, the analysis reveals that an author of an opinion must select from a continuum of breadth.
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resolving a case makes the broader selected proposition dicta. We will eventually conclude that it
does not.101
The breadth issue affects whether a later court may distinguish a precedent from an
earlier court. A later court cannot distinguish a prior case in a way that is contrary to any of that
case’s holdings. If Justice Powell had issued only the narrowest possible ruling, focusing only on
the facts, then a later court could have distinguished Bakke easily. For example, a court might
have concluded that a program just like the Davis plan, but with a smaller percentage of spaces
reserved for minority students, was acceptable. Given Bakke as written, a later court
distinguishing Bakke on the same ground would need to conclude, explicitly or implicitly, either
that Powell’s reasoning did not endorse the proposition that racial quotas are unconstitutional or
that the proposition was dicta. Otherwise, the distinguishing court would seem disingenuous. Our
analysis cannot do all the work of clarifying when it is permissible for a later court to distinguish
a prior case, of course. That will also depend on resolution of ambiguities about what
propositions the precedent-setting court indeed endorsed.102
If unnecessary breadth makes a statement dicta, then both statements (7) (focusing
exclusively on race would hinder genuine diversity) and (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder
the attainment of diversity) would be dicta because the biconditional statement analysis above
suggested that statement (8) might be a holding only on the assumption that statement (7) counts
as a holding. Let us, however, assume (as we will later conclude103) that broad statements do not
make statements dicta. The final statement other than the disposition, statement (9) (the Harvard
plan would be constitutional), is easily analyzed. Statement (9) followed logically only because
Powell had already endorsed statement (6) (diversity is a compelling interest).104 Against the
backdrop of the remaining statements, given either statements (6) or (9), the other statement
101

As we will later demonstrate, see infra notes x-x and accompanying text, an understanding of holding that would relegate to
the status of dicta any rationale that is broader than necessary in resolving a particular case operates in tension with the Supreme
Court’s narrowest grounds rule articulated in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1973). Such an understanding would
suggest that the Court’s holding is limited to the narrowest possible grounds even when a majority, or indeed a unanimous Court,
stands united behind a broader rationale in support of the ultimate case disposition.
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See infra Part III.C.7.
It might appear that statement (9) also presents the problem of breadth, because the court concludes that a plus factor
approach would be constitutional, rather than merely drawing the narrower conclusion that a plus factor approach is narrowly
tailored. But this issue is analytically distinct from the problem of breadth. Consider statement (9) in conditional form: “if a
program uses a plus factor approach, then constitutional.” The problem of breadth concerns the antecedent to this conditional (a
program uses a plus factor approach), not the consequent. Whether the breadth of the consequent should count as a holding
depends on whether statement (6) counts as a holding.

104
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follows as a corollary. Where a statement’s truth depends on that of other statements, it logically
can count as a holding only if the other statements count as holdings.
3. Summary and Comparison with Previous Analyses
We have now completed the necessary analytical apparatus with which to analyze Justice
Powell’s Bakke opinion. Table 2 includes in the first column each of the propositions discussed
above. The second column states whether the identified proposition is necessary or sufficient to
some higher-order proposition in the case, and the third column states whether this classification
makes it a supportive proposition, thus warranting presumptive holding status, or a
nonsupportive proposition, thus warranting presumptive dicta status. Finally, the fourth column
identifies the reasons that the presumptive status accorded each proposition in the third column
might be rebutted, thus discounting some presumptive holdings as dicta and crediting some
presumptive dicta to holding. Because statement (8) is ambiguous,105 we have offered two
constructions, each with its own analysis.
Table 2. The Bakke Propositions and their Presumptive and Ultimate Holding-Dicta Classifications
Proposition

Classification of
proposition

Presumptive
status

Possible rationales for rebutting
presumptive holding or dicta
status

(1) Davis program is
race-based.
(2) Equal protection
protects nonminorities.
(3) All race classifications
are subject to strict
scrutiny.

Necessary to statement (10)

Holding

None

Necessary to statement (10)

Holding

None

Test; selection of some test was
necessary to statement (10)

Holding

(4) Remedying the
present effects of past
discrimination is not a
compelling interest.
(5) Improving health
services for
underprivileged
communities was not
shown to be a goal to
which program was
narrowly tailored.

Sufficient for proposition that goal
of remedying the present effects
of past discrimination does not
pass strict scrutiny
Sufficient for proposition that goal
of improving health services for
underprivileged communities
does not pass strict scrutiny

Holding

Problem of alternative possible
justifications; the Court might have
instead concluded that the Davis
program failed a laxer test.
Problem of alternative possible
justifications; the same result could be
achieved under strict scrutiny by refuting
narrow tailoring.
Problem of alternative possible
justifications; the same result could be
achieved under strict scrutiny by finding
no compelling state interest.
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Holding

See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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Proposition

Classification of
proposition

Presumptive
status

Possible rationales for rebutting
presumptive holding or dicta
status

(6) Diversity is a
compelling interest.

Nonsupportive proposition

Dicta

(7) Focusing exclusively
on race by means of a
quota would hinder
genuine diversity.

Sufficient for proposition that
Davis program is not narrowly
tailored to goal of achieving
diversity

Holding

(8) A plus factor plan
would not hinder
attainment of diversity.

Arguably nonsupportive
proposition

Dicta

Arguably sufficient for proposition
that Davis program is not
narrowly tailored to goal of
achieving diversity

Holding

Nonsupportive proposition

Dicta

Problem of structured analysis; the
compelling interest prong is a part of the
structured strict scrutiny analysis and
arguably is ordered first in that analysis.
(1) Problem of alternative justifications;
the second interpretation of statement (8)
is also sufficient for the proposition that
the Davis program is not narrowly
tailored to goal of achieving diversity.
(2) Problem of breadth; Powell could
have issued a narrower holding.
Problem of biconditional statements,
assuming that (7) is a holding; Powell
established the quota vs. plus factor
dichotomy as the means of determining
narrow tailoring.
(1) Problem of alternative justifications;
statement (7) is also sufficient for the
proposition that the Davis plan is not
narrowly tailored to goal of achieving
diversity.
(2) Problem of breadth; Powell did not
have to resolve the constitutional status
of all plus factor plans.
(3) Problem of hypotheticals; the plan at
issue was not a plus factor plan.
(Note: If any of these three is adequate to
convert the presumptive status, then the
problem of biconditional statements
might convert the status to dicta.)
As corollary of (6) and (8)

The disposition

Holding

None

(9) The Harvard plan
would be constitutional.
(10) The Davis plan is
unconstitutional.

Determining the status of Justice Powell’s discussion concerning the Harvard plan, and
specifically whether any conclusions reached were dicta or holding, had significant implications
for lower court litigation about affirmative action. And yet, those courts never adequately
confronted the governing definitional issues. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, concluded, “We
do not believe that Justice Powell's opinion is binding, and his discussion of the Harvard Plan
was entirely dicta.”106 While that court rested the first conclusion on its analysis that the Marks
narrowest grounds doctrine cannot be applied to Bakke,107 the more important point for present
106
107

Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1246-47. But see supra note 37 (arguing that the Powell opinion necessarily is controlling under Marks).
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purposes is that it offered no justification at all for the second conclusion.108 The Sixth Circuit
noted the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion but declined to address whether the Eleventh Circuit was
correct. “Even if this portion of Justice Powell’s opinion could be labeled dicta, it is nevertheless
dicta from the determinative opinion in the only Supreme Court case to address the consideration
of race and ethnicity in academic admissions,” the court observed, concluding that it therefore
carries “considerable persuasive authority.”109
Legal scholars have considered the question whether the discussion of the Harvard plan
should be treated as dicta in greater detail, but even those discussions have not identified the
critical issues that we have shown here. In an informative discussion, Alan Meese argues, “The
language approving the use of a plus system . . . was plainly gratuitous, dealing, as it did, with an
issue—and an admissions program—that was not before the Court. This language was dicta
under the conventional definition.”110 Meese is correct that the Harvard plan was not directly
before the Court, and perhaps that alone might be viewed by some as sufficient to remove
Powell’s conclusions concerning plus-factor plans from the category of holding. But as
demonstrated above, one can argue that Powell’s discussion of the Harvard plan was not
gratuitous at all. Rather, the discussion was arguably essential to the narrow tailoring analysis of
the Davis plan and within the confines of that discussion, merely constituting the “and only if”
portion of his proffered biconditional holding on narrow tailoring. We will assess later whether
that should count as enough, and while Meese has accurately described a “conventional
definition” of dicta insofar as one exists, his lack of attention to this point of logical structure
reflects the broader lack of attention in the scholarly literature.
The status of Justice Powell’s discussion was particularly critical to lower court litigation,
because once lower courts identify a Supreme Court holding, they must follow it under the rule
of vertical stare decisis.111 The definitions of holding and dicta, however, also matter to the
108

The district court offered only a slightly more detailed justification of this position. “Powell’s view as to the validity of a
‘Harvard-style’ admissions system was mere dicta and not a holding in any event, since Bakke concerned a dual-track program
rather than a ‘plus factor’ program like Harvard’s or UGA’s.” Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
109
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746 n.9 (2002) (en banc), aff’d, 2003 WL 21433492 (U.S. June 23, 2003) (No. 02-241).
110
Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 381, 383 & n.12 (1998) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of
dicta). Meese’s application of the conventional definition seems reasonable, subject to the caveat that at least to Powell, the
evaluation of the Harvard program may in fact have been necessary. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. We will argue,
however, that the conventional definition is flawed and inconsistent with conventional practice. See infra Part IV.A.3.
111
Under State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989), lower federal courts and state courts are prohibited from anticipatorily overruling Supreme Court precedents

36

application of horizontal stare decisis, both at the circuit court level (where previous decisions
are binding except in the unusual case of a prior panel decision that is vacated pursuant to en
banc reconsideration or an intervening Supreme Court case that demonstrates that the prior panel
case rests upon discredited precedent),112 and in the Supreme Court. In the recent Supreme Court
affirmative action litigation,113 most of the briefs ignored the issue.114 Perhaps the absence of
discussion is attributable to a strong intuitive sense that Justice Powell’s discussion of the Davis
plan was dicta. The failure of affirmative action’s opponents even to make any rigorous attack on
the characterization of the Harvard plan as holding, however, reflects problems with existing
definitions of dicta and the failure of commentators more broadly to consider the definitional
question with precision.
Admittedly, the distinction should have mattered less than it would have had the relevant
portion of Justice Powell’s opinion been set out in a majority opinion. Had the Court wished to
deviate from Powell’s conclusions, it could have simply observed that whether or not the Powell
opinion resolved Bakke on the narrowest grounds, the Supreme Court, unlike lower federal
courts and state courts, need adhere only to precedents established in its own majority
decisions.115 And while Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, adopted more or
less in full Justice Powell’s Bakke analysis, she did so while claiming no need to resolve whether
Powell’s Bakke opinion was a binding precedent under the narrowest grounds rule.116 After all,
whether a statement is holding or dicta does not matter much if the subsequent court concurs
with the merits of the stated proposition. Yet, at various points in her opinion, O’Connor justified
based upon subsequent case law developments. Instead, lower federal courts and state court must wait until an express overruling
by the Supreme Court itself. If one accepts the premise that both halves of Powell’s Bakke opinion—striking Davis’s use of race,
while allowing some use of race in the form of a plus factor—expressed the holding under the narrowest grounds rule, then
Hopwood v. Texas, 732 F.2d 932, 968 (5th Cir. 1996), which struck down the University of Texas Law School affirmative action
program based largely upon post-Bakke developments in the Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence, violated the principle
expressed in Khan and de Ouijas. For further discussion of Hopwood, see infra notes 309-315.
112
See supra note x and accompanying text.
113
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
114
For a notable exception, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Neither Party at 1315, 2003 WL 164165, Grutter(No. 02 -241). This brief concludes that Powell’s discussion of the Harvard plan is dicta, based on a
definition offered by Arthur Goodhart. Id. We will critique that definition later. See infra Part IV.A.2.
115
See supra note 38. This approach would have served the dual purposes of enabling the Supreme Court both to extricate itself
from Powell’s idiosyncratic approach to affirmative action and to remind lower federal courts and state courts of their continuing
obligation to abide all Supreme Court precedents, including narrowest grounds decisions, unless and until the Supreme Court
expressly overturns them, see supra note 111.
116
Justice O’Connor stated that it was unnecessary to perform the Marks inquiry, because “we endorse Justice Powell’s view that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at
325. O’Connor gave no indication that she even recognized the existence of an issue of whether Justice Powell’s comments on
the Harvard plan were dicta.
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her conclusions as much by citing Powell as by developing her own argument.117 Such citations
might have seemed somewhat more persuasive if Powell’s statements were clearly holdings
(even if holdings not entitled to stare decisis weight), and conversely, somewhat less persuasive
if Powell’s statements were clearly dicta.
B. Summary of Identified Problems
We have now created a presumptive definition of holding embracing each statement that
is a supportive proposition, in the sense that it is necessary or sufficient either for the disposition
or for another holding. We now will summarize the problem categories that, assuming that this is
the appropriate presumptive definition,118 might reverse the presumptive classification. Table 3,
which follows, identifies the problems that might turn presumptive holdings into dicta, or that
might turn presumptive dicta into holdings, along with explanations and illustrations from the
preceding discussion. Because the problem of structured analysis may have both effects, it is
listed twice.

117

See, e.g., id. at 337 (“The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions
program is paramount.”) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (opinion of Powell, J.), without offering any additional defense).
118
See infra Part III.D.1-3 (arguing in support of this presumptive definition). If we determined that the problem of alternative
possible justifications and the problem of alternative justifications were both sufficient to turn a holding into dicta, then we would
need to abandon the presumptive definition.
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Table 3. Potentially presumption-altering categories, with explanations and illustrations
Potentially
Presumption-Altering
Category

Explanation

Example from Bakke

Alternative possible
justifications

A and B are propositions that, if accepted,
would each be sufficient for a holding. The
court resolves and accepts A but does not
consider B. The question is whether the
failure to consider B denies A the status of
holding.

Alternative justifications

A and B are propositions that, if accepted,
would each be sufficient for a holding. The
court resolves and accepts both A and B. The
question is whether A and B must both count
as dicta because neither was necessary for
resolution of the case.

Hypotheticals

A is a conditional proposition with an
antecedent that is false on the facts of the
case. The question is whether A should count
as dicta as a result.

Breadth

A is a proposition that is a presumptive
holding, but A is broader than necessary for
the court to reach the disposition. The
question is whether the broader than
necessary portion of the statement is dicta.

Structured analysis (for
presumptive alternative
holdings)

A and B are propositions that are tied
together by a doctrinal test. That test may be
ordered or unordered. For example, suppose
a legal test that the court is applying
considers A before B. The court resolves A in
a way that resolves the test as a whole (either
finding A true if the test is “A or B” or finding A
false if the test is “A and B”), and it then
proceeds to resolve B in the same way. The
question is whether the resolution of B should
count as dicta, assuming that the problem of
alternative justifications does not ordinarily
turn presumptive holdings into dicta.

Justice Powell found that the goal of
remedying past discrimination was not a
compelling interest, but he did not consider
whether the Davis program was narrowly
tailored to this goal. A negative answer to this
question also would have been sufficient for
the proposition that the goal of remedying
past discrimination could not justify the Davis
plan. The question is whether the finding that
remedying past discrimination was not a
compelling interest is a holding.
Justice Powell arguably offered two
justifications for the proposition that the Davis
program failed narrowed tailoring: first, that
the Davis program itself hindered genuine
diversity; and second, that a more narrowly
tailored program, the Harvard plan, would
meet the constitutional requirement. The
question is whether each finding negates the
status of the other as holding.
Justice Powell determined that if an
affirmative action plan were structured like the
Harvard plan, it would be narrowly tailored to
the goal of improving diversity. (Note that
even if the problem of hypotheticals would
make this statement dicta, the problem of
biconditional statements might restore this
particular example to holding status.)
Justice Powell concluded that if a program
uses quotas, it is not narrowly tailored to the
goal of improving diversity. The Court could
have offered a narrower proposition, such as
if a graduate educational program uses
quotas or if it uses quotas based upon a
particular percentage, it is not narrowly
tailored to the goal of improving diversity.
In a hypothetical alternative to Bakke, the
Court concludes that Bakke did not have
standing and that he would have lost anyway
because affirmative action is constitutionally
permissible. Even if the conclusion that
affirmative action is constitutionally
permissible ordinarily would count as a
holding because alternative justifications in
fact do count as holdings, the question is
whether the proposition should count as dicta
since the first prong of the analysis (standing)
made it unnecessary for the Court to consider
the second prong (merits).
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Biconditional statements

A is a holding, and B, which is not a
presumptive holding, is the inverse of A. The
question is whether B’s status as the inverse
of A elevates B to the status of holding.

Structured analysis (for
presumptive dicta)

A legal test that the court is applying
considers A before B. The court resolves A in
a way that does not resolve the test as a
whole (either finding A false if the test is “A or
B” or finding A true if the test is “A and B”),
and it then resolves B in opposite fashion.
Because the stated resolution of A does not
affect the resolution of the test, A is a
nonsupportive proposition and thus
presumptively dicta. Whether A should
nonetheless count as a holding may depend
on the degree to which the test is ordered.

Justice Powell identified as the test for
meeting narrow tailoring to the goal of
diversity whether the program took the form
of a plus-factor plan (permissible) or a quota
(impermissible). Assume that the following
counts as holding: If a program uses quotas,
it is not narrowly tailored to the goal of
improving diversity. Now assume that
biconditional statements count as holdings.
Then, the following would also count as a
holding: A program taking the form of a plus
factor plan is narrowly tailored to further the
goal of academic diversity.
Justice Powell applied the strict scrutiny test,
which may be understood to require first a
compelling interest prong, and second means
that are narrowly tailored in furtherance of
that interest. The Court applied the test in that
order, concluding that diversity was a
compelling interest, but that the Davis plan
was not narrowly tailored to it. The question is
whether the compelling interest conclusion
should be considered a holding because it is
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.

III. POSITIVE MODELS AND NORMATIVE FACTORS

We have now identified several categories of judicial assertions that courts can, and
sometimes do, present as holdings in their judicial opinions. Before reviewing the various
definitions of holding and dicta that have been offered in the literature and presenting our own,
the subject of Part IV, we must lay a proper theoretical foundation to use in evaluating the
various definitions. This task has both a positive and a normative component.
Understanding the conceptual origins and characteristics of stare decisis, and defining
holding and dicta, are distinct but overlapping projects. Each set of inquiries focuses in
significant part on evaluating two aspects of judicial overreaching, first the risk that judges will
present overly broad written opinions as precedent, and second, the risk that judges will
disingenuously construe past precedents to avoid results with which they disagree. As a result, it
is important to our project to understand the role of both sets of legal constraints—stare decisis
and the definitions of holding and dicta—in shaping appropriate judicial behavior. This task
requires that we explore the conceptual foundations and characteristics of stare decisis, and that
we evaluate the extent to which stare decisis itself inhibits the two identified forms of judicial
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overreaching. Once we understand the constraining role of stare decisis, we can better appreciate
any remaining opportunities for these forms of overreaching even with stare decisis in place.
Proper definitions of holding and dicta should be targeted toward reducing (even if they cannot
altogether eliminate) the remaining opportunities for inappropriate judicial behavior.
As we will demonstrate, stare decisis doctrine provides meaningful limits on
opportunities on judicial overreaching. It leaves substantial room, however, for differences
among judges, even when those judges are acting in good faith, respecting the permissible extent
to which a court can properly claim holding status in a given opinion for particular propositions.
It also leaves substantial room for differences as to which a later court can credibly claim a basis
for distinguishing a seemingly problematic precedent.119 While stare decisis provides a core set
of principles for limiting judicial overreaching, it does not answer several of the specific
questions identified in Part II concerning those holding categories that prove the most difficult.
To understand the nature of the limits that stare decisis imposes, it is important to
appreciate the doctrine’s theoretical origins. As we will elaborate,120 prior commentators have
offered models grounded in rational choice theory to demonstrate that even without formally
imposed rules demanding adherence to precedent, judicial systems would develop a legal regime
that employs precedent in some form.121 In addition, commentators have used rational choice to
demonstrate that within a legal system based upon precedent, judges behaving rationally are
motivated to limit, to a considerable extent, the scope of their written opinions. Rational choice
analysis is appealing in this context because it suggests that even if society did not impose formal
obligations on judges to adhere to precedent, or to limit the scope of their opinions in some way,
a system resembling the one that we observe, which possesses these characteristic features,
would likely emerge as a product of the rational expectations of interactive jurists.
While these conclusions are largely compatible with our own analysis, we are less
persuaded that the models developed thus far accurately reflect the dynamics that give rise to the
119

See supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the relationship between the holding-dicta distinction and the task of
distinguishing precedents).
120
See infra Part III.A.
121
One datum strongly supportive of this intuition is that civilian regimes go further than declining to impose an obligation of
precedent, and instead formally eschew precedent. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 144 (1969). While civilian regimes formally reject precedent,
legal scholars have observed that over time, such systems nonetheless begin to resemble common law systems in their effective,
if not formal, reliance upon precedent. See id. (observing that “although there is no formal rule of stare decisis, the practice is for
judges to be influenced by prior decisions”); infra note 263.
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stare decisis doctrine or to the incentives in shaping the judicial writing and construction of
opinions. Exploring the contributions and limits of existing models, and suggesting some modest
refinements, will allow us to appreciate several critical features of stare decisis that are of
particular relevance to our larger project, namely devising theoretically sound and functional
definitions of holding and dicta thatcomplemen t stare decisis in encouraging appropriate judicial
behavior. Refining the existing models allows us to improve upon the explanatory force of
rational choice in providing a theoretical foundation for several important aspects of judicial
practice that we commonly observe. Once we have accurately described the nature and limits of
stare decisis based upon our rational choice model, and have further considered the limits of that
doctrine in properly constraining the two feared manifestations of judicial overreaching that we
have identified,122 we can then evaluate the role of proper understandings of holding and dicta in
furthering appropriate judicial incentives. After we set out our positive model, we will thus
undertake a careful analysis of the various categories of judicial assertions set out in Part II based
upon four normative considerations that are particularly relevant to our larger project.
Before proceeding, we would like to offer a few brief methodological comments. Our
analysis is not intended to suggest (and does not suggest) that judges uniformly exhibit a set of
common behaviors that one can label “rational.” We do not, for example, suggest a single
maximand or utility function that can be superimposed on judges as a class.123 Judges, like
members of any other profession, have a wide range of personal attributes and expectations,
including expectations about their profession. Our goal is not to use rational choice to describe
the psychology of the individual jurist or even of jurists generally. Instead, by developing some
basic suppositions about judges and recognizing that there are exceptions to any characterization
that we make, we can evaluate how the judiciary as an institution is likely to respond to some of
the problematic phenomena that our analysis reveals. We can then further consider how judges
behaving rationally are likely affected by those judicial practices that our analysis predicts will
emerge. The essential intuition that underlies our analysis is merely that institutions are formed
122

See infra Part III.A.
To that extent, we agree with the subtitle of Judge Posner’s essay, responding to the question “What do judges maximize?”
with the reply “the same thing as everyone else.” See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing as
Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). The point of course is that individual preferences—and in this case judicial
preferences—are widely varied. A sound rational choice analysis can account for such differences and still provide insights into
how the judiciary shapes, and is shaped by, the expectations of a group of diverse judges acting rationally in pursuit of their
objectives.
123
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or modified in response to particular difficulties that confront individuals when they are unable
to solve certain bargaining or coordination problems on their own, and further, that individuals
shape their behavior, and their expectations, in consequence of the structures of the institutions in
which they are operating.
Our analysis will demonstrate that solutions to the problems that we identify sometimes
affect the structure of the judiciary as a whole; sometimes take the form of rules (or rebuttable
presumptions); and sometimes, when changes in institutions or rules prove impracticable, take
the form or customs or norms.124 While the solutions to the problems that we identify vary, in
each instance, rational choice analysis is helpful in identifying the nature of the problem, the
likely judicial responses, and the probable solution. To be clear, we do not contend that any of
the solutions that we identify are perfect in the sense of absolutely ensuring appropriate judicial
incentives and behaviors. Indeed, our project is motivated by the limits of existing institutional
structures, rules, and norms in encouraging proper judicial behavior in the writing and
construction of opinions, and specifically by the need for improved definitions of holding and
dicta.
Before proceeding to our analysis of the models, we wish to acknowledge that rational
choice has been criticized for relying upon thinly constructed models to justify bold public policy
prescriptions.125 Indeed, we are sympathetic to such concerns.126 Thankfully, our purpose in
assessing and developing rational choice models of stare decisis here is quitemodest. We are
using rational choice to help answer some of the fundamental questions about our system of
precedent as it actually exists. To the extent that our model helps to answer such questions, and
to the extent that our answers help to provide an important context for constructing proper
definitions of holding and dicta, this part of our project has served its purpose. We are not using
rational choice to suggest an optimal stare decisis rule, which is beyond the scope of our project,
124

For an interesting recent article describing the role of stare decisis as a norm constraining decision making on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767 (2004). While we agree that stare decisis can sometimes be understood as a norm, our rational
choice analysis is designed to study stare decisis within the context of several features that limit judicial overreaching, some
affecting institutional structure, some taking the form of rules, and some taking the form of norms. See infra Part III.A.
125
See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 11 (1994) (arguing that “too often prescriptive conclusions . . . are floated upon empirically dubious rational
choice hypotheses”).
126
See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Rational Choice and the Rational Actor, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY (David S.
Clark ed., forthcoming 2004) (urging rational choice theorists to develop “narrower claims increasingly subject to meaningful
falsification”).
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or to suggest how holding and dicta should be defined. For that, one must undertake a careful
normative analysis, which although edified by our positive analysis, is the subject of the next
subpart.
Instead, the rational choice analysis we offer is targeted to providing answers to the
following inquiries: Why would judges willingly limit their ability to effectuate legal policy by
abiding the precedents of other judges with whom they disagree?127 If judges on the same level
court have an incentive to disregard precedents of other judges, how does the judiciary develop a
system of precedent? Why are multi-member appellate court panels better equipped than singlejudge trial courts at encouraging (or presumptively requiring) adherence to the precedents
established by earlier decision makers on the same level court? Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, if we assume that judges are rationally motivated to construct a system that adheres
to some form of precedent, what then prevents an opinion writer from using any given case to
announce the judge’s preferred resolution of any number of legal policy issues and from
claiming holding status for the resulting discussion? While our rational choice model will
provide answers to these, and other related,128 questions, we do not suggest that ours is the only
correct or edifying approach, or that we have constructed the only plausible account of stare
decisis.129 Rather, we contend that our model offers important insights into the nature and
problem of precedent that provide an essential backdrop in devising a meaningful definition of
holding and dicta.

127

Addressing this question does not require that we assume judges are bent on imposing their normative views into law. A
judge’s view of legal policy can consist of a desire to produce results that are driven by a dispassionate application of external
principals of law, even those with which the judge disagrees. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW:
READINGS AND COMMENTARY 540 (1997) (explaining that the rational choice assumption that judges seek to impose their own
normative views into law can include judges whose normative views “require principled, rather than preference-based,
decisionmaking”). But a system of precedent can, nonetheless, prevent a judge from achieving even that objective if the decisions
of judges who prefer to impose their normative views onto the law are binding precedent.
128
For example, if an earlier court has issued a judicial decision that is not overreaching, what is to prevent a later court
nonetheless from disregarding it to the extent that the later court finds the constraint it imposes problematic? See infra Part
III.A.3.
129
For two interesting alternative economic perspectives on stare decisis, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989), which uses game theoretic analysis to evaluate costs and benefits of stare decisis
when changes in technology outpace doctrinal preferences for less valuable activities; and Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and
External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93 (1989), which explains the adaptability of stare decisis to
societal change and discussing the role of legislation as an external check on precedent that entrenches outmoded technologies.
While these two articles provide valuable assessments of the societal costs and benefits of stare decisis, they do not focus on the
capacity of stare decisis to emerge as an endogenous feature of judicial decision making.
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A. Modeling Stare Decisis and the Holding-Dicta Distinction
The rational choice model stems from a puzzle concerning judicial incentives in crafting
opinions. Academic commentators within law and political science routinely assume that judges
are motivated by the desire to implement their preferred resolutions of issues of legal policy.130
Such a claim can be advanced in a broad form, insisting that judges seek to convert desired
policy objectives into law without regard to the legal issues presented, or (more plausibly in our
view) in a narrow form, maintaining that when legal doctrines admit of some flexibility in their
construction, judicial policy preferences will inform which of the plausible constructions a judge
is likely to prefer. Either way, within our post-realist jurisprudential world, it is commonly
appreciated that judges not only make law,131 but also that they seek to advance their views of
legal policy in doing so.132 Indeed, the prevalence of this view is so striking that those who
embrace a contrary vision of judicial law making—one that anticipates that judges will be
motivated by a neutral desire to resolve cases within the framework of existing rules and without
regard to any policy preferences that they might hold—are depicted as naïve.133 Even so, our
understanding of rationality and the model we build upon that assumption is sufficiently
accommodating to include judges for whom this is a sound description.134
If judges truly are motivated by the desire to advance their views of legal policy in the
cases that they decide, they have a potentially strong incentive to use those cases that appear
before them as vehicles with which to make substantially broader pronouncements of legal
policy than is required to resolve the immediate case. The puzzle is that while judges sometimes
might be seen as overreaching, many, perhaps most, judges are cautious about creating new law,
130

The classic work is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). We,
however, are not claiming that judges necessarily seek to impose their normative views into law. See supra note 127 (explaining
that judges can hold the view that the judicial role should be limited to the dispassionate and neutral resolution of legal disputes).
131
As one commentator has aptly noted, “Post-realist jurisprudence must depart from the truism that judges make law and begin
instead with the question of how they make law.” See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 636 (1993).
132
We do not intend to suggest that judges create policy in the same manner as do political actors operating within elected
branches of government. Indeed, our project is intended to underscore an essential difference between adjudicatory and political
decision making, namely the greater constraint—imposed by the fortuitous circumstances that give rise to a case—on judges in
their efforts to create desired policy relative to legislators that a proper understanding of dicta and holding imposes. See infra Part
III.B (describing normative considerations that emerge as a function of judicial lawmaking).
133
Cf. Nancy Weston, The Fate, Violence, and Rhetoric of Contemporary Legal Thought: Reflections on The Amherst Series, the
Loss of Truth, and the Law, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 733 (1997) (asserting that “[l]egal formalism . . . appears ripe for discard as
naïve and illusory—or, worse, as mendacious, the later version of this judgment, as indeed it must in a world in which realism
reigns”).
134
See supra note 127.
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and very few seem to use cases to resolve altogether unrelated issues. The immediate challenge
is to identify those mechanisms within the judicial process that help to counteract the tendency to
overreach, even if they do not succeed in eliminating it entirely. This puzzle is not new. Indeed,
it has motivated legal scholars in their efforts to explore the conceptual origins of both horizontal
and vertical stare decisis, as well as in their efforts to explain judicial incentives to craft narrow
rather than broad holdings.
1. Modeling Horizontal Stare Decisis
As is generally the case with rational choice analysis, we will begin with a set of stark
assumptions, and then relax the assumptions to bring the model closer to the actual institutions
that our analysis is offered to study. In this case, we will begin by imaging that our judiciary
consists solely of a single level trial court in which individual judges hear and resolve disputes.
We can imagine the judges on such a court realizing that while they would prefer that their
colleagues on the bench respect their resolutions of issues they resolve as a necessary part of the
cases they decide as precedent, their colleagues do not have a strong incentive to do so. If other
judges agree in principle to the resolution of such issues, they will, of course, reach similar
results in future cases. But this signifies no constraint in the form of precedent. After all, even
absent a prior case that turned on the same issue of law presented in a new case, the later
deciding judge would achieve the same result.135
This insight can be cast in simple game theoretical terms using the framework of the
standard prisoners’ dilemma. While each judge would prefer to see his or her views reflected into
law, each would also prefer not to be bound by the views of other judges who happened upon the
need to resolve the same issue in an earlier case. As a result, without regard to whether the other
judge abides one’s own opinions as precedent, one has an incentive to decline to honor the other
135

This point has long been understood:
If a court follows a previous decision, because a revered master has uttered it, because it is the right decision, because it
is logical, because it is just, because it accords with the weight of authority, because it has been generally accepted and
acted on, because it secures a beneficial result to the community, that is not an application of stare decisis. To make the
act such an application, the previous decision must be followed because it is a previous decision and for no other
reason.
Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 200 (1933). It is
possible, for example, that a prior decision explored the legal issue in a sufficiently persuasive manner that a later judge, who
initially would have resolved the issue differently, changes positions. Should this occur, the second judge is not basing the
resolution on the fact of the precedent, however, but rather on the persuasiveness of the earlier reasoning. A judge is invariably
free to do this, just as a judge may find a treatise, law review article, an op ed, or a speech by a law professor persuasive on a
relevant point of law.
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judge’s opinions as precedent. These incentives are mutual and thus the dominant outcome is
mutual defection even though the payoffs to each judge would be greater if each was able to
achieve a regime of mutual cooperation, meaning that each respects the opinions of the other
judge as precedent. This is so even though mutual cooperation itself limits the ability to achieve
results that each judge might otherwise prefer in individual cases.
We see traces of such a regime in which decision makers resolve cases but do not create
precedents in doing so within some real world institutions for the resolution of legal disputes.
These include civilian courts, which formally eschew precedent,136 and both nonbinding
mediation and arbitration, which do not develop binding bodies of internal precedent in the same
manner as do courts.137 While there are certainly differences between the hypothetical regime
that we imagine and any of these real world regimes, for simplicity, we will refer to our decision
makers for now as arbitrators. In our hypothetical regime, the individual arbitrators resolve
disputes without developing precedent that binds other arbitrators. Their immediate concern is to
identifying mechanisms that will enable them to elevate themselves from merely resolving
disputes to judging, and in doing so, to creating, and not merely applying, law.
Professor Erin O’Hara has developed a game theoretic model, which although designed
to explain stare decisis, ultimately demonstrates the conceptual difficulty that individual judges
on the same level court confront in their effort to construct a system of precedent that elevates
themselves from de facto mediators, who resolve disputes without making law, to judges, who
perform both functions.138 O’Hara begins with the observation that different judges sometimes
hold different normative views.139 As a result of this divergence of viewpoint, individual judges
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See Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating International Business Disputes, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 464 (2004) (positing that
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Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretical Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL
L. REV. 736 (1993). While O’Hara imagines single panel appellate judges, we adapt her analysis to imagine single-panel
arbitrators.
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consistently with a rule of stare decisis. . . Where their normative views differ . . ., however, the judges will engage in
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would prefer their colleagues to abide the decisions they issue as precedent, while, at the same
time, avoiding any reciprocal obligation to abide the opinions of their colleagues as precedent.
Thus cast, O’Hara’s model represents the classic prisoner’s dilemma that we have
identified. For each judge in the game, the ideal situation is to impose an obligation on other
judges, but not to have an obligation imposed on one’s self. If other judges honor precedent, it is
rational for a judge to receive the benefit of their adherence to the judges’ opinions, while
declining to honor their opinions. And if other judges decline to honor the judge’s precedents, it
remains rational to decline to honor their precedents. Either way, it is rational to “defect” from a
regime of precedent enforcement. Because these payoffs are reciprocal, meaning that other
judges have the same incentives, mutual defection—meaning the absence of a system of
precedent—emerges as the dominant strategy. While O’Hara describes the resulting regime, one
that threatens to undermine the optimistic claim of endogenously created stare decisis, as one of
“nonproductive competition,”140 we can also think of the resulting regime as that of arbitrators
failing in their attempt to change their status to judges.
O’Hara considers whether this regime of mutual defection could be avoided if the game
were treated as iterated, rather than single period. O’Hara observes that if the iterations are
infinite, then the judges might well achieve a cooperative solution: “As long as the judges expect
to work together indefinitely, then each can use potential future benefits from stare decisis to
encourage present cooperation from the other.”141 A judge who fails to cooperate in one period
invites retaliation in the next period, as the judge whose decision was ignored in turn refuses to
enforce the other judge’s precedent.142 “As long as the gain from defecting today is less than or
equal to the present value of future losses from perpetual noncooperation, then both judges are
willing to follow each other’s precedents.”143
140

Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 751.
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shown below, see infra notes x-x and accompanying text, emerges in the first instance within multimember appellate panels, this
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Professor O’Hara recognizes, however, that the cooperative solution induced by the
iterated games threatens to unravel when the participants confront a certain, or anticipated, end
period. To illustrate, O’Hara posits three known periods, and considers what happens in the third
period when the players anticipate no further iterations.144 In this situation, the players no longer
confront a threat in any future period for defection, and, as a consequence, mutual defection
reemerges the dominant strategy as in a single period game. In period 2, anticipating mutual
defection in period 3, the players again defect, realizing that they will receive no benefit from
cooperation. With any definite end period, the same “unraveling” begins in the final period and
continues to the very first period, suggesting that unless iterations are infinite, or sufficiently
long that future defection is heavily discounted, unraveling threatens to restore mutual defection
as the dominant outcome.145
We do not intend to suggest that the choice is quite as stark as selecting between
unraveling with anything short of endless iterations versus cooperation in an infinitely iterated
game. Some literature suggests that even without endless iterations, under certain assumptions it
is possible to generate cooperative solutions.146 It is beyond our scope here to review the
literature on the iterated prisoners’ dilemma and assess the possibility of cooperation where there
is only some probability of the game ending in any period. Rather, it is sufficient to note that a
cooperative solution that generates a regime of stare decisis among single judge panels on the
same level court is likely to be at least substantially unstable. And in fact, this intuition, which is
consistent with O’Hara’s analysis, reflects practices that we observe in trial courts.147
noncooperative behavior such that the regime no longer represents a prisoners’ dilemma. See STEARNS, supra note 127, at 54142. Eric Rasmusen, in a separate article written at about the same time as O’Hara’s, see Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a
Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994), reaches a similar conclusion concerning the possibility of a cooperative
solution under specified conditions.
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88-89 (1989).
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Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520 (1994) (positing that depending upon the payoff function, cooperative behavior can arise
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Within the United States, as a general matter, precedent does not take as strong form a
constraint—if it is a constraint at all—among trial judges operating in the same level court.
While judges might find the opinions of their colleagues persuasive, they do not generally
consider themselves bound to adhere to those opinions as precedents. This suggests that the
practice thus far tracks the observations of the model, which would not predict a strong form
cooperative equilibrium in this context. And yet, the practical problem remains, namely that
individual trial judges seek to extricate themselves from the function of arbitrating (or merely
resolving disputes) to that of judging (thus making law as needed in the course of resolving
disputes). The solution to this problem lies not in the iterated prisoners’ dilemma, but rather in
the nature of a pyramidically structured court.
2. Modeling Vertical Stare Decisis
In an earlier article,148 Professor William Landes and then-Professor Richard Posner also
addressed the conceptual difficulty in employing a prisoners’ dilemma analysis to devise an
explanation for horizontal stare decisis. Landes and Posner offered an alternative explanation for
the emergence of stare decisis doctrine that relies upon the emergence of pyramidically
structured judicial system.149 By devising another level in an emerging judicial pyramid, judges
create a means of developing and promoting adherence to precedent. Most importantly, in doing
so, they avoid the need for cooperation among the judges at the trial court level.150 An appeals
court’s “power to reverse the decisions of lower courts,” Landes and Posner explain, “checks any
tendencies on the part of lower-court judges to disregard precedent (reversal foils a judge’s
attempt to create his own precedent), and its own position in the judicial hierarchy checks its
members’ tendencies in that direction.”151 An appellate court, even one that is drawn from the
ranks of the trial court judges, most logically in odd-numbered random groupings to prevent ties,
is able to induce cooperation and limit defection among individual trial judges who would
148

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249
(1976).
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Civilian regimes, which formally eschew precedent, also follow a pyramidic structure. This does not undermine the Landes
and Posner theory, but might be attributable to the need to correct rulings within the immediate case, rather than to impose the
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civilian courts. See supra note 121; infra note 263.
150
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Landes & Posner, supra note 148, at 273.
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otherwise fail to make law as they routinely disregard each others’ precedents. The analysis
reveals that a statutory mandate or other external source of law is not required to induce
cooperation in the form of precedent because the emerging judicial hierarchy, which creates the
same result, emerges as a function of the rational incentives of participating jurists.
While this analysis helps to resolve the difficulty posed by mutual defection among
judges at the trial court level, the explanation remains only partial. The same incentive to ignore
precedent that confronts individual trial judges also confronts the various members of separate
appeals court panels. The question then arises why such panels do not experience the same
mutual defection—or nonproductive competition—that trial judges would experience in a
judiciary that lacked a heirarchical structure. To some extent this motivation is tempered when—
as occurs within the United States Courts of Appeals—appellate panels include three judges who
are randomly drawn. For an appellate judge to disregard precedent, the appellate judge will have
to find at least one other judge who is willing to sign on. In addition, anticipating serving on the
same panel with a judge whose opinion one chose to disregard might motivate more collegial
behavior. But a considerable incentive to disregard precedent, perhaps by engaging in
disingenuous distinctions from prior rulings, remains, especially where judges on a panel have
similar ideological preferences.152 The incentive might even be exacerbated at the appellate level
as a result of the greater impact of precedent over a broader number of future trial and appellate
judges.
A final step in the judicial pyramid, namely the creation of a supreme court, to the extent
that it serves a similar function with respect to appeals courts that appeals courts serve with
respect to district courts, might further limit incentives to disregard precedent. But at best such a
solution once again is only partial.153 Within the federal judiciary, as is widely recognized,
Supreme Court review is sufficiently rare—far rarer than appeals court review of district court
152
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decisions154—that substantial opportunities remain to disregard prior appeals courts decisions as
precedents. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, while en banc review (the practice
whereby the full circuit court has the power to vacate and review three judge panel decisions)
might be used to correct defection taking the form of failures to abide internal circuit court
precedent, it too is also rarely used.155 We know of no cases in which the Supreme Court has
reviewed a case to ensure consistency of case law within a particular circuit. In addition, once the
Supreme Court is established, it is potentially subject to a similar form of defection, here an
incentive among individual justices to disregard the Court’s own precedents, assuming they can
persuade the requisite majority to join.
If each level in the judicial hierarchy substantially reduces the risk of defection in the
court below, but cannot prevent defection at the newly created court level, the question thus
arises how the various appeals courts—including the circuit courts and the Supreme Court—
overcome the incentives of their own members to defect from a cooperative stare decisis regime.
The answer does not rest in the prisoners’ dilemma analysis, but rather lies in the need to
stabilize doctrine in multimember appellate courts. While the need to stabilize doctrine is a
general problem on multimember courts, even those that hear case en banc, the problem is
particularly acute in courts in which subgroups, for example panels of three, hear cases for the
entire court, but might not reflect the views of the court as a whole. An analysis based upon
social choice demonstrates the nature of the problem of doctrinal instability on multimember
appellate courts, whether or not the courts hear cases in panels, and the function of stare decisis
in horizontal form in substantially reducing it.
Under specified conditions, judges on a multimember courts sometimes hold preferences
over the resolution of cases,156 that when subject to a series of direct pairwise contests would
result in the phenomenon of cycling. For a simple illustration, consider three persons—P1, P2,
P3—holding the following rank ordinally ranked orderings over options ABC: P1: ABC; P2:
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BCA; P3: CAB. If the three people were presented with the three possible binary comparisons
and voted sincerely based upon their expressed ordinal rankings, the result would be a cycle,
such that B is preferred to C (P1 and P2 winning); and A is preferred to B (P1 and P3 winning),
implying that A is preferred to C, when in fact, C is preferred to A (P2 and P3 winning). Thus,
even though each member holds preferences that are transitive, the group as a whole prefers A to
B to C to A. Social choice theory demonstrates that a general assumption of individual
rationality, namely that preferences satisfy the minimal condition of transitivity, cannot be
assumed for groups of three or more.157 With a set number of options represented by n (here
three), a regime that allows only n minus 1 (here two) votes provides a stable outcome, albeit one
that turns on the order in which the votes are taken. The following example will demonstrate that
stare decisis in horizontal form effectively removes an option for multimember appellate courts,
thus stabilizing doctrine, with the effect of rendering doctrine dependent on the order in which
cases are presented.
Imagine a three judge panel deciding two cases on the same day,158 first, Adams v. School
Board, raising a constitutional challenge to busing ordered by a school board, and the second,
Barnes v. State Court, raising a constitutional challenge to busing ordered by a state court.
Imagine that in each case, the lower court rejected the constitutional challenge and that the same
three judge panel—consisting of judges J1, J2, and J3—decided the two cases on the same day.
In Adams, J1 and J2 conclude that the challenge is not meritorious, and thus affirm the decision
below sustaining the statute, while J3 dissents. In Barnes, J2 and J3 conclude that the challenge
to the state court busing order is meritorious, and thus reverse the lower court decision sustaining
that order, while J1 dissents. Imagine that in their respective dissenting opinions, J3 and J1 both
state that in their views, the two cases are indistinguishable, a position that is consistent with
their individual votes to either reject (as did J1) or sustain (as did J3) both challenges. The
analysis reveals three majorities, one of which must be suppressed: (1) J1 and J3 to sustain the
statute in Adams; (2) J2 and J3 to strike the court order in Barnes; and (3) J1 and J3 to treat
Adams and Barnes as indistinguishable.

158

This discussion is based upon a stylized rendition of two actual Supreme Court cases. For a more detailed discussion and
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Now imagine that instead of the two cases arising concurrently, Adams arises first,
followed, one year later, by Barnes. Because the Adams court affirms (J1 and J2 controlling),
and because J1 and J3 believe that the cases are indistinguishable, the result in Barnes would
also be to affirm. Alternatively, if Barnes arises first, resulting in a reversal (J2 and J3
controlling), then because J1 and J3 view the cases as indistinguishable, the result in Adams will
also be to reverse. The analysis reveals that depending upon the order of presentation, any of the
three identified outcomes might arise: both upheld, both struck down, or Adams upheld and
Barnes struck down.159 In each sequence above, the court has not permitted resolution of all three
issues (Adams as a matter of first impression; Barnes as a matter of first impression; and Adams
or Barnes with the other case as a precedent) that would be required to determine that the
combined outcomes over the three possible binary comparisons are an arbitrary function of the
order in which the cases have been presented for consideration. Adams then Barnes generates
opposite outcomes from Barnes then Adams, and both sequences generate a different outcome
from the two cases arising together and thus without one or the other as precedent.
If the court were permitted to run through all possible iterations endlessly, the
arbitrariness would become clear.160 Social choice theory, of course, does not posit that
institutions are plagued by endless cycling and indeterminacy. In most instances, institutional
structures induce equilibria even when the participants possess intransitive preferences.161 Courts
are no different in this regard, and our example serves to illustrate this point. At whatever point
the relevant structure induced equilibrating rule breaks the theoretical cycle, the chosen outcome
inevitably suppresses a set of majority preferences for a contrary result.
This admittedly stylized presentation provides a core insight into the function that stare
decisis serves in multimember appellate courts. Social choice analysis reveals that when a group
possesses cyclical preferences over multiple options and must achieve determinate outcomes,
159
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one means of ensuring actual results is to limit the number of binary comparisons relative to the
number of options.162 In parliamentary procedure, for example, rules proscribing reconsideration
of defeated alternatives163 serve the function of breaking cyclical indeterminacy by ensuring that
for n options, there will be no more than n – 1 binary comparisons.164 The outcome under such a
regime is arbitrary; had the voting started elsewhere, the outcome would have been different.
Because any outcome is arbitrary, however, the regime of horizontal stare decisis has the decided
benefit of giving at least the appearance of majority support, as the final outcome and all those
preceding it will be decided with majority opinions, within the context of a legitimating process.
Thus, stare decisis is the judicial equivalent of a rule limiting the number of binary
comparisons relative to options in appellate courts.165 The doctrine achieves this by holding off
limits those options that have been defeated in earlier cases, which now form the basis of
precedent. The analysis demonstrates that while vertical stare decisis—the product of
pyramidical courts—emerges as a solution to the problem trial judges face in trying to extricate
themselves from a arbitration type regime in which they resolve disputes but do not make law,
the horizontal form of stare decisis within appellate courts emerges as a solution to a different
problem, namely the need ensure stable doctrine and prevent cycling. Stare decisis may not have
arisen historically to solve a potential cycling problem. Regardless of its initial motivation,
horizontal stare decisis has survived at least in part because the doctrine solves a practical
difficulty that might otherwise threaten the objective of doctrinal stability on multimember
appellate courts.
The analysis also helps to explain a difference in the nature of stare decisis as it operates
at the level of the Supreme Court and in the United States Court of Appeals (and by extension
between state supreme courts and intermediate state courts of appeals). In the Court of Appeals,
panels are the product of random draws of three among a larger set of members of the court. The
randomness exacerbates the problem of doctrinal instability by increasing the probability that
panels that do not represent accurately the membership of the court as a whole will decide
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cases.166 In contrast, with narrow exceptions, the Supreme Court always meets as an en banc
court. As a result, although that Court is occasionally prone to preference aggregation problems
that conceal doctrinal cycles,167 the problem is minimized relative to circuit courts because
subgroups generally lack the power to resolve cases on behalf of the Court as a whole.168
The Courts of Appeals have two additional mechanisms for reducing doctrinal instability.
The first is the possibility of Supreme Court review, which as we have already explained is not
likely motivated to check against intra-circuit doctrinal instability. The second is en banc review
by the full membership of the relevant court of appeals.169 While this is a statistical rarity as
compared with review by the Courts of Appeals of district court cases, for purposes of stare
decisis enforcement, en banc review nonetheless serves a similar function with respect to the
circuit court as a whole to that which circuit court review serves for district courts. A possible
justification for en banc review is therefore to check against panels that stray sufficiently from
predictable outcomes for the circuit as a whole that they invite a considerable risk that over time,
the result will be to codify unstable—and perhaps eventually cyclical—preferences.
Within our judicial system, we observe several features that the model outlined here
would predict: (1) a relatively weak stare decisis rule among trial judges operating at the same
level court; (2) a substantially stronger vertical stare decisis norm operating from a supreme
court to an appellate court and from an appellate court to a trial court; and (3) a strong
presumptive stare decisis rule, one that requires overruling in either a higher court or an en banc
court operating horizontally at the supreme court and appeals court levels. The solutions to the
difficulties of extricating jurists from the task of arbitrating to that of judging, however, creates a
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new difficulty of its own. Once the system of stare decisis is in place, what is to prevent its
abuse? Specifically, if judges on appellate courts have the power not merely to resolve cases, but
also to establish precedents, what then prevents them from abusing that power by resolving
substantially more than is required in the immediate case in an effort to engraft their strongly
held policy views into the fabric of legal doctrine?
3. Modeling the Breadth of Holdings
If we accept the premise that judges are motivated to advance their views of legal policy,
whatever their views happen to be,170 a substantial risk arises that ambitious judges operating
within a stare decisis system will use the cases that they decide to announce their preferred views
of law and public policy as “holdings.” This difficulty is exacerbated once we realize that stare
decisis takes its strongest form in vertical form and at the appellate level. Because courts of
appeals decisions have a substantially broader impact—they apply to more courts and over a
broader geographic domain—than do decisions of district court judges, the incentive to present
expansive opinions as holdings is all the more powerful. So the question arises what, if anything,
mitigates judicial incentives to overreach, and specifically, what motivates judges to limit the
reach of their holdings.
Legal scholars who have used rational choice to study the emergence of stare decisis in
its various forms have also employed rational choice theory to identify mechanisms that induce
cooperative strategies that are conducive to a properly limited judicial decision making function,
one that generally inhibits judges in their efforts to use particular cases to advance broad policy
prescription under the guise of holdings. As with those models designed to construct a system of
stare decisis, these related models suggest that even without an externally imposed rule
demanding appropriate judicial restraint, it is rational for interactive judges to develop a system
of appropriate restraint, one that we might think of as a custom or norm,171 that encourages
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restricting holdings to the resolution of issues bearing a meaningful connection to the operative
facts of the cases that they are called upon to decide, and thus inhibiting judicial efforts to use
cases as vehicles for effectuating unrelated, or tangentially related, views of law and public
policy.
In contrast with the structural aspects of stare decisis described in the last subpart, which
produce enforceable rules that all participating judges are at least presumptively required to
follow, here we are concerned with norms concerning the form that opinions take once the stare
decisis regime is established. While those declining to adhere to stare decisis are subject to a set
of formal processes, most notably the possibility of further appellate review, and difficulties in
finding judges to join their opinions, there are no such formal or informal processes through
which to counteract clumsily written or overbroad judicial opinions. There is no meaningful
prospect for devising formal rules that appropriately tailor judicial incentives, but over time,
customary practices taking the form of norms are likely to develop, and these in turn become
meaningful benchmarks against which other judges on the same court can evaluate the quality of
opinions and make appropriate suggestions for revision. Our analysis here and in Part III.A.
reveals that rational choice explains a range of mechanisms that encourage proper judicial
restraint respecting the impact and content of opinions, including institutional modifications
(developing a judicial hierarchy with an imposed rule of vertical stare decisis), formal rules
(creating a regime of horizontal stare decisis to induce doctrinal stability among multimember
appellate panels), and norms (encouraging appropriately limited statements of holdings within
opinions).
While Professor O’Hara’s argument focuses on providing a game theoretical analysis of
interactive judges, she also considers whether limits of judicial prescience in anticipating the
consequences of overly broad holdings might provide an endogenous incentive to limit ambitious
judicial opinions.172 Thus, for example, O’Hara imagines a judge confronted with a case
requiring her to determine if adult pornography is protected speech. This judge is generally
protective of free speech, including pornography, but fears that an overly broad statement of the
holding might unwittingly also protect child pornography, which she does not seek to protect.
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The result is that the judge articulates a relatively narrow holding, perhaps one limited to the
material facts, which do not involve child pornography, as a means of avoiding the pitfall of
potentially codifying into law a result that does not accurately reflect her ultimate views of legal
policy. O’Hara summarizes her intuition as follows: “Although the judge can later abandon that
part of [the] opinion which creates undesirable incentives, [the judge] prefers to avoid
encouraging such behavior in the interim.”173
One difficulty this hypothetical highlights is that while some judges might be reticent to
anticipate future legal issues, either based upon concerns for failing to anticipate the
consequences of their holdings or simply due to their understanding of a limited judicial
function, other judges might not share the same reticence. If so, then those judges who are more
disposed to expand present cases into future doctrinal areas would then have an advantage in
setting out the law at the expense of the law making power of more reticent judges. The result
would then be a regime in which ambitious judges dominate the judicial lawmaking game. So
viewed, self restraint motivated by failing to anticipate the consequences of one’s own rulings
seems unlikely to promote a stable regime that limits judicial overreaching. While this might
explain a tendency that we actually see, namely varying degrees of ambition in judicial opinions,
it does not explain any generalized custom or norm that limits judges in general as it relates to
the scope of judicial opinions.
Professor Eric Rasmusen has provided an alternative account of how judges, behaving
rationally, might achieve an equilibrium in which they limit the scope of their written opinions.
In his model, each judge seeks to limit the power of other judges to state overly broad holdings
in exchange for other judges respecting her precedents in their own opinions. Rasmusen
describes the problem, and his suggested solution, as follows:
The distinction between ratio decedendi and dictum limits the rate at which new
law can be created, which is useful with regard to maintaining a precedentobeying equilibrium. Judges must wait to create new law until appropriate cases
arrive at their benches, and only the ratio decidendi or holding—the case’s
essential and decisive point of law—is binding precedent. Dicta, rulings irrelevant
to the case outcome, are, by convention, not binding on future judges, although
like anyone else’s writings, they may be considered as arguments. If dicta were
binding, a judge could create an unlimited amount of new law. His 600-page
decision on a bankruptcy case could also control the law on abortion, copyright,
173
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and criminal evidence. Such an equilibrium could not be maintained . . . because
even if the dictacarefully avoided violating existing precedent, very little new
law would be left to future judges to create.174
In Rasmusen’s analysis, the stability of a stare decisis equilibrium requires that judges not
overstate their holdings. Otherwise, judges will not afford themselves or their colleagues the
opportunity to develop law unencumbered by any prior judge’s overreaching in future periods.
Overreaching in this analysis occurs when judges claim holding status for assertions that should
be dicta, which Rasmusen asserts are not binding “by convention.”
Rasmusen’s argument suggests both an equilibrium in which rational judges limit their
holdings to ensure sufficient room for future law making by other judges and that judges must
self consciously restrain themselves so as not to disturb this equilibrium.175 Thus, using an
extreme example, Rasmusen suggests that an ambitious judge might thwart the equilibrium if he
were to use a bankruptcy case as a vehicle for a book length treatment on such wide ranging
issues as abortion, copyright, and criminal procedure, while presumably claiming holding status
for the resulting discussion. The difficulty is that if it is rational for ambitious judges to engage in
a strategy of defection, thus producing such excessive opinions, then the game is closer to a
prisoners’ dilemma in which the dominant strategy would be mutual defection rather than
cooperation. While some judges might voluntarily restrain themselves, nothing prevents other
judges from assuming a more ambitious law making role, which would cause the claimed
equilibrium to unravel.
While the explanations that O’Hara and Rasmusen offer would appear to invite mutual
defection as the dominant strategy, refining the models will allow us to identify the basis for a
more benign equilibrium outcome. The rational choice analysis will help to explain the
emergence of a norm concerning the scope of judicial opinions. This norm encourages judges to
limit their holdings based upon the material case facts. Judges are motivated to do so as a means
of ensuring their own ability to police against defections by other judges on the same court who
would prefer to set out their own policy preferences unconstrained by precedent. A precedent
setting judge will rightly fear that as the precedent setting opinion appears to overreach, that
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opinion will be increasingly vulnerable to future judges who not only will distinguish the factual
predicates that give rise to tangential aspects of the opinion, but also will disingenuously
distinguish those parts of the opinion that represent core holdings. In this analysis, the motivation
to limit the scope of opinions stems entirely from rational motivation of judges to enhance their
own power to make law rather than to arbitrate disputes, and since all judges on the same level
court share this incentive, it provides the basis for a stable equilibrium outcome, one that in this
instance takes the form of a norm, rather than that of a rule or a modification to institutional
structure.
Consider a very simple example involving two judges, each operating as single judge
appeals court panels, who resolve three cases in sequence. Assume that Judge Potter holds strong
views on whether the optimal tort regime is one of contributory or comparative negligence.
Further assume that Judge Potter is presented with Case I, a contract dispute that turns solely on
whether the claimed contract was supported by consideration. Assume that Judge Potter resolves
the contract dispute in favor of the plaintiff, finding consideration, and goes on to state: “I further
hold that in a tort suit, the rule of contributory negligence applies such that when plaintiff is more
than 50% at fault, defendant is afforded complete relief based upon plaintiff’s comparative fault,
but when plaintiff’s fault is 50% or less, defendant is entitled to no offset based upon plaintiff’s
comparative fault.”
One year later, Judge Weasley is called upon to resolve Case II, a negligence suit in
which the jury, in a special verdict, determined that the plaintiff is 40% at fault. The trial judge,
relying upon Case I as a precedent, determined that because the plaintiff was not more than 50%
percent at fault, under the Judge Potter’s selected regime of contributory negligence, the
defendant was not entitled to any liability offset resulting from plaintiff’s comparative fault. On
appeal to Judge Weasley, the defendant claims that Case I was not controlling and that the
preferred regime—one Judge Weasley would be free to adopt if Case I is not controlling—is
comparative negligence, under which defendant’s liability would be offset by plaintiff’s 40%
comparative fault.
In his opinion in Case II, we might anticipate Judge Weasley saying something like the
following:
Case I presented a contract dispute and turned on the whether or not consideration
was present. This case presents the question whether the governing tort regime is
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contributory or comparative negligence. While Judge Potter expressed views on
the issue presented in this case, and further characterized those views as stating a
holding, nothing in Case I turned on his determination on that issue. As a result,
regardless of the label that he attached to that discussion, anything expressed on
this question in Case I falls squarely into the category of dicta.
In this analysis, Judge Weasley avoids the claimed obligation of precedent by relying upon the
material facts in two cases: first, the case in which the claimed holding was articulated, and
second, the case presently before him.
Anticipating this type of response by Judge Weasley creates a problem for judges,
including Judge Potter, in future cases that they decide. Judge Potter realizes that he cannot
affect doctrine outside the context of the material facts of the cases before him. But that is not all.
He also is concerned that if he is not careful in articulating a defense of his genuine holdings, in
the first case involving an issue of consideration in a contract dispute, then future judges might
further characterize those holdings as dicta. Unless Judge Potter carefully defends a holding
based upon a justification for making law that is grounded in those issues implicated by the
material case facts, he runs the risk that Judge Weasley, or other judges, not only will distinguish
that which is obviously outside the case, but also disingenuously distinguish core holdings.
The analysis reveals two critical features of the stare decisis norm as it relates to the
scope of written opinions. First, it shows that judges can credibly affect only the direction of law
in the cases that they are called upon to decide based upon the material facts that are presented in
those cases. Second, it reveals that when writing opinions, judges will be rationally motivated to
seek to protect their core holdings by grounding those holdings in the material facts of the case.
Otherwise, they will rightly fear that future jurists might attempt not merely to distinguish the
parts of their opinions that go beyond the core facts, and which thus constitute legitimate
distinctions, but also that overly broad holdings will invite disingenuous distinctions that cut into
core holdings. Thus, in a case in which Judge Potter actually must resolve a series of legal issues
to resolve the dispute before him, he will be concerned that any failure to justify the need to
reach each issue, bydemonstrating a logical progression that links the resolutions of the issues he
claims to resolve to the material facts of the case, will invite future jurists to limit the reach of the
holdings that are credibly grounded in the fortuitous circumstances of the case.
Conversely, future jurists will read published opinions for material fact-based
justifications of any newly made law as a precondition to applying holdings within those
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opinions as precedent in the cases before them to which no material distinctions apply. Over
time, the resulting practice of defending opinions based upon material facts and seeking material
fact-based justifications for written opinions provides a stable solution to the potential defection
strategy that would otherwise dominate and encourage judges to overreach, if not by writing the
proverbial 600 page opinion, at least by extending beyond the material case facts in the
resolution of immediate cases. And notice that this equilibrium is not the product of any desire to
leave room for future jurists to make law, or of any reticence among judges to make law
themselves. Unencumbered by the threatened non-enforcement of core holdings, judges would
happily write opinions that go well beyond immediate case facts, or at least those judges who are
confident of their own jurisprudential views would. But this model provides a rational incentive
to limit defection, namely the desire to ensure that although the law making role is thereby
limited to chance presentation of issues linked to material facts, at least any law that jurists make
in resolving those facts will be respected as precedent.
Thus far, the analysis reveals that stare decisis forms an endogenous constraint that
limits, to some extent, the tendency of appellate judges to overreach in claiming holding status
for propositions of law that are not necessary to the resolution of the cases before them. Limiting
holdings to those issues the resolution of which can be credibly defended as necessary to resolve
a case based upon the material facts articulated in a judicial opinion allows appellate judges to
increase the impact of their decisions. More broadly, voluntary self-imposed limits on the scope
of holdings allow the appeals courts to move from institutions that resolve disputes to institutions
that make law in the course of performing that task. But the very transformation from arbitrators
to jurists invites a tendency to overreach precisely because judges, unlike arbitrators, have
substantial power to make law.
Other factors, including concerns for reputation and collegiality, also influence decisions
to cast holdings broadly or narrowly, and certainly we do not suggest that our simple rational
choice model captures all relevant concerns. For example, once we recognize that appeals courts
do not operate in single judge panels, and that majorities on panels of three for most appeals and
of full appellate courts for en banc reconsiderations are necessary to create precedent, we can
further appreciate that strategy might sometimes overtake candor as the basis for decisions to
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join with others as a means of creating desired precedent.176 While rational choice helps to
answer some important questions concerning why judges to do not systematically overreach, the
analysis thus far is at best a rough cut, one that provides a useful starting point in undertaking a
careful normative analysis of dicta and holding. This is especially so once we realize that most
cases involve facts or law that are neither obviously within nor beyond the scope of what is
needed to resolve a case. Having identified some core limits exposed by the rational choice
model, we now turn to four overlapping sets of normative concerns, which prove critical in
defining dicta and holding.
B. The Judicial Four C’s
In this section, we identify four normative considerations, which we will call the
“Judicial Four C’s.” Jewelers evaluate carat, cut, color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we
evaluate constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor in forming understandings of what to treat
as holding and dicta within judicial opinions. While our considerations only overlap directly in
one category, clarity, this area of overlap proves particularly significant. As with diamonds, the
principal difficulty in overly broad holdings is that of inclusions, and specifically of clouding
what should be clear statements of the holding with other assertions that should instead have
been treated as dicta. While we do not employ cut as a criterion, just as a diamond’s cut can be
too shallow or too deep, the factors that we employ do not push inexorably in a single
direction.177 In the case of judicial consideration, for example, this means that judges resolve
those issues targeted to the immediate case, without avoiding difficult questions necessary to
resolving cases presented, but not inquiries that cases might implicate if conceived at a broader
level. The criteria are useful, of course, not only because they might allow us to grade judicial
opinions, but because they allow us to assess possible definitions of dicta, and more specifically
the analytical categories and problems that we identified in Part II.
We recognize that the normative considerations we consider not only push in more than a
single direction, but also that they are incommensurate. Weighing these factors against one
another requires us to make normative judgments that some might dispute. In addition, although
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we doubt that many readers would claim that any of these four factors are unimportant, we
recognize that some might place different weights on these factors, and might include other
normative factors as well. We believe that each of the considerations we have chosen is
relatively uncontroversial in its own right.
1. Constraint
Constraint is perhaps the most significant normative consideration in justifying limits on
the scope of holdings. At first blush, this concern might appear to push solely in a single
direction. Limiting holdings to the resolution of issues that are implicated by the material case
facts substantially constrains the power of judges to make law on extraneous issues. Assuming
agreement on what constitutes extraneous discussion, such discussion should be understood as
dicta. But even this is not so simple. The doctrines of ripeness, standing, and mootness, though
frequently deployed in the name of judicial constraint, are often criticized as devices that allow
an unrestrained judiciary to avoid deciding, or to choose when to decide, some of the most
difficult questions of law and public policy that are implicated in properly presented cases.178
Constraint therefore is relevant in assessing not only when a court has strayed too far, but also
when it has decided to avoid going down a necessary, but difficult or unpleasant, path.
Along with the remaining considerations, constraint is best understood at a micro level,
one that focuses not on the role of the case against some broad set of doctrines, justiciability or
otherwise, but rather on the scope of judicial autonomy in deciding the particular case. Even if
the rules of the judging game impose considerable restraint, within individual cases, judges
retain substantial flexibility. And indeed, as we will argue in the next part, we believe that the
definitions of dicta and holding must be sufficiently capacious to allow the deciding jurists such
flexibility in setting out the reasoning within particular cases. Consistent with our earlier positive
analysis,179 however, we also believe that the legal system should restrain judges from
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conclusively resolving issues not meaningfully presented by the material facts of the particular
case.
Some might argue that courts have no less a role in setting out legal policy than
legislatures, and therefore that there are no inherent limits linked to the obligation to resolve
particular cases on judicial law making powers.180 We respectfully disagree. Courts inevitably
make positive law, but that does not mean that individual judges are normatively justified in
making positive law at will. A central feature of the judicial system is the random selection of
judges to hear cases and thus to resolve the issues presented by those cases.181 Cases arise from
circumstances beyond the control of the individual judges, thus limiting any given judge’s ability
to determine which issues to resolve.182 Proper definitions of holding and dicta can preserve this
feature while still allowing judges control over case reasoning on issues fairly presented. To the
extent that judges may resolve issues independent of the random generation of cases in need of
resolution and of the factual bases of the cases that arise, a central aspect of judicial legitimacy—
and thus of judicial restraint—is undermined.
Although legal scholars might disagree as to how much constraint is desirable, even those
who believe that judges should have a substantially stronger policymaking role recognize the
need for some restraint on judicial lawmaking.183 Imagine a judicial system in which there were
no constraint, whether taking the form of formal rules or informal norms, encouraging judges to
limit their case dispositions to resolving issues implicated by material case facts. Any judge then
would be free to resolve—and indeed might feel justified in resolving—any issue at any time the
he or she chose. This judicial system then would be akin to a legislature in which any single
legislator could pass a bill.184 Other rules or norms still might constrain judges relative to
180
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legislators—for example, stare decisis, the custom of honoring legislative intent, and the
expectation that judges explain their reasoning in written opinions—but such a system would
certainly not further, and might undermine, these practices. The judges who would elect to
resolve particular issues would likely be those who care most deeply about the issues they elect
to consider. In electing to resolve issues not obviously implicated in the cases before them, they
might willingly sacrifice constraint to ensure preferred outcomes.
We recognize that there are some potential virtues in affording judges broad flexibility in
identifying on their own those issues that they elect to resolve. Granting broad flexibility might
promote valuable specialization. The judge who cares most about admiralty law is likely to be
the judge who knows the most about admiralty law, and such a judge might be particularly eager
to draft a broad rather than a narrow holding in an admiralty case, one that anticipates a problem
important to that body of precedent. With the specialist, rather than a dabbler, deciding such an
issue, there might be a lower risk that the failure to appreciate the peculiarities of admiralty law
will generate problematic doctrine. Similarly, more capable judges might be better able to
identify remaining legal ambiguities in doctrine than less capable judges, and a system that
effectively allows judges to resolve cases or issues within cases more broadly depending upon
their abilities might generate sounder legal doctrine.
Again, however, we must consider important countervailing concerns. By allowing the
specialist—whether in admirality, bankruptcy, corporate law, tax law, or something else
entirely—to drive precedent in a chosen area, the judicial system would create discrete doctrinal
enclaves that might not reflect broader doctrinal or institutional concerns. We might then
confront a choice between a system with numerous bodies of specialty judges and specialty
jurisprudence, versus a system of generalists who encourage various specialized bodies of law to
conform more comfortably with an overriding set of agreed upon jurisprudential principles.185
Moreover, a legal system that allowed judges unfettered discretion to determine what issues to
resolve might invite ideology as a determinant of which issues particular judges elected to
address. Legal doctrine might become less coherent with ideologically polarized judges

Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1288-89 (1994).
185
For an essay defending the generalist appellate judge, see Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Couts of Appeals Surivive Until
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. C AL. L. REV. 761 (1983).

67

simultaneously resolving issues in a particular substantive area.186 We do not suggest that
specialization should be altogether avoided, but rather that there are substantial tradeoffs in a
system that invites systematic specialization among judges who might care more deeply about
particular outcomes or bodies of case law than with reconciling that case law within the larger
context of the legal system.
The challenge is for the legal system to discourage judges from reaching out to resolve
issues, while allowing them to resolve, and perhaps even demanding that they resolve, those
issues that do arise. The legal system might grant a sufficient amount of flexibility in identifying
issues so as to allow more specialized and more intelligent judges a greater role than other
judges, without allowing undue influence of ideology on who decides any given issue. In
economic terms, the legal system should allow flexibility up to the point at which the marginal
costs of flexibility exceed the marginal benefits. We will argue that the proper distinction
between holding and dicta affords judges considerable latitude to select among various paths that
lead from facts to judgment, and among levels of breadth, in forging a particular path of case
reasoning.187 Our definitions, however, will also prevent judges from reaching out to resolve
issues on paths that do not lead from facts to judgment. A judge can retain considerable
flexibility even while restrained by the rules and norms of the judicial game.
2. Consideration
In a legal system in which a judge could use any case as the vehicle through which to
resolve issues of her choosing, some judges might race to resolve particular issues for which they
hold particularly strong normative concern. Not only would such judges be less likely to be
neutral, but also the race itself might reduce the care with which they address issues. The
American legal system includes various mechanisms that encourage proper consideration before
judges resolve those issues implicated in the cases they are deciding. These include finding
issues not previously litigated to be waived on appeal,188 discouraging (although not prohibiting)
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ex parte adjudication,189 and the various justiciability rules—ripeness, standing, and mootness—
that limit access to the judicial process absent the requisite circumstances to ensure that
consideration takes place within a concrete judicial setting.190 At the same time, the expectation
that judges explain how they reached their decisions encourages judges to pay considerable
attention to those issues that are properly before them. The holding-dicta distinction similarly
should serve both functions, delaying resolution of issues until judges can properly consider
them and encouraging judges to focus on the issues before them.
The propositions that judges should be hesitant to create new law absent adequate
presentation, normally through the adversarial process, and that judges are required to exercise
proper care in resolving the cases they decide, are, of course, not new. To the contrary, they are
emblematic features of judicial law making.191 Cass Sunstein, for example, has recognized the
value of judicial minimalism and what he calls “incompletely theorized agreements.”192 Judges
should seek agreement on how to resolve a case, even if that agreement masks chasms on larger
jurisprudential or philosophical issues that the case may present.193 The holding-dicta distinction,
properly conceived, helps to enforce an appropriate level of consideration, one that delves into
reconciling the case with the larger body of precedent, but that does not necessarily look for, or
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agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to
decide the case. When they disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level of greater particularity. The
distinctive feature of this account is that it emphasizes agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on
(relative) abstractions. This is an important source of social stability and an important way for diverse people
to demonstrate mutual respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as a whole.
Id. at 1735-36.
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attempt to resolve, fissures within larger bodies of case law, at least at one time. Judicial
minimalism leaves important issues open for resolution after further democratic deliberation.194
3. Clarity
Once a judge has fully considered a particular issue, the judge must still decide whether
to offer a broad or narrow resolution of the issue. Judicial minimalism often calls for narrow
resolutions. In some cases, however, “a wide rule, even if overinclusive and underinclusive,
would be better than a narrow judgment,” Sunstein acknowledges, because in the absence of a
wide rule “lower courts and subsequent cases would generate an even higher rate of error.”195 A
legal regime that insisted that issues always be resolved as narrowly as possible might invite
paralysis. There is value in achieving legal clarity, and althoughclarity sometimes pushes in the
same direction as do the factors of constraint and consideration, other times clarity pushes in the
opposite direction.
Broad rulings can promote clarity by cutting off a subsequent line of cases as, for
example, would have occurred had the Supreme Court ruled for the state in Roe v. Wade,196 and
found no constitutional right to abort.197 Courts sometimes promote doctrinal clarity, however, by
engaging in the opposite strategy, thus providing very specific and detailed holdings. Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, for example, gave educational institutions a relatively clear
framework for developing affirmative action policies, or at least appeared to have done so from
the time of the initial decision in 1978 until at least 1995,198 by signaling his approval of the
Harvard plus-factor plan, even though that plan was not immediately before the Court.199
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See SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 24-25. For an argument countering that minimalism can produce avoidance, see Pushaw,
supra note x.
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SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 49-50.
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410 U.S. 113 (1973); infra Part V.B.
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For a list of 46 post-Roe cases involving abortion, counting only up to 1993, see Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood
v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 77 n.283 (1993).
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See infra notes 309-315 (discussing Hopwood v. Texas, 732 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
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Perhaps ironically, Lino Graglia, an outspoken opponents of affirmative action residing at the University of Texas Law
School, recently supported this point:
A task this difficult [namely reconciling affirmative action in higher education with the principal of nondiscrimination]
requires superior intellect, such as one could expect to find at Harvard, and Harvard, Powell thought, had in fact
already pulled it off. All that remained to be done was raise Harvard’s achievement to the status of constitutional law,
which is exactly what Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke did. . . . We are being indirectly ruled by the Harvard faculty,
however, Bakke illustrates with unusual clarity through the ruse of the Supreme Court—mirror and mouthpiece of
liberal elite academia—purporting to interpret the Constitution.
Lino Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently Unconstitutional” Unless
Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity,” 98 TUL. L. REV. 2037, 2040 (2004).
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4. Candor
The clearer the holding-dicta distinction itself, the more difficult it will be for judges to
offer disingenuous rationales for avoiding the central determinations of previous cases. As the
distinction between holding and dicta becomes increasingly vague, past precedents can be
increasingly manipulated. Judges will face greater temptation to cheat from the regime of mutual
cooperation,200 or perhaps even convince themselves that they are not cheating, when they can
offer some facially plausible argument for disregarding a statement in a prior case. If the
holding-dicta distinction were perfectly clear (a goal that we recognize as impossible), then
disingenuous manipulation of precedents would be immediately recognizable. That would reduce
the incidence of manipulation and improve the legitimacy of the judicial process. Our goal is to
move the judicial system closer to this ideal, thus improving judicial candor.
By candor, we do not mean a naïve sense of disclosing the jurist’s subjective sensibilities
about legal doctrine or case facts. Rather, we mean that the legal system seeks to ensure that
judges disclose their genuine views concerning how the case they are deciding should be
resolved within the context of existing legal doctrines. It is entirely possible that if the deciding
jurists had the power to define the governing legal doctrines without regard to precedent, they
would do so differently. Perhaps the most significant benefit of candor in the sense that we use
that term is in furthering reliance upon the rule of law. Absent meaningful expositions on the
manner in which the court applies the governing rules to the case facts in the course of reaching a
disposition, it would be difficult for judges, or other affected actors, to discern with a reasonable
degree of certainty the rule of law as it applies in the next related dispute.201
Judicial incentives for candor, of course, depend not only on the clarity of the holdingdicta distinction, but also on how broadly holding is defined. Again, however, there are crosscutting concerns. On one hand, a narrower definition of holding, by granting future judges more
flexibility, may also encourage judges to be more candid. The power to create precedents, we
have seen, may encourage judges to interpret precedent other than in a purely neutral manner. It
is, after all, a common pastime for legal academics to point out exercises in creative judicial
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STEARNS, supra note x, at 88-92.
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draftsmanship,202 sometimes with admiration (depending on the importance of the doctrinal
objective), but often with a smirk. A definition of the holding-dicta distinction that allows great
flexibility for judges to craft broad holdings may also increase the incentives that later judges
have to offer disingenuous reasons for avoiding holdings. Even if it is theoretically desirable to
have a regime allowing broad holdings, such a regime might bring about its own collapse.
On the other hand, a narrow definition of holding may make judges less willing to
express nuanced legal conclusions. If only part of a judge’s reasoning will constitute the holding,
a judge might try to articulate a holding in a broader and less nuanced fashion than the judge
would ideally prefer. More worrisome still, to the extent that the judge believes the nuances
critical to the analysis, the judge might adopt a position opposite the judge’s preferred case
resolution.203 By switching positions and sacrificing the judge’s preferred resolution in the case at
hand, the judge may be able to ensure that caveats that otherwise would be considered dicta will
count as holding, although at the expense of too broad a holding in the opposite direction.204 We
believe that a regime that encourages a judge to disguise true beliefs about cases ultimately
undermines the rule of law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity, and second by
inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine.
C. Assessing Propositions and Problem Categories
We will now apply the Four C’s to the various categories of potential holdings that we
defined in Part II.
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See, e.g., Dorf, supra note x, at 2021-24 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s recasting of earlier executive removal precedents in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
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Some doctrines, such as the Supreme Court’s outcome voting regime, discourage judges from endorsing case resolutions with
which they disagree as a means of achieving some other goal. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting
Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1932 (2001) (demonstrating that social choice “reveals
one important constraining effect [the outcome voting] rule places on judicial behavior by encouraging not only principled—
meaning nonstrategic—articulation of issues, but also principled resolution of issues”).
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For a related analysis using social choice to demonstrate that the narrowest grounds rule limits strategy in Bakke by
preventing Justice Powell from being forced to select an opinion that strikes down the Davis plan but that employs an overly
stringent understanding of the permissible use of race in admissions (per Justice Stevens), or an opinion that upholds the Davis
plan, thus permitting the use of race in admissions, but in a manner that Powell found constitutionally defective (per Justice
Brennan), see STEARNS, supra note 37, at 137-38.
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1. Necessary Propositions
The most straightforward category to analyze is necessary propositions, such as the
proposition in Bakke that the Equal Protection Clause protects nonminorities.205 Unless a system
of adjudication rejects altogether the notion that legal principles can constitute holdings,206 a
proposition that is necessary to the disposition (or, by extension, to another holding) itself must
count as a holding. Absent an overruling, a subsequent court must distinguish a precedent if it is
to arrive at an opposite result. And unless the judicial system is willing to invite upon itself
claims of complete disingenuousness, a subsequent court will need to reconcile its ruling with
the earlier case.207 Denying relief to the next white applicant on otherwise indistinguishable facts
because Cotter begins with the letter “C” while Bakke begins with the letter “B” will not do. If
we set aside such obvious absurdities, it is apparent that no credible court could reconcile a
holding resting upon the determination that a racial set aside is not a race-based classification or
that Equal Protection Clause does not protect whites with the ultimate holding in Bakke. Under
any fair reading of the case, Bakke could not have prevailed without succeeding on these two
arguments.208 Where a Court explicitly endorses a proposition and could not have reached the
result without at least implicitly endorsing the proposition, then the proposition must be a
holding.
Although we recognize that this will be the least controversial of our conclusions, it is
worth establishing that the four normative factors that we have identified strongly support the
categorization of necessary propositions as holdings, at least absent other concerns. Where a
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It is, of course, our ambition to assess whether propositions are holdings without regard to whether the propositions are
correct or persuasive. We recognize that some might conclude that the Equal Protection Clause properly understood does not
protect whites. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (construing the Equal Protection Clause as
primarily motivated by the need to protect blacks against state action). But if precedent has any constraining influence at all, a
court determining whether to apply precedent must consider more than simply whether it would have resolved the initial case
differently. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (listing factors to consider in applying stare decisis and
applying those factors to avoid overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
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For discussion of legal systems without precedent, see supra note 121; and infra note 263.
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In Bakke, Statement (7) (the Davis program, which focuses solely on race, hinders rather than furthers diversity) is the
narrowest possible expression of the holding, applying itself only to the immediate case. An interesting question is what the
effect of (7) would be if the Court had simply announced the facts and then skipped immediately to (7) without explaining its
justification. We would argue that in such a case, other courts would still have to justify any opposite results from the result
announced by (7), by identifying a relevant distinctions in the facts. See infra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that the even in the absence of
any articulated reasoning, the combination of facts and the announced judgment create a very narrow holding).
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As this analysis suggests, the necessity of considering and resolving an issue as a court resolved it is sufficient for the court’s
resolution of the issue to count as a holding. But necessity is not required for a statement to be a holding. See infra Part IV.A.3. In
addition, the logical necessity of deciding an issue that the court has not actually decided might not transform a potential holding
into a holding. See infra Part IV.B.1.

73

court must resolve an issue to resolve a case, and in fact does resolve that issue, the court cannot
be thought of as having reached out to resolve the issue, so concerns about constraint do not
arise. The failure to resolve the issue, although potentially ensuring continued consideration of
the issue over time, would entail a failure to dispose of the immediate case based upon a proper
consideration of a critical issue. Perhaps most important, counting such propositions as holdings
is essential to maintaining legal clarity, for the set of holdings would be very small if necessary
propositions did not count. Finally, concerns about candor seem irrelevant. The resolution of a
necessary proposition does not alter the need for a judge to resolve any other propositions, and so
judges can be expected to resolve these questions based on their candid views rather than based
on strategic considerations.
2. Sufficient Propositions and Related Problems
We also conclude that sufficient propositions for the disposition (or, by extension, for
other holdings) should at least presumptively be holdings, and that the existence of alternative
possible justifications or alternative justifications should not be a bar to crediting sufficient
propositions as holdings. Let us consider alternative possible justifications first. The principal
concern is that when alternative possible justifications exist, we know that the jurist has made
some choice. It is possible that a judge might use such flexibility as a vehicle through which to
make law, and judges with strong preexisting normative views on particular issues may be more
likely to resolve those issues than other judges. To that extent, alternative possible justifications
might trigger concerns about constraint.
While we believe that the normative merit of creating law within cases is a function of
the judge’s need to resolve cases, we do not believe that judges should be constrained in
choosing among decisional paths when the legal doctrines implicated in the cases they decide
require the exercise of judicial discretion. One might criticize particular legal doctrines for
affording judges too much leeway, but some leeway is inherent in the judicial process. If a test
requires that two prongs be met to achieve a result, a judge cannot be said to overreach in finding
that because one of the two elements is not met, the test is not met. The judge must pick some
decisional path to resolve the actual case presented. As long as a judge does pick an appropriate
path from material facts to judgment, the judge remains considerably constrained.
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Two other factors, meanwhile, are decisive in suggesting that alternative possible
justifications should not bar sufficient propositions from counting as holdings. First, if alternative
possible justifications exempted actual justifications from holding status, it would be difficult to
develop clarity in the law. There almost always exist alternative possible justifications for the
result that the court reached with respect to a dispositive issue or to the case as a whole.209
Second, a holding rule excluding alternative possible justifications would lead judges determined
to establish a holding to consider the full range of alternative possible justifications. Because
there may be a large number of alternative possible justifications, this pursuit would call the
judge to consider a large number of issues, distracting the judge from focused consideration of
any one of those issues.
The analysis of cases in which a judge in fact offers alternative justifications for the same
result is equally straightforward, indeed easy given the conclusion that alternative possible
justifications should not deprive sufficient propositions that the court did reach of presumptive
holding status. There exists some risk that a judge will offer two justifications rather than one
because the judge is particularly concerned about making law with respect to both issues, thus
once again exposing concerns about constraint. The concern, however, can only be with respect
to the issue about which the judge cares less. Give our resolution of the alternative possible
justification problem, a judge would have the flexibility to resolve at least one of two alternative
justifications regardless of the rule governing alternative justifications. Granting the judge the
power to resolve a second (or third or fourth) alternative justification does not seem particularly
likely to channel resolution of issues to the judges who feel particularly strongly about those
issues.
Denying holding status to alternative justifications would delay the resolution of legal
issues for reasons having nothing to do with the need for more consideration, thus rendering the
law less clear without a compelling justification. This would thus undermine both the goal of
encouraging judges to consider issues genuinely presented in cases, and the goal of promoting
209

As we noted in Bakke, for example, the Court conceivably might have struck down the program on the basis of sex
discrimination rather than race discrimination. See supra notes x-x and accompanying text. That this seems exceedingly unlikely
under the facts of Bakke may suggest that the real question is whether there were alternative plausible justifications. That
formulation, however, emphasizes the difficulty of assessing the reasonableness of justifications that have not been explored. The
holding-dicta distinction would not be clear if it demanded an analysis of legal issues that the court did not even consider.
Alternative possible justifications might be found only where litigants in fact advanced those justifications, but with such a rule,
there might be considerable debate about whether litigants did sufficiently raise justifications, an issue that would require looking
beyond the judicial opinions themselves.
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clarity in the law. The concern for candor, meanwhile, furnishes an additional reason for
counting alternative justifications as holdings. In a regime that denied the status of holding to
alternative justifications, a judge might have an incentive to resolve more than one potential
justification as a means of denying holding status to the proposition establishing the most critical
justification in the case. Suppose that Powell had wanted to strike down the Davis program, but
did not want to create any precedent on the strict scrutiny analysis of social remediation.210
Powell might explain that each prong was sufficient because he wanted neither to be a holding.
Because judges establish precedent in resolving cases, the risk that judges will decide cases
based primarily on their idiosyncratic predilections toward particular litigants is reduced.
Candor concerns would be particularly severe if both alternative possible justifications
and alternative justifications were excluded from status as holding. Imagine a holding rule
demanding that whenever an alternative possible justification can be identified, the chosen
justification counts as a holding only if the alternative possible justification is expressly
considered and rejected. A judge then might have an incentive to reject rather than accept the
alternative possible justification simply as a means of ensuring that the actual justification would
have the status as holding. We posit that this might cause only slight damage to precedent,
because the rejection of the alternative possible justification itself would be dicta under the
analysis that follows. A judicial system that invited such manipulation, however, not only would
undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process, but also would aggravate the concerns about
lack of constraint, as the judges most eager to set a precedent would be most willing to jump
through the necessary hoops to do so.211
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It may seem implausible that Powell would want to strike down the Davis program for reasons other than those actually
considered in the case. But there are at least some cases in which judges might want a particular litigant to win, perhaps because
of the underlying case equities, but not want to create the precedent that would be necessary for that litigant to win. The
controlling opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), suggested that it might have viewed that case in this manner, stating:
“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.” Id. at 109.
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The recognition that a regime that fails to credit actual justifications because of alternative possible justifications would
produce incentives for noncandid resolution of issues also shows that such a regime would encourage judges to consider issues
unnecessarily. Again, using Bakke, consider the implications of not crediting the alternative explored justification on societal
remediation. Such a regime would insist that Powell specifically rule on both prongs to have even the chance of holding, even
though only one of the two prongs is needed for him to reject this justification for the use of race. Justice Powell then would be
reaching at least one issue that it inessential to his ultimate disposition. Requiring a judge to resolve an issue the resolution of
which is beside the point certainly promotes consideration of that issue, but it does so in the precisely the manner that excursions
into dicta promote consideration of matters extraneous to the resolution of the case at hand.
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3. Nonsupportive Propositions
In contrast, nonsupportive propositions generally should count as presumptive dicta.
Where a judge resolves an issue in a manner that does not contribute to the disposition of the
case, there is a strong possibility that the judge is reaching out to resolve that issue because the
judge holds relatively strong views about it. It is one thing to allow a judge to choose among
alternative paths of decision leading to the case judgment and to credit issues that are necessary
or sufficient to supportive propositions along that path. It is another to allow a judge to choose
decisional paths that do not lead to the disposition and to credit as holdings the resolution of
issues that lead to a place that the court is not compelled to go.
Not all nonsupportive propositions are equally irrelevant. We have distinguished, for
example, between absolutely irrelevant propositions (those that could have no conceivable
connection to the case) and six categories of nonsupportive propositions that might have been
relevant if they had been resolved differently or if other propositions had been resolved
differently.212 For example, the issue in Bakke concerning whether diversity is a compelling
interest was at least potentially relevant in the sense that a negative conclusion would have been
sufficient for the disposition, and an affirmative conclusion could have been supportive along a
path to an opposite case disposition. Thus, although the issue was not on the decisional path to
the actual disposition of the case, it was on a decisional path to a potential resolution.
Nonetheless, we believe that the constraint factor is ordinarily sufficient to render
resolution of such an issue dicta. While it is certainly not uncommon for a judge to indicate that
certain issues point in the direction opposite the disposition of a case, a judge can just as easily
skip such issues altogether, and often judges do skip such issues. A judge might use the process
of writing an opinion to determine how to resolve a case, but more often a judge considers all of
the issues in the case before deciding at least tentatively how to structure the opinion.213 As
recent cognitive psychology research has revealed, judges are like other decision makers in this
respect; human reasoning tends not to be linear, with premises leading to conclusions, but
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bidirectional, with anticipated or preferred conclusions also affecting premises.214 Thus, a judge
who reaches a nonsupportive proposition typically recognizes that the proposition is
nonsupportive before the judge writes the relevant section of the opinion. When a judge decides
to resolve that proposition nonetheless, there is a strong possibility that the judge cares especially
about the resolution of that issue, and the constraint factor presents a strong argument for
counting the resolution of such a proposition as dicta.
The issue remains close, however, because the remaining normative concerns move
largely in the other direction. The parties in a case have had incentives to brief potentially
relevant issues. Karl Llewellyn recognized long ago that the consideration factor does not
necessarily militate in favor of delaying resolution of potentially relevant issues.215 On the other
hand, a holding-dicta distinction that encourages judges to travel down only decisional paths that
actually lead to the disposition will likely encourage greater consideration of issues along that
path, rather than diverting judicial attention to issues that arise along several possible alternative
paths, some of which might not lead to the judgment. Clarity in the law sometimes might be
advanced by resolving issues that have been briefed, but allowing potentially relevant
propositions to count as holdings might require difficult distinctions about which propositions in
fact were potentially relevant rather than irrelevant to the outcome of a case. At a more global
level, therefore, clarity is promoted by limiting holding status to an identifiable class of
propositions.
Finally, providing holding status to potentially relevant propositions might advance the
goal of candor, because it would reduce the risk that a judge would resolve other issues
differently to ensure that resolution of the particular issue is credited as a holding. Suppose, for
example, that Justice Powell cared a great deal about his conclusion that diversity was a
214
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Karl Llewellyn poses the following hypothetical: “Again, take a case where the court rules on four points in favor of a man
who won below, but reverses, for all that, on the fifth point.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS
STUDY 46 (1929). Llewellyn recognizes that the issue is close:
One of the reasons, of the sound ones, often given for weighing dicta lightly, is that the background and consequences
of the statement have not been illumined by the argument of counsel, have not received, as being matters to be weighed
with brows-a-wrinkle, the full consideration of the court. In the case put the first reason does not fit; the second, if it is
to be put on at all, hangs loose and flaps.
Id. Llewellyn’s subsequent analysis, however, focuses not on the fact that the four are nonsupportive propositions, but on the fact
that there are five propositions in all. See id. at 46-47. Llewellyn thus failed in this portion of his argument to distinguish the
problem resulting from nonsupportive propositions and the problem of alternative justifications. Shortly before, however,
Llewellyn identifies the category of nonsupportive propositions, excluding them from holding status, noting “no rule can be the
ratio decidendi from which the actual judgment . . . does not follow.” Id. at 45.
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compelling interest, but not so much about his narrow tailoring analysis. If it were clear that his
compelling interest conclusion would count as dicta, he might have had an incentive to switch
sides in the case and find that the Davis plan was narrowly tailored to the goal of improving
diversity.
Evaluating potentially relevant propositions thus demands a difficult balance between
constraint and the other factors. As a general matter, we believe that the constraint factor
predominates in this context because allowing judges to create holdings on every issue that
possibly could be relevant to resolution of a case would create many chances for opportunistic
resolution of legal issues, and because the class of cases in which judges are likely to care
sufficiently deeply about issues pointing in the opposite direction of their preferred case
resolution as to encourage them to switch sides is quite small.216 We do recognize, however, that
the Supreme Court, given its unique role relative to the federal and state judiciaries on issues of
federal law and its limited docket capacity, might afford itself more leeway in defining its own
holdings more broadly than would ordinarily be the case in other courts.217
4. Structured Analysis
The classification of potentially relevant propositions is a sufficiently close call that other
considerations might rebut our presumptive conclusions. One such factor is the problem of
structured analysis, which, we will argue, should be sufficient to move some nonsupportive
propositions from the status of presumptive dicta to holding. We have already argued, however,
that Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest should count as dicta, even
though the compelling interest analysis is part of the structured strict scrutiny test. Using the
taxonomy of nonsupportive propositions that we offered in Table 1,218 we would draw the line
between “structured but unordered, with continuing relevance” and “structured and ordered, with
continuing relevance,” while recognizing that this line may at times be difficult to draw.
Where a test has a strong natural order, and the resolution of the first part of the test turns
out to be a nonsupportive proposition, the constraint concern is diminished. In such cases, the
judge might have been able to violate the natural order and thus avoid resolving issues that point
216
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away from the court’s eventual disposition, but when a judge does follow the natural order of a
test, the concern that the judge is reaching out to resolve an issue about which the judge has
particularly strong concerns is substantially diminished. Similarly, when an analysis does not
involve a particular test but presents a logically ordered analysis, this too diminishes the concern
regarding constraint. Certainly, where a court finds standing before ruling against a plaintiff or
petitioner on the merits, the standing conclusion should count as a holding even though it is
opposite the ultimate judgment.219
Unordered or weakly ordered tests do not seem to us to furnish a sufficiently strong
argument to convert propositions from presumptive dicta to holding. Once again, we recognize
that there seems no ready metric for assessing how strongly tests are ordered or where to draw
the dividing line between ordered and unordered tests, but given that virtually all tests are at least
articulated in an order by the courts originating them,220 we would be wary of claims that tests
are generally strongly ordered so as to convert nonsupportive propositions into holding. Because
narrow tailoring analysis could build upon an assumed rather than established compelling
interest, however, it is not obvious that what may be the more intuitive ordering—compelling
interest then narrow tailoring—is a sufficiently strong natural ordering in the sense in which we
use that term.221
We recognize, however, that dominant lawyerly and judicial intuition might sometimes
diverge from formal analysis on how to treat a particular test. If most lawyers and judges would
find a particular test to be strongly ordered that a more formal analysis reveals to be weakly
ordered, perhaps the dominant understanding should control. For example, while we have argued
that strict scrutiny is a weakly ordered test, and that Justice Powell's nonsupportive assertion that
racial diversity is a compelling state interest is therefore dicta, one might instead conclude that
the proposition is a holding if lawyers and judges in general consider strict scrutiny to be a
219
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strongly ordered test. The dominant perception of lawyers and judges on the question of ordering
provides an independent check against articulating holdings that are motivated primarily by the
desire to resolve questions of legal policy rather than dictated by the need to resolve the
immediate case. A nonsupportive proposition may therefore be classified as holding based upon
a determination that it derives from the application of a test that either is strongly ordered or that
is generally understood to be strongly ordered.
The problem of structured analysis also may provide a basis for converting to dicta some
alternative justifications that presumptively count are holdings.222 The paradigmatic case, once
again, involves standing, except this time the court finds that a litigant who lacks standing would
have lost in any event. Even though the court’s assessment of the merits provides an alternative
justification for the judgment, it was improper for the court to reach the merits given that the
standing denial is jurisdictional. When a court does consider the merits in such a case (as in a
case in which jurisdiction is absent), that may suggest that the judge has a strong normative
interest in the resolution of the merits. The constraint factor thus counsels against treating the
court’s conclusion on the merits as holding. Similarly, discounting the merits resolution as dicta
promotes proper consideration. One of the commonly expressed justifications for standing is to
ensure adversity concerning those issues to be resolved.223 Allowing a court to set a precedent on
the merits of a nonjusticiable case would undermine that justification.
We recognize that the factors do not point unambiguously in one direction, however.
Allowing courts to resolve issues that the litigants have briefed might contribute to resolving
ambiguities in law and thus promote clarity. Meanwhile, by denying precedential status to the
merits resolution of a nonjusticiable case, a judge who is particularly interested in resolving the
merits may have an incentive to find the case justiciable in order to achieve a holding on the
merits, thus threatening both candor and constraint. The observation that judges might
manipulate justiciability doctrine is, of course, not new,224 and the judges most inclined to engage
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in such manipulation are likely those with particularly strong normative views on the merits
resolution for which a more dispassionate standing determination might pose a barrier.
Where analysis is as strongly ordered as the questions of standing and the merits,
however, that is presumably because the courts have concluded that there is a strong reason to
resolve the second inquiry only after the courts achieves a certain resolution on the first. In such
circumstances, where the resolution of the first inquiry makes the second inquiry irrelevant, we
believe that resolution of the second inquiry should count as dicta. We would reach the opposite
conclusion, however, with tests that are only weakly ordered, such as the strict scrutiny test.
Evaluation of the second prong of a weakly ordered test despite the resolution of the test as a
whole through the first prong is not so unusual as to raise red flags about a judge’s motivation in
doing so.
A variation on the problem occurs where a court skips the first prong of an ordered test to
resolve the second prong, most commonly because the second prong is the easier to resolve. For
example, a court might avoid an analytically difficult standing issue and conclude that the merits
of the claim is frivolous. The Supreme Court has confronted cases in which lower federal courts
have engaged in such “hypothetical jurisdication.” In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,225 Justice Scalia, writing for a majority on this issue, rejected the practice, claiming
that it “offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.”226 The Court, however, has not
always insisted that courts follow the order of even relatively strongly ordered tests. Thus, in
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,227 Justice Ginsburg, while claiming to adhere to Steel Co.,
permitted a lower federal court to resolve a less difficult question of personal jurisdiction, which
represents a waivable barrier to jurisdiction, without first resolving the more difficult and
nonwaivable question of subject matter jurisdiction, where the particular resolution of the easier
jurisdictional question rendered moot the resolution of the more difficult one. The Court
concluded that despite the difference in the power to waive these forms of jurisdiction, “there is
no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy.”228
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Our point is not to resolve the difficult questions of hypothetical jurisdiction or interjurisdictional priorities. These doctrines do not concern whether the courts should consider the
resolution of logically subsequent issues as precedent, but rather whether courts are permitted to
skip steps in reaching them. Nonetheless, the factors that underlie our analysis suggest that these
issues are closely related, and thus it is not surprising that the courts have made fine distinctions
in this area. There are policy issues that counsel in favor of permitting courts to resolve cases
based upon easy (even if subsequent) rather than difficult (even if prior) issues. Doing so allows
for continued consideration of the difficult issue while providing adequate consideration of those
issues that prove sufficient to resolve the case. Clarity might be furthered as the legal system
benefits from incremental development of doctrine, which is promoted by limiting the obligation
of courts to reach issues in resolving cases. And when the second issue is genuinely easier, a
judge’s decision to resolve the case on that issue does not suggest that the judge had a
particularly strong normative interest in that issue.
On the other hand, once judges are allowed to skip a preliminary issue, judges who
particularly wish to resolve the second issue might present the subsequent issue as easier than it
actually is, and might set out a simplistic analysis of that issue to reinforce the judge’s claim that
skipping the logically prior issue is justified. In addition, there remains a concern that skipping
the first issue will promote underdevelopment of doctrine in that area, especially if the area is
viewed as an arcane body of jurisdictional case law. In the narrow class of cases in which it is
permissible to skip jurisdictional predicate issues to get to the merits, the courts have presumably
found that concerns about manipulation are not sufficient to force compliance with the general
rule.
5. Hypotheticals
The problem of hypotheticals proves one of the easiest to resolve. Hypotheticals and
analogical reasoning sometimes help to sharpen case issues. The power of reasoning by analogy
might suffice to make the resolution of hypothetical issues a sufficient, or even necessary,
proposition in a case from the perspective of the deciding court. Nonetheless, the power to create
holdings through hypotheticals presents significant problems of constraint. If a court, by
resolving a hypothetical case, can determine the result of that case should it arise, there will be a
strong incentive for judges to pose hypotheticals that they are particularly interested in resolving.
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This might result in courts devoting excessive attention to, and sometimes purporting to resolve,
potentially relevant hypotheticals even absent adequate briefing, thus undermining the goal of
proper consideration. Assigning holding status to hypotheticals would diminish doctrinal clarity
in the law, at least to the extent that abstract or tangential hypotheticals obscure what a judge was
actually required to resolve in the immediate case. Providing holding status to hypotheticals
would thus threaten to undermine candor, as judges would increasingly claim to identify
hypotheticals as relevant to the immediate case when their real interest is just resolving the
hypotheticals themselves. Thus, propositions that are hypothetical should count as dicta.
6. Biconditional Statements
Even a hypothetical, however, conceivably could count as a holding if it is the inverse of
a holding and part of a biconditional statement. The case for counting both halves of a
biconditional statement as a holding is strong. When the case reasoning directly results in an “if,
then” holding on a particular issue, there is little reason to believe that the judge has reached out
in resolving the inverse issue. A judge who concludes that the inverse proposition is true may
reach that issue because the judge feels particularly strongly about the issue, but there is at least a
strong possibility that the judge is simply trying to offer a comprehensive resolution to the
relevant question presented. For example, in Bakke, Justice Powell resolved the question of how
a university could use race as a factor in an admissions program in a way that would be narrowly
tailored to advance the interest of diversity.
The concerns about constraint that ordinarily would arise with respect to nonsupportive
propositions thus seem greatly reduced when the nonsupportive proposition is the inverse of a
holding and thus part of what the court intended as a biconditional test. The consideration factor
and the clarity factor point in opposite directions, but we believe that the pull of the clarity factor
is stronger. Delaying final resolution may always promote consideration, but there is no special
reason to delay resolution of inverse propositions. Bakke, for example, unquestionably presented
the question that Powell resolved, and waiting until additional cases raised the same issue would
not have greatly improved the Court’s ability to address the issue. The clarity factor, meanwhile,
strongly suggests that inverse propositions generally should be holdings. If a court cannot issue
biconditional holdings, it may take considerably longer to provide definitive guidance on where
the line is. Of course, sometimes there will be reasons for judges to conclude that given the
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complexity and fact-dependent nature of an issue, the consideration factor will outweigh the
clarity factor, but we do not believe that the holding-dicta distinction should demand that
consideration trump clarity in every such case.
Finally, the concern for judicial candor is significant here, as the Bakke example shows.
If Justice Powell had been clearly prohibited from treating his analysis of whether the Harvard
plan was narrowly tailored as holding, and if he had feared that a holding limited to striking
down the Davis program might signal that no race-based admissions programs could be narrowly
tailored or at least have left open that possibility, then he might instead have elected to go further
in deciding which programs to allow. A regime that flatly prohibits the issuance of biconditional
holdings might have placed Powell in the difficult position of either striking the Davis plan on
narrow tailoring grounds, and leaving open the possibility that a later Court would extend Bakke
to cover the Harvard plan, or endorsing the Davis program, even though Justice Powell truly
believes that it was not narrowly tailored.229 By instead issuing a biconditional holding, Powell
was able to issue an opinion that promoted judicial candor in the sense of informing the relevant
institutions as to the precise, and nuanced, basis for his narrow tailoring holding. The holdingdicta distinction ideally should not induce judges to take disingenuous positions on issues,
contrary to how they actually believe the issues should be resolved. This problem might also
distinguish the Supreme Court given the relative rarity with which it reviews any particular
substantive issue. The hiatus in equal protection analysis of affirmative action programs in higher
education admissions from 1978 when the Supreme Court decided Bakke until 2004 when the
Court decided Grutter and Gratz provides a credible normative justification for affording that
Court more flexibility to determine the scope of its own holdings as compared with courts that
lack discretionary power to control their dockets.
As a general matter, we believe that the inverse statements of holdings generally should
count as holdings as well, but there is a significant caveat. It often may not be obvious that an
inverse of a holding in fact is an inverse of a holding, when the holding and the inverse statement
are not conceptually connected in the form of a biconditional. Allowing all inverse statements to
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count as holdings thus makes the holding-dicta distinction itself difficult to apply, undermining
the goal of clarity. We would thus limit our conclusion to situations in which a court clearly is
creating a test that is equivalent to a biconditional statement. An important virtue of this
approach is that we believe that it comes closer to judicial practice and lawyerly intuition than an
approach that counts all inverse statements of holdings as holdings. Our anecdotal evidence
suggests that lawyers generally believe that when a court creates a test, even a biconditional test,
that is a holding, but lawyers do not generally have an intuition that all inverse propositions of
holdings should be holdings. Later, we will consider a case presenting inverse propositions that
should not count as holdings.230
We recognize that this approach introduces a concern with respect to the clarity factor,
albeit one that we view as less significant: determining whether the court is crafting a test.
Although we think the answer in Bakke is affirmative, that case nonetheless illustrates the
difficulty. Powell could have stated more explicitly that he was announcing a distinction between
quotas and plus factors as the test for meeting narrow tailoring. Even so, the true test of a theory
may be whether it can identify which cases are difficult, and our analysis can show precisely
why the discussion of the Harvard plan presents a difficult issue for the holding-dicta
distinction.231 Some readers of Bakke may see the discussion as creating a test, and those readers
will tend to think the discussion created a holding. Others may see the discussion as unconnected
to Justice Powell’s conclusion that the Davis plan was not narrowly connected, and those readers
will tend to think the discussion was dicta. We side with the former readers because Powell did
explain that the reason that he was discussing the Harvard plan was because it bore on the issue
of the extent to which a university can use race.232 But readers need not accept our conclusion to
agree with our more general position that biconditional statements that announce tests create
holdings, while other biconditional statements do not.
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7. Breadth
The holding-dicta distinction should not force judges to resolve cases in the narrowest
possible manner that is consistent with the case judgment. When an issue is genuinely before a
judge, and thus concerns about constraint are at their minimum, the holding-dicta distinction
should leave the choice to the deciding jurist to weigh the benefits and costs of resolving the
issue in a complete and comprehensive manner. We recognize that there may be times when it is
appropriate for a judge to craft holdings that have very narrow application, leaving it to future
courts to identify which features of the case were dispositive, but there may be other cases in
which it is appropriate for a court to clarify the law by offering a broader holding.233
As before, there is some risk that allowing judges to determine the breadth of their
holdings will lead to an issue’s being resolved in a comprehensive way by the first judge who
has strong feelings about an issue. But any judge will be constrained by the obligation to
harmonize a case with the holdings of earlier cases. The norm that judges should not
disingenuously distinguish prior cases itself provides a significant constraint, complementing the
constraint that a judge can issue holdings only along the decisional path to the case result. What
is decisive here, however, is not a conclusion that constraint is irrelevant. Rather, it is the
observation that a regime prohibiting unnecessarily broad antecedents would, except in cases
involving patently absurd distinctions, effectively be a regime in which cases are generally
distinguishable on their facts, and in which generalizations by a court would rarely provide the
basis for holdings. We will turn to the task of critiquing such a regime soon.234 For now it is
sufficient to observe that this type of regime is in tension with the premise of this Article that
statements in opinions sometimes constitute holdings. It is always possible to make statements
narrower and more dependent on the particular facts of a case, but our system of precedent
sometimes counts generalizations beyond the facts of a case as holdings.
That does not mean, however, that all broad statements should be considered to be
holdings. Imagine the following hypothetical statement in Bakke: “If a graduate admissions
program uses a quota, or an undergraduate admissions program uses a quota or a plus factor, then
the program fails narrow tailoring.” Allowing that proposition to be a holding would effectively
233
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provide an end run around our conclusion governing hypotheticals. No undergraduate admissions
program was before the Court. It would be fine for a court to sweep graduate admissions and
undergraduate admissions together—“if any university admissions program uses a quota, then it
is fails narrow tailoring”—even though such a conclusion would resolve no greater a number of
cases. But a court cannot invoke a narrow antecedent for the case at hand, and then resolve
additional cases not fitting within that antecedent. Stated conceptually, a court can fit the facts of
a case within a broad circle and resolve all the fact patterns within that circle, but it cannot then
annex an additional circle and resolve the fact patterns within that circle too.
8. Summary
Before analyzing the definitions of holding offered by other scholars and setting out our
own, we will summarize the preceding discussion. The following table presents each of the
problems identified in Part II and evaluates them according to the four normative criteria
developed in this part. This table repeats each of the problem categories from Table 3, indicating
whether the category has potential relevance for presumptive holdings or presumptive dicta. The
second column identifies factors that provide an argument for altering the presumptive status of
propositions based on this category, and the third column identifies factors that provide contrary
arguments. The fourth columnoffers a conclusion based on the analysis in the preceding
subsections, indicating whether the problem category should convert presumptive holdings to
dicta or presumptive dicta to holding.
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Table 4. The problem categories and their resolutions
Problem category (and Factors that argue for
presumptive status of alteringpresumptive
potentially affected
status
statements)

Factors that argue
against altering
presumptive status

Conclusions

Alternative possible
justifications (applied to
presumptive holdings)

The ability to choose a
decisional path implies some
freedom from constraint, as a
judge may pick the path
containing issues that the
judge most wants to resolve.

Should not turn holdings into
dicta.

Alternative justifications
(applied to presumptive
holdings)

Allowing judges to choose
multiple decisional paths
undermines constraint, as
the judges who choose
multiple paths may be
particularly eager to resolve
the relevant issues. The
effect on constraint is
minimal, however, assuming
that judges already have the
power to choose a path.
When a court reaches a
second issue despite
resolving a test on the first
issue, it is reaching out to
resolve the second issue,
thus undermining constraint.

(1) There are alternative
possible justifications for a
large number of propositions,
so an exception here would
limit clarity by preventing the
development of law.
(2) Disallowing reliance upon
a single prong of a multiprong test would undermine
concerns for candor and
consideration by encouraging
resolution of issues
unnecessary to resolving the
immediate case.
If alternative justifications
were not holdings and
alternative possible
justifications also were not
holdings, judges might have
an incentive to reach a result
on one issue opposite from
that on the other to ensure
that they create a holding,
undermining the goal of
candor.
(1) Allowing courts to resolve
briefed issues may advance
clarity in the law, without
reducing consideration.
(2) Considering a second
alternative justification to be
dicta in some circumstances
might lead a court to change
its position on the first
alternative justification.
Allowing courts to resolve
briefed issues may advance
clarity in the law, without
reducing consideration.

Structured analysis (applied
to presumptive holdings)

Structured analysis (applied
to presumptive dicta)

Hypotheticals (applied to
presumptive holdings)

When the first prong of an
ordered multi-part test
produces a nonsupportive
proposition, concerns about
constraint are less than with
most other nonsupportive
propositions.
If hypotheticals count as
holdings, courts may have
wide discretion to resolve
issues not before them,
undermining constraint.

Should not turn holdings into
dicta.

Where a test is ordered, only
the first of multiple alternative
justifications should count as
a holding. For example,
resolution of the merits of the
case after a finding of no
standing is dicta.

Where a test is ordered, the
resolution of one prong
should not be considered to
be dicta merely as a result of
resolution of a later prong.
Even if a hypothetical
proposition is presumptively
a holding because of its role
in the argument, it should
count as dicta.
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Problem category (and Factors that argue for
presumptive status of alteringpresumptive
potentially affected
status
statements)

Factors that argue
against altering
presumptive status

Conclusions

Biconditional statements
(applied to presumptive
dicta)

Allowing biconditionals can
promote clarity and candor
by avoiding a choice
between extreme doctrinal
positions.

The inverse proposition of a
holding should count as a
holding where the court
effectively endorses both
halves of a biconditional in a
test.

If broad statements are not
allowed, all cases are subject
to being distinguished on
their facts, undermining
clarity in the law.

A court is free to endorse
broad propositions, as long
as the propositions do not
forge together distinct sets of
factual issues in an effort to
evade the characterization of
hypotheticals as dicta.

Breadth (applied to
presumptive holdings)

By allowing judges to hold on
inessential issues,
biconditionals threaten to
undermine constraint. The
effect on constraint is small,
however, because a judge is
still limited to issues along a
chosen decisional path.
The judges who resolve
cases broadly may tend to be
those with strong normative
views on the issues in those
cases.

IV. DEFINING HOLDING AND DICTA

Not surprisingly, given the central importance of delineating dicta and holding, there is a
longstanding, and often insightful, literature that has focused on this question. In this part, we
will begin by providing a critical overview of that literature. While our analysis will show
agreement with many discrete insights, it will also underscore our larger point, namely that the
failure of prior scholars to undertake a more comprehensive approach in setting out the problem
of defining dicta, and specifically the failure to articulate categories of judicial assertions that
give rise to disputes in characterization, has limited the efficacy of prior scholarly efforts in this
important area.
While the analytical framework set out in the prior parts of this Article can improve
conceptual clarity even if courts ultimately reject our definition, we believe that our definition
has much to commend it both at a theoretical level and at the level of practical implementation.
As with virtually any definition that one might offer, ours is prone to some difficult applications
and to potential disputes in concrete case settings. But a definition that hubristically claimed to
resolve all cases would undoubtedly mask serious difficulties and disagreements. Instead, our
definition is sufficiently capacious to allow reasonable jurists in difficult cases to argue for
different conclusions edified by the common theoretical foundation. Properly applied, our
definition resolves many issues and reduces the set of substantial disagreements that will arise.
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A. The Inadequacy of Existing Definitions
1. Reconciliability
We begin with Professor Michael Dorf’s important article,235 first by evaluating his
critique of a commonly held definition of holding (and by implication of dicta), and second by
critiquing Dorf’s alternative suggested definition.236 Professor Dorf’s principal project is to attack
the definition of holding as limited to a meaningful or plausible reconciliation of the facts and
outcomes of prior cases. Under the facts-plus-outcome, or reconciliation, approach, a court’s task
is to identify a theory that can explain the results of previous cases, regardless of whether the
precedent-setting courts themselves adopted the superimposed theory. We agree with Dorf’s
conclusion, though we disagree with some of his reasons and will offer some additional and, we
believe, more persuasive reasons. His analysis focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court and its powers
as an Article III court; in contrast, while we use several cases arising in Article III courts as
illustrations, our analysis is not grounded in the requirements of Article III.237
Dorf uses case examples to illustrate in depth how the Supreme Court infamously
reinvented the important line of cases concerning the President’s authority to remove
administrative agency officials.238 Perhaps the strongest indication of recasting arose in Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s decision in Morrison v. Olson,239 in which a majority upheld the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, even though the Act prevented the
President from exercising complete removal authority over the independent counsel. The
independent counsel performs purely executive functions,240 and a previous case had clearly
provided that Congress cannot restrict the President’s authority to remove officials performing
purely executive functions.241 Morrison effectively supplanted what had been a clear line with a
balancing test.242
235

Dorf, supra note x.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
237
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Using the euphemism of “present considered view” to describe the Court’s new position,
Rehnquist rewrote longstanding doctrine by effectively ignoring broad positions in the prior
cases to arrive at an otherwise unattainable result.243 Relying on this line of cases and others,
Dorf argues that the Court has repeatedly invented new rationales and used “a too-narrow view
of holdings . . . as a means by which judges evade precedents that cannot fairly be
distinguished.”244 Dorf expresses the concern that constraining “holding” to facts-plus-outcome
invites such manipulation given the ability to recast prior results in a new light.245 The removal
cases certainly support this insight. Dorf then proceeds to offer a broader theoretical justification
for rejecting the facts-plus-outcome approach.
Dorf persuasively argues that the reconciliation approach simply fails to provide a
positive explanation of judicial practice: “[T]he courts do not accept the facts-plus-outcome view
of holdings; when they are not busy circumventing precedent by abusing the holding/dictum
distinction, judges typically pay a great deal of attention to the words as well as the results of
judicial decisions.”246 Ironically, the fact that courts sometimes construct seemingly disingenuous
distinctions, or ambitiously recast old doctrines in a new light, underscores Dorf’s argument that
courts ordinarily evince an obligation to attend to and somehow reconcile previously articulated
holdings. And yet, as Dorf acknowledges, the occasional practice (one that might be more
frequent in the Supreme Court than elsewhere) of disingenuously distinguishing extant case law
complicates the task of constructing normatively satisfying and functional definitions of holding
and dicta.
Not all observers of the courts believe that precedents, or even the facts of cases,
constrain courts. Some judicial politics scholars have used empirical methods to argue that
that case itself involved a disingenuously narrow reading of Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
242
Morrison, 478 U.S. at 691 (“[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light.”). Morrison itself was narrowly read in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), decided at around the same time
Dorf’s article was published. See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998) (discussing Edmond). If the trend continues, Edmond will be read
narrowly as well.
243
In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed up the revisionist nature of the majority analysis. See Morrison, 478 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Surprising to say, the Court appears to concede an affirmative answer to both questions [implicated by present
doctrine], but seeks to avoid the inevitable conclusion that since the statute vests some purely executive power in a person who is
not the President of the United States it is void.”).
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precedent fails to explain appellate court decision making.247 One difficulty in proving or refuting
such claims involves selection bias.248 Cases that fail to settle tend to present close issues,249 and
the Supreme Court’s procedure for choosing most of its own docket weeds out many cases in
which the relevant precedents provide relatively clear guidance, even if the lower courts have
applied them incorrectly.250 In addition, the claim to “stare indecisis,”251 meaning that precedent
imposes no meaningful constraint on judicial decision making, rests upon heavy citation in
support of, and in opposition to, both sides of a given issue in a case. The difficulty with relying
upon such data to refute the constraining effect of precedent is that litigants are apt to cite cases
concerning the most contentious issues, while issues well settled by precedent, and thus beyond
credible dispute, fail to warrant heavy citation. In any event, the widespread practice of citing the
reasoning of prior cases strongly suggests that precedent, and expressed reasoning within
decided cases, matters. If it did not, then litigants and courts presumably would simply present
persuasive arguments without bothering to structure their arguments in the context of precedent.
This insight suggests that as a positive matter, both the facts and at least some of the
generalizations of prior cases do affect the results in subsequent cases.
Of course, even if we are correct that courts do not limit the reach of precedents to facts
plus outcomes, it remains possible that earlier generations of jurists afforded less deference than
courts today to the express reasoning articulated in prior opinions. Consider, for example, the
ancient distinction between the holding and the ratio decidendi (or more simply ratio) of a case.
As Karl Llewellyn explained: The “actual holding must be stated quite narrowly,” encompassing
the “precise point at issue . . . that the case decided.”252 The ratio provides the “generally
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applicable rule of law on which the opinion says the holding rested.”253 The ratio must also be
distinguished from the “‘the rule of the case,’ meaning the ‘principle’ for which a case stands,”
as that principle may develop in subsequent case law.254 Llewellyn observed a similar contrast
between dictum and obiter dictum.255 A dictum is a statement that is nonessential but may have
“second-order precedential value.”256 Obiter dictum is “merely a remark in passing” and is thus
entitled to no more weight than the expression “of a legal scholar.”257 Our point is not to resurrect
seemingly dated terminology, but rather to show that even assuming that it was once clear, the
distinction between holding and ratio decidendi has blurred,258 as has that between dictum and
obiter dictum. Whileit is interesting to speculate as to why commentators in the early twentieth
century offered more gradations of precedent than is common today,259 our task is to provide a
practical set of tools for distinguishing holding and dicta that can be employed to edify current
practice.
Dorf offers two normative arguments against the facts-outcome approach. With respect,
we find these arguments less persuasive than his observation that the courts treat holdings as
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significant, at least when not evading them. First, while acknowledging Justice Holmes’s
assertion that “the common law evolves through a process of rationalization,”260 Dorf insists that
“reconceptualization has its limits” and that the facts-outcome view is “ultimately incoherent.”261
The problem, Dorf argues, is that “‘no mechanical rules can be devised to determine the level of
generality intended by the precedent court.’”262 We agree that there can be no mechanical rules
for determining precedents in a facts-outcome regime, but we disagree that this makes the
reconciliation view “incoherent.” Indeed, presumably the strongest argument for the factsoutcome approach is that its flexibility frees courts from strict adherence to the reasoning of their
predecessors, thus allowing them to refine doctrine within a context of overall judicial constraint.
A jurisprudential system providing no precedential weight to written opinions might be criticized
for producing too little clarity,263 but incoherence arises only from mutually inconsistent
constraints, not from indeterminacy.
Second, Dorf argues that “reconceptualizations rarely pay sufficient attention to the real
issues at stake in the earlier case.”264 A court distinguishing an earlier case may do so on the
basis of a fact to which the litigants in that case paid little attention.265 “When a court attempts to
re-explain a prior decision,” Dorf argues, “the court necessarily focuses greater attention on the
case before it at the moment than on the prior case.”266 Dorf does not explain, however, why this
admitted tendency to read old cases in a new light is undesirable or, more generally, why the
legal system should systematically prefer the original court’s articulated rationale to an arguably
consistent alternative rationale—one that facilitates a desired judicial outcome—provided that it
can be meaningfully constructed from the prior case. The original court, after all, might have
selected its rationale without fully anticipating the implications of its immediate holding for a
260
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Id. at 2036.
262
Id. (quoting MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988)).
263
The civil law system has no doctrine of stare decisis, but precedents may have some persuasive weight, and this weight may
become stronger when multiple courts arrive at the same conclusion. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in
Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis (2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=534504)
(providing an economic analysis comparing the civil law’s approach to precedent to that of the common law).
264
Dorf, supra note x, at 2038.
265
Dorf offers Humphrey’s Executor as an example: “How did the Humphrey’s Executor Court know with such certainty that a
postmaster carries out inherently executive functions? Might not the setting of postage rates be considered quasi-legislative?
Could not the application of those rates to particular parcels be termed quasi-adjudicatory?” Id. These arguments attack
Humphrey’s Executor for positing facts that may not have existed in Myers. Yet one can imagine a definition of holding that
permits distinctions, but only where the distinctions are clearly supported by facts deemed material by the original court.
266
Id.
261

95

significant future case. The second judge is in a better position to consider the operative
precedent in light of at least two sets of facts: those motivating the initial precedent, and those in
the immediate case. Thus, Dorf’s argument might even cut in favor of the reconciliation
approach.
Larry Alexander has also offered an argument against the reconciliation approach,267
which he labels “the result model of precedent.”268 After distinguishing various formulations of
this model, Alexander argues that they are all ultimately equivalent to Ronald Dworkin’s general
jurisprudential approach, demanding the articulation of a morally sensible principle that
encompasses the relevant body of precedent and reconciles it with the immediate case.269 Under
this approach, a court must identify an admittedly imperfect but neutral governing principle that
best harmonizes the cases.270 Because a system of precedent implies reliance upon decisions with
which an applying court might disagree as an original matter, the challenge under the
reconciliation approach is for the court to reconcile those cases whose outcomes it prefers with
those cases that it would have decided differently. So viewed, the defects of the facts plus
outcome approach to precedent are the familiar defects of Dworkin’s project.271
Professor Alexander provides a detailed attack on Dworkin, but for our purposes, it is
sufficient to focus on one argument. Dworkin’s task, Alexander notes, is to answer the following
question: “‘Which incorrect political/moral theory is ‘best’ from the point of view of correct
political/moral theory?’”272 No theoretical apparatus “can answer such a question because the
question is so bizarre,” Alexander insists.273 We need not assess whether Alexander is correct in
his assertion, because it is sufficient for our analysis to note that the task of identifying the best
incorrect theory leaves considerable room for disagreement. The reconciliation approach might
suffice in doctrinal areas with so few cases that one theory can explain them all. But the
approach threatens to disintegrate as the underlying doctrinal area expands and gains sufficient
complexity that it becomes implausible to offer a single theory that can credibly account for even
267
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the vast bulk of cases. In many areas of law, commentators can agree only that the law is a
“mess,”274 and while some commentators and jurists offer positive accounts that they trumpet as
less messy than existing doctrine, or perhaps even neat, they generally will concede that even
their new approach cannot explain all existing cases.275
But even if one could devise a comprehensive framework with which to embrace all or
even most of the cases in a complex field, the reconciliation approach would remain normatively
problematic. Perhaps ironically, it becomes problematic precisely because of the potential to
develop such a comprehensive theory. Thus, in a system that truly cared only about a theory that
could reconcile the facts and outcomes of decided cases, the law review article through which a
professor best or most comprehensively reconceptualizes a seemingly problematic body of case
law would—or at least should—have as much, and perhaps more, weight than admittedly partial
judicial explanations. Even the most ardent law-and-economics positivists would not claim that
their recapitulations are the law. Rather, the invariable claim is that such efforts best explain the
law. Nor is this distinction semantic.276 Judges generally cast their opinions in the language of
legal doctrine, rather than that of meta-theory, whether economics, moral philosophy, or some
other methodology.277 And the incrementalism of doctrine necessarily imposes constraints that
operate in tension with any theoretical claim to robustness. Moreover, academic claims to
robustness are as contested as the doctrines themselves, and given the incentives of those
proffering such explanations, they should be. Predictable doctrine in a reconciliation world
would likely be impossible, at least in doctrinal areas involving complex and conflicting policy
concerns.
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2. Factual Materiality
The reconciliation approach, however, is not always treated as a license for courts to
accept just any theory that reconciles the case law. Seventy years ago, Arthur Goodhart offered a
variant on the facts-plus-outcome approach that he saw as producing some predictability.278 Parts
of his analysis appear dated,279 but because Goodhart furnishes an important early and often
incisive effort to distinguish holding and dicta, his analysis deserves close attention. Goodhart
addresses some of the problems we have identified, and he offers important insights without
providing a complete resolution.280 We begin with an algorithm that Goodhart claims can be used
to identify the holding of a case, and thus to reduce the scope of uncertainty that underlies the
facts-plus-outcome approach. In considering Goodhart’s view, we implicitly assess the more
famous, though less formally explicit, methodology of his contemporary Karl Llewellyn, who
like Goodhart focuses on a consideration of the materiality of various facts.281
Goodhart rejects the view that we can ignore a judge’s reasoning altogether, noting that
the judge necessarily makes law in his selection of the facts of the case to report.282 For
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Goodhart, supra note 11.
Goodhart carefully analyzes the precedential value of cases where courts have not issued opinions and where different
reporters indicate different versions of the facts, small problems today. See id. at 169-70. Another limitation is Goodhart’s failure
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Goodhart, “[i]t is by his choice of the material facts that the judge creates law,”283 and a holding
is thus the proposition that given the set of material facts, the result of the case obtains.284 The
challenge is thus to determine which case facts are or are not material. Goodhart recognizes
judicial discretion in identifying facts as material, and suggests a resolution thattakes the form of
the following rebuttable presumption: “the facts of person, time, place, kind, and amount are
presumably immaterial.”285 Conversely, other facts are presumed to be material.286
In either case, the presumption is rebuttable. Thus, Goodhart asserts that the court can
treat as immaterial facts that are generally presumed material,287 and can specify that facts
generally presumed to be immaterial are material in the actual case.288 In either instance,
Goodhart claims, the court’s statement of materiality or immateriality controls. Goodhart’s
analysis can perhaps best be conceived as an intermediate position between one that allows
courts to articulate the ratio decedendi and one that instead limits the case to the facts plus
outcome. While Goodhart would allow the judge to articulate a rationale that links the case facts
to the judgment, the purpose of the announced rule is just that. It is a vehicle through which the
judge, with some discretion in choosing among the various case facts, can weed out particular
facts as immaterial.
Goodhart’s approach has been subject to two related critiques. Julius Stone argued that
facts may be identified at different levels of generality, and that different views about the
generality of facts will produce different holdings.289 Goodhart’s method is therefore potentially
indeterminate. And A.W.B. Simpson criticized Goodhart’s distinction between a judge’s
identification of facts and a judge’s statement of principles of law as wooden.290 The judge’s
enunciation of legal principles, Simpson argues, is what makes particular facts material,291 and,
as a result, Goodhart’s approach is equivalent to what Simpson refers to as the “classical
proposition” that the ratio is the “principle of law which the judge considered necessary to the
283
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decision.”292 As Simpson observes, this merely brings us back to where we started, since there is
no single formula for identifying the ratio decidendi.293
In a response to his critics, Goodhart denied that accepting a judge’s statements of legal
rules (a commonly held view of precedent) was equivalent to Goodhart’s preferred approach,
deducing principles based on the material facts.294 And while Goodhart acknowledged the
possibility of indeterminacy under his system, he insisted that no method could produce perfect
determinacy.295 We agree with Goodhart on these two points, but we read his critics to make a
broader claim. Stone and Simpson imply that ignoring judicial pronouncements of law in favor
of the material facts that the judge has elected to report is an arbitrary method through which to
identify holdings, and further, that the method is unlikely to achieve consensus even if everyone
agreed to adopt it. Thus, while Goodhart’s approach is systematic, it seeks to impose order
without adherence to either the common practice of accepting a judge’s articulated reasoning in
achieving a decision or seeking an alternative normative justification with which to reconcile the
prior result.
The weaknesses in Goodhart’s model becomes manifest when Goodhart seeks to reach
conclusions about specific issues. For example, in treating the issue of alternative holdings,
Goodhart insists, “it is incorrect to say that either one of the conclusions involved a dictum
because the one preceded the other or because the one was based on broad grounds and the other
on narrow grounds.”296 While Goodhart does not explain this conclusion, he suggests that the
judge who issues alternative holdings found both sets of facts to be material. Yet this observation
alone cannot serve as a justification for according alternative holdings precedential status. The
292
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conceptual difficulty with this holding category arises because two sets of material facts
redundantly lead to the same result. Goodhart’s methodology has no means of assessing the
implications of redundancy.
We agree that Goodhart’s approach is excessively mechanical, or “wooden,” and that
reliance upon reported material facts—even with the benefit of Goodhart’s rebuttable
presumptions—cannot alone resolve the many difficult questions that arise in defining holding
and dicta. As our preceding analysis suggests, however, we also recognize that the identification
of material facts provides an important early step in constructing such a set of working
definitions. Goodhart’s central contribution is in recognizing that judges inevitably have some
discretion in selecting the issues for which they will make law
, and that discretion is constrained,
although not eliminated, by the facts presented. The difficulty, which lies at the core of the
various critiques we have reviewed, is that facts, material or otherwise, do not speak for
themselves. A system of rebuttable presumptions concerning potentially material and immaterial
facts cannot form the framework for identifying either the governing theory of a case or the level
at which, whichever theory is chosen, it should be expressed. Judges do not merely identify
material facts, but they develop legal reasoning that applies the facts and that eventually reaches
a particular result. A satisfactory definition of holding and dicta must therefore examine the
reasoning that connects the material facts to the result, rather than relying solely upon the
selected material facts.
3. Necessity
The most influential definition, perhaps largely because of its inclusion in Black’s Law
Dictionary,297 identifies “dictum” as a statement in a judicial opinion that is “unnecessary” to the
case resolution. The focus on whether a statement is necessary dates at least to Eugene
Wambaugh, who explained, “So far as the opinion goes beyond a statement of the proposition of
law necessarily involved in the case, the words contained in the opinion, whether they be right or
wrong, are not authority of the highest order, but are merely words spoken, dicta, obiter, or
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obiter dicta.”298 Perhaps the main virtue of Wambaugh’s test is its simplicity. As Wambaugh
asserted, the test allows “even the beginner [to] determine whether it is possible for a given
proposition of law to be involved in a given case”299:
In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of
law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him
then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good,
and had had it in mind, the decision could have been the same.300
Wambaugh thus establishes a high threshold for necessity: If the decision could have been the
same with the negation of a proposition, then the proposition was not necessary to the disposition
and thus counts as dicta. In this analysis, sufficient but not necessary propositions are dicta.
While frequently cited by courts, Wambaugh’s approach (and along with it, that of
Black’s Law Dictionary) proves the easiest to falsify. For that reason, we should not be surprised
that it is inconsistent with standard judicial practices, including that of according precedential
status to alternative justifications.301 Judge Kozinski noted the problem of alternative
justifications in his disagreement with Judge Tashima in a recent en banc Ninth Circuit case.
Judge Tashima invoked the “necessary” definition of holding,302 and Judge Kozinski pointed out
the inconsistency:
Under his rationale, which is that everything not necessary to the result is dicta,
both alternative holdings are dicta because neither is necessary to the result. We
can test this proposition by asking the question: Would the result change if either
of the alternative holdings were removed? The answer, of course, is no. Since
either could be removed without affecting the result, neither is necessary, and so
under Judge Tashima's reasoning, dicta.303

298

WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 13, at 18-19.
Id. § 11, at 17.
300
Id.
301
See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1940) (“[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be
relegated to the category of obiter dictum.”); see also In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004); Whetsel v. Network Property
Services, LLC, 246 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 2001).
302
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Tashima, J., concurring). As Judge Tashima noted, the
Ninth Circuit had invoked the Black’s Law Dictionary definition previously. Id. (citing Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54
F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1995)). Judge Tashima, however, did not consider whether that selection of a definition was itself a
dictum.
303
Id. at 915 (Kozinski, J., concurring). The same analysis applies when a court grants standing and then denies relief on the
merits or when a court finds harmless error. The “holding,” which grants standing or finds error, can be reversed without
affecting the case judgment, namely denying relief.
299

102

Writing for the Court, Judge Kozinski instead adopted an earlier case definition that, in the spirit
of legal fictions, redefined “necessarily” to mean “only that the court undeniably decided the
issue, not that it was unavoidable for it do so.”304
Judge Kozinski’s alternative appears untenable or at least incomplete.305 While Kozinski
rescues Black’s use of “necessary” in defining “dicta,” he does so as an exercise in creative
redefinition. Wambaugh’s test, in contrast, was based upon the actual meaning of “necessary,”
and the court’s attempt to escape from Wambaugh’s approach reflects the deficiency of a
necessity-based definition of holding. Wambaugh himself maintained that alternative
justifications were dicta,306 but that the existence of alternative possible justifications was
irrelevant.307 The latter conclusion appears to be in tension with Wambaugh’s test, however,
because whenever there is an alternative possible justification, it is at least possible that the court
could have reached the same result even if it had negated the conclusion on the alternative issue
that it did explore.
It is possible to devise a test that generally requires necessity as a precondition to
attaching the status of holding, but that exempts alternative rationales from this general
requirement to avoid the anomaly of concluding that the court has expressed no holding in such a
case. But even if we can thereby avoid a particular problem associated with the necessity
requirement, we still need a normative justification for necessity in the first place. The failure of
the necessity approach to accord with a fundamental practice in distinguishing holdings from
dicta reveals that the approach does not match our intuitions about the holding-dicta line. Thus,
304
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even setting aside alternative justifications and alternative possible justifications, consider the
case of an unnecessarily broad holding that is clearly embraced within an announced opinion.
Any time a case could be resolved on narrower grounds, the broader rationale can be claimed
unnecessary. Much judicial reasoning is unnecessary in the sense that a court could have
resolved a case on narrower grounds, for example by issuing a fact-specific ruling without
making the legal basis of a decision clear, or simply by declining to announce a broad rule when
a narrower alternative is available.308
We have already concluded as a normative matter that judges should be allowed to create
holdings broader than necessary, but it is worth also showing that judges are, in fact, allowed to
do so in practice. To illustrate, consider the Hopwood decision, in which a split panel of the Fifth
Circuit struck down the University of Texas Law School affirmative action program.309 Two
panel members claimed broadly that race could not be used in furtherance of diversity, and that
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion was not controlling. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Wiener
maintained instead that the challenged program was invalid even under Bakke and that the
majority’s approach was improperly broad and unnecessary to achieving the case result.310 Our
point, of course, is not to defend the majority decision in Hopwood.311 Rather, it is that whether
or not the majority panel correctly interpreted Bakke, there is no question what it held. The
court’s holding was not the narrower position embraced by the concurrence. Instead, the holding
was the broader and unnecessary view—unnecessary in the sense that the court could have
achieved the same result with a narrower view that did not call the precedential status of
Powell’s Bakke opinion into question—embraced by the majority to resolve the case.312
308

This harkens back to the difficulty with Goodhart’s effort to rely upon selected material facts as the basis for identifying a
holding; even if one agrees on which facts are material, this fails to resolve the level of generality at which the holding of the case
should be cast. See supra text accompanying note 289.
309
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
310
Id. at 963, 967-68 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
311
Indeed, as we have made clear, we do believe that Powell’s Bakke opinion expressed the holding of the Supreme Court, and
thus was binding on the lower courts. See supra note 37.
312
In dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Politz complained, “The majority of the panel overruled Bakke,
wrote far too broadly, and spoke a plethora of unfortunate dicta.” Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 724 (Politz, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). Politz’s only specific claim about dicta, however, was as follows: “This ‘injunction’ is wholly
unnecessary to the disposition of the matter appealed and thus is clearly dictum . . . .” Id. at 722 (Politz, C.J., dissenting from
failure to grant rehearing en banc). At first glance, this language appears to ignore the distinction between the reasoning of a case
and its disposition. It is the reasoning of the case, rather than the disposition, that must be classified as holding or dicta. The
looseness of language here, however, lies in the word “injunction,” as the panel in fact denied an injunction. See Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Politz’s complaint is that “two members of the three-judge panel
determined to bar any consideration of race in the Law School's admission process,” 84 F.3d at 722, and the word “injunction”
reflects, however imprecisely, that the decision would have sweeping effects. Nonetheless, Politz makes no clear argument that

104

We know of no rule that suggests that the holding of a split appeals court panel is
expressed in that opinion that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds when the remaining
two jurists agree to an alternative, albeit broader, rationale. Indeed, the narrowest ground rule,
announced in Marks v. United States,313 implies just the opposite. The rule states: “When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”314 The negative pregnant of the
announced rule is that when the Supreme Court is not fragmented (meaning that it issues a
unanimous or majority decision), and thus when a majority embraces a single governing
rationale, the holding is expressed in the majority opinion. Critically, this is so even if a justice
concurring in the judgment would have preferred instead to resolve the case on a narrower
ground. Extending this rule to the three-judge circuit court panel, the Hopwood majority, despite
its broader holding and despite the narrower special concurrence,315 stated the holding.
Applying Wambaugh’s approach to cases like Hopwood wouldpotentially make a court’s
decision to address a case on relatively broad grounds irrelevant to the precedential effect of the
announced rule when a narrower alternative can be imagined. As suggested above, the Marks
rule would then have to be adapted to apply even to majority decisions when a judge concurring
in the judgment offers a narrower means of achieving the same result. Indeed, the implications
might be broader still. The availability of an unarticulated narrower ground (as might occur, for
example, in a case decided by a unanimous court) would potentially prevent the broader
articulated ground from having precedential status. Thus, a law review article suggesting a
narrower rationale that could have been used to achieve the outcome in a Supreme Court case
could in theory state the law, rather than the opinion under review. A narrower ground suggested
in an opinion concurring in the judgment would then prove a sufficient, but not a necessary,
condition for disregarding the broader rationale embraced in a majority opinion.

the fact of sweeping effects is sufficient to classify any of the panel’s statements as dicta.
313
430 U.S. 188 (1977).
314
Id. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
315
The circuit court uses “special concurrence” in the same manner as the Supreme Court uses concurrence in the judgment.
Indeed, at the end of Judge Wiener’s special concurrence, he states, “Thus I concur in the judgment of the panel opinion but, as to
its conclusion on the issue of strict scrutiny and its gloss on the order of the remand, I disagree for the reasons I have stated and
therefore concur specially.” 78 F.3d. at 968 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
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Taken to its logical conclusion, this understanding of necessity would call into serious
question twin premises of legal realism, first that judges make law, and second, that they have
discretion in doing so. Ultimately, the analysis suggests that the necessity approach is no more
than the reconciliation approach in a disguised form. For a proposition to be necessary to a
judgment, there must be a unique chain of reasoning from the facts to the judgment dependent
upon that proposition, or if there are multiple possible chains of reasoning, then each of the
alternative chains must also be dependent upon that proposition. Thus, when a proposition is
necessary to a judgment, there is no way to reach the same judgment with respect to the relevant
facts without including the claimed proposition. Suppose, for example, that after an opinion
containing a proposition that satisfies the necessity test is announced in a given case, another
court would prefer to resolve a later case in a manner that depends upon the negation of the
established proposition from the earlier decision. Assuming adherence to precedent, the second
court would then be unable to resolve the subsequent case in the preferred manner while
harmonizing the two cases. Thus, a proposition can be necessary to a judgment only if that
proposition would also be controlling in a reconciliation-based precedent regime.
Wambaugh clarifies his test by providing that “a case is not a precedent for any
proposition that was neither consciously nor unconsciously in the mind of the court.”316 If we
adopt this interpretation of necessity, then it becomes even more difficult to establish a precedent
under the necessity regime than under the reconciliation regime.317 Even if a judge logically
could not have reached the case outcome without endorsing a particular proposition, that
proposition still would not be considered a holding if the judge did not at least subconsciously
consider that proposition. The difficulty of determining subconscious processing aside,
Wambaugh’s test would result in creation of a holding only when a judge must have adopted a
proposition to arrive at the case outcome and in fact did adopt and articulate that proposition.
Although this approach, unlike the reconciliation approach, pays some attention to a court’s
articulated chain of reasoning, it cannot be squared with any approach that credits the
discretionary choices judges actually make in resolving cases.
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WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 17, at 24.
The “mind of the court” approach is reminiscent of the “meeting of the minds” concept in contract law. Both are fictions that
are intended to capture objective indicia of the approach the court necessarily took, or that the parties agreed upon, respectively.
317
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4. Preclusivity
In developing his test for determining which portion of a court’s articulated reasoning
should be credited as holding, and which portions should be discounted as dicta, Professor Dorf
imports the doctrine of issue preclusion.318 In particular, Dorf focuses on a provision from the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: “When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim.”319 Dorf also relies upon a comment to this section that endorses the converse
proposition. Specifically, when the articulated criteria for issue preclusion are not met, the
determination is not deemed to have been resolved conclusively in subsequent litigation between
the parties on the same or on a different claim.320 The explanatory comment explains that
determinations that do not satisfy the criteria for issue preclusion are not deemed to have been
resolved conclusively because “such determinations have the characteristics of dicta.”321
While we agree that issue preclusion provides the basis for insights into distinguishing
holding and dicta, Dorf fails to provide a foundation for relying upon preclusion law to develop
his definition of holding. Dorf does note that preclusion law requires the applying court to
distinguish more important or more central rationales from less important or less central
rationales. That may suffice to show that preclusion law sheds some light on the holding-dicta
analysis, but it does not establish the preclusion law analogy is sufficiently strong as to provide a
sound normative basis for the definitions of holding and dicta. While the sets of concerns that
these two bodies of law address overlap, they remain critically distinct.
Preclusion law seeks to provide rules for which issues are deemed conclusive to the
parties in future cases; it does not aspire to provide rules for which issues will bind nonparties.
There are sound normative justifications for defining issues in the preclusion context more
broadly than governing rationales in the context of defining holding. One of the policy
318

Dorf does not wholeheartedly endorse importing preclusivity. Instead, he states, “Perhaps we can gain some insight from a
related field: preclusion law.” Dorf, supra note x, at 2041. Earlier in the article, Dorf describes the portion discussing preclusion
law as “explain[ing] what it means to say that a proposition is essential to the rationale of a case.” Id.
319
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982), quoted inDorf, supra note x, at 2041.
320
Id. § 27 cmt. h, quoted in Dorf, supra note x, at 2041 & n.159.
321
Id. Reliance upon the quoted provisions is potentially circular. Thus, Dorf relies upon issue preclusion to define holding and
dicta because the relevant provision in the Restatement helps to explain what counts as “essential” within an opinion; meanwhile
the same provisions base their discussion of what is essential, as needed to determine issue preclusion, upon the distinction
between holding and dicta.
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justifications for preclusion is to encourage parties to air their legal disputes in a cost-effective
manner, one that minimizes the burdens on judicial resources.322 Potentially redundant claims
should therefore be minimized, and one way to achieve that is to construe “issue” sufficiently
broadly that parties are encouraged by issue preclusion to present closely related claims in one
proceeding.
At the same time, the normative considerations that are central to the holding-dicta
distinction are reduced in the preclusion context. Preclusion doctrine, for example, is not
particularly concerned with judicial incentives to reach out and resolve issues not closely tied to
the material facts of a case. It may be worthwhile for appellate judges to anticipate issues that
will arise immediately on remand, and there is thus an argument that law-of-the-case doctrine
should be broader in its definition of holding than the holding-dicta distinction that we have been
considering.323 Given that Dorf’s primary project was to criticize excessively narrow definitions
of holding, it is not surprising that he carefully considered preclusion doctrine in his analysis.
Our concern, however, is that in doing so, Dorf might have been led into endorsing an
indefensibly broad definition of holding.
In considering the question of alternative justifications, for example, Dorf cites the
Restatement for the proposition that “when an appellate court bases a decision on two grounds,
each of which, standing alone, would support the judgment, preclusive effect will be given to
both determinations.”324 He then posits that this alternative judgment rule from preclusion law
can effectively be extended to distinguish holding and dicta in such cases.325 While Dorf
acknowledges that given alternative holdings in a single case, “neither rationale is essential to the
Court’s conclusion,”326 he nonetheless argues in favor of treating both rationales as holdings
because “[t]he Court gave careful consideration to both rationales” and because “a decision
322

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS at Introduction (“Indefinite continuation of a dispute is a social burden. It consumes time
and energy that may be put to other use, not only of the parties but of the community as a whole.”); see also Robert G. Bone,
Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196 (1992) (noting that “increasing
concern about the social costs of litigation” explains recent tendencies to increase the scope of preclusion, but that “[c]ourts have
hesitated to expand nonparty preclusion—the preclusion of persons who were not parties to the first lawsuit—even though
current nonparty preclusion rules . . . tolerate extensive relitigation at substantial social cost”).
323
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have generally held that dicta is not law of the case. See, e.g., Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson,
229 F.3d 321, 326 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The law of the case doctrine does not apply to dicta.”); United States v. Rice, 1996 WL
44452, *4 (10th Cir. 1996) (listing numerous additional citations from various circuits). We have seen, however, that
conventional definitions of holding and dicta are ambiguous.
324
Dorf, supra note x, at 2042.
325
Id.
326
Id. at 2044.
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based on either ground would have been legitimate.”327 While we ultimately agree with Dorf’s
conclusion on alternative justifications, we find his explanation less persuasive. Our analysis has
emphasized that a central concern of the definition of dicta is to minimize judicial overreaching
and to ensure legitimacy in the construction of actual holdings. Careful consideration, standing
alone, cannot suffice to elevate a judicial assertion into a holding.328 Otherwise courts could
resolve any issue for which they hold strong views by presenting a well reasoned opinion
concerning its resolution.
In other respects, issue preclusion is too narrow to serve as a basis for the holding-dicta
distinction. Even twentieth-century expansions of issue preclusion, for example nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion,329 which allows a nonparty to a prior suit to preclude a party to that
suit from relitigating an adversely resolved issue,330 will not permit someone who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party in the prior suit to be bound by any issues that were determined
in that suit.331 This limitation cannot logically be applied in the holding-dicta context, because the
distinction between holding and dicta applies to both parties and nonparties. If the holding-dicta
distinction were defined without reference to that criterion, much of issue preclusion doctrine
would be redundant, at least in cases within the same jurisdiction as an initial decision. If
findings in a lawsuit were conclusive against parties and nonparties alike, nothing would turn on
whether a party actually litigated a lawsuit, an issue to which the Restatement not surprisingly
pays considerable attention.332
Even if preclusion law were not significantly over- and under-broad (another way of
saying that it provides the wrong set of rules) for evaluating the definitions of holding and dicta,
it would nonetheless prove an inadequate guide because the legal doctrines it establishes are too
ill defined to provide meaningful guidance. Recognizing this, Dorf suggests that preclusion law
327

Id.
If it did, anything that a court carefully considers would count as holding rather than dicta. It is more plausible to imagine
careful consideration as one among many elements in identification of holdings, but we do not think that such a balancing test is
necessary. Rather, lack of clear judicial consideration matters because it tends to leave ambiguous the level of abstraction at
which a court decided a case, making it harder for subsequent courts to classify a holding at a particular level. See infra Part
IV.B.1 (noting that there may be ambiguities about the level of generality at which a court resolved a particular issue).
329
See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (approving of the use of nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion, where not unfair to the defendant).
330
See generally Comment Note—Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a
Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3D 1044 (2004) (detailing the decline of the mutuality rule, and the current state of the law).
331
Id. n.7 (“The party asserting issue preclusion must establish that . . . the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”).
332
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 (using “actually litigated” language).
328
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can provide guidance based upon examples if not from clear rules.333 One difficulty, however, as
Dorf himself recognizes, is that the case law sometimes contradicts the Restatement , even on the
simple problem of alternative justifications.334 Looking to a body of law that itself is murky does
not seem an edifying approach for the courts to adopt in resolving the holding-dicta distinction
when the concern is that courts currently draw this distinction too imprecisely.
Even where the Restatement directly anticipates interpretive problems, it does not always
offer clear resolutions. For example, statement c of § 27 acknowledges, “One of the most
difficult problems . . . is to delineate the issue on which litigation is, or is not, foreclosed by the
prior judgment.”335 Delineating any given issue, that is determining which conclusions about a
particular issue are conclusive, is as important in defining the holding as is determining whether
a portion of a case contains a holding at all. Statement c merely suggests a balancing test in cases
in which the issues are not identical from one case to the next. The elements of the balancing test
are open-ended and, as is appropriate to preclusion law but not to evaluating holding versus
dicta, are geared to situations in which the same parties are litigating both cases.336
While Dorf appears to recognize some of the inherent limitations of the Restatement in
providing guidance for defining dicta and holding, he nonetheless relies upon the principle of
essentiality, which underlies much of preclusion analysis. One example that Dorf considers
anticipates what we have called the problem of structured analysis, and more specifically the
problem of ordered tests.337 Specifically, Dorf posits a case in which an appellate court
determines that a lower court committed harmless error.338 Because the finding of harmlessness
results in an affirmance, the question is whether the finding of error, which but for the
harmlessness would produce a remand and perhaps a reversal, is nonetheless a holding. Dorf
concludes that it is because “[i]t forms an essential ingredient in the process by which the court
333

Thus, Dorf observes, “Fortunately, preclusion law consists of more than abstract statements of principle. At least in its widely
accepted canonical form, the Restatement of Judgments, preclusion law takes clearer shape from examples.” Id. at 2041-42.
334
Id. at 2042 n.160. Dorf points out that some cases do provide preclusive effect to alternative judgments of trial courts. Id.
(citing Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and noting a “division of authority”).
335
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c.
336
For example, the comment asks, “Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter presented in the first action
reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in the second?” Id. There are two problems with
applying this to the holding-dicta distinction. First, there is no indication of what may “reasonably be expected.” Second, the
focus on pretrial preparation makes far more sense when the same parties are litigating an issue.
337
See supra Part II.A.2.b.i.
338
“The appeals court rules: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the confession because it was coerced, but (2) the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so the conviction is affirmed. Is part (1) dictum?” Dorf, supra note x, at 2045.
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decides the case, even if, viewed from a post hoc perspective, it is not essential to the result.”339
Again, we agree with Dorf’s ultimate conclusion, but we find his analysis question-begging in
much the same way that Dorf himself claims at a different point in his analysis that essentiality
proves question-begging in the Restatement.340 If one determines that finding error is essential,
that follows from the intuition that even if courts are permitted to assume error and then assess
harmlessness, harmless error analysis in criminal appeals remains substantially ordered.341 Our
analysis, in contrast, allows jurists and legal scholars to pinpoint exactly why the harmless error
question is difficult, namely that one might dispute just how ordered the test is.
B. Necessary Conditions for a Holding
Having now considered several definitions of holding and dicta, we will set out our own.
This definition seeks to capture in an easily applied manner the resolutions of the problem
categories that we have suggested above.342 A holding consists of those propositions along the
chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the
facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case
counts as dicta.
Each of the three numbered prongs is premised upon the power of the deciding jurist or
court to select among one or more potential decisional paths in resolving a case. The first prong
thus requires that for a proposition to be credited as a holding, it must be actually decided along
the chosen decisional path or paths.343 The second proposition then limits the permissible range
of articulated propositions that can be credited as holding by insisting that they be grounded in
339

Id. The purpose of this example apparently is to reinforce Dorf’s conclusion that alternative rationales are not unique by
illustrating an additional situation in which part of a court’s rationale is not essential to the result.
340
Id. at 2041.
341
The point is quite similar to that raised in the context of the strict scrutiny test. The word “harmless” modifies the word
“error,” and so lawyers might conclude, rightly or wrongly, that it makes logical sense to see whether an error exists before
determining whether it is harmless. See supra text preceding and accompanying note 73.
342
See supra Part III.C.
343
We recognize that in selecting as part of our formulation the words “along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning”
we are employing language that does not form part of commonplace definitions of holding. That said, we are confident that our
chosen language better captures the intuition that underlies most judicial constructions of holding and dicta. In addition, while the
term “path” is perhaps new to the problem of construing holdings, the concept is quite familiar to lawyers. For example, it is
common to speak of a chain of reasoning, which like a path or paths of reasoning implies a progression of steps from facts to
disposition. We have selected the term “path” rather than “chain” because a chain connotes links, and specifically, the risk that
one link might be broken, thus affecting the disposition. Path instead emphasizes the choice among means of getting from one
place (the case facts) to another place (the judgment). Because the determination that an assertion is a holding or is dicta does not
turn on the power of the reasoning with respect to each step (an indefensible proposition in a poorly reasoned case can
nonetheless be a holding), a weak link will not undermine the judge’s selection of the route from facts to disposition for purposes
of identifying what constitutes a holding in a case.
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the facts of the case. And the third proposition, by linking the ultimate disposition to the selected
decisional path, both constraints and broadens judicial discretion. While this prong ensures that
holdings are limited to issues that lead to the judgment, it also recognizes that particular findings
might move us away from the judgment as the means of traveling along a path that eventually
gets to that judgment. By analogy, a trip from a southern to a northern destination will sometimes
require turns south, east, or west, depending upon the configuration of, and the relationships
among, the various roads along the chosen route. So it is with legal reasoning. Thus, our
definition allows a judge to draw one or more conceptual lines (or paths) from case facts to
judgment, and to credit all issues resolved along the chosen path or paths to produce holdings. At
the same time, it discounts as dicta issues on paths that do not originate in the facts in the case or
lead nowhere.
Our construction of a definition around the concept of a decisional path reflects the
insight that judges, while bound by the presentation of cases as the means for creating law, often
retain substantial choice in the means of using cases to make law. Our analysis is consistent with
the premises that courts and legislatures have distinct lawmaking functions and that judicial
decision making is legitimated by the passive quality of resolving cases presented by actual
litigants.344 Nonetheless, when a case admits of more than one path to a particular resolution, or a
broader or narrow arc in forming the path from facts to judgment, we believe that judges should
be afforded appropriate flexibility in crafting holdings when selecting the governing path or
paths. Without this concession, we would be forced back to one of the definitions of the holdingdicta distinction that we have criticized above both on theoretical and practical grounds.345 If
judges cannot choose among paths, there will be virtually no holdings in cases of even modest
complexity, and if judges cannot choose the appropriate level of breadth, then cases will almost
always be distinguishable based upon factual differences that most would agree have little or no
relevance in terms of providing a material basis for different legal treatment.
While our definition is easy to articulate, each element proves more complex than it may
first appear. In addition, while we are confident in the general structure and meaning of our
proffered definition, we recognize that our approach does not and cannot be used to dictate
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See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part IV.A.
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results in every conceivable case. The inherent breadth of the terms that we employ will
necessarily invite some good faith disagreements among courts in determining how to treat
statements presented as holdings in a prior case. We do not consider this a weakness, because we
are as concerned with facilitating meaningful analysis of dicta and holding, using a common
framework, as we are in applying that framework to resolve all cases. Indeed, we have
intentionally phrased our definition in sufficiently broad terms to permit disagreement on the
closest analytical issues that we have identified. That said, we will offer proposed resolutions to
concrete questions that our definition poses.
Finally, we note that as with other matters of judicial administration,346 institutionspecific concerns might also affect the manner in which some courts treat dicta and holding.
While we believe that our approach can be applied generally, we recognize that for some courts,
some adaptation might be required. An important example is the United States Supreme Court.
Arguably, because the Supreme Court has the power to define the rules governing the distinction
between holding and dicta, when the Court explicitly provides that a statement is in one category
or the other, the statement is in that category, regardless of whether the Court’s conclusions
accord with the general definitions of holding and dicta that we, or others, have offered. It might
even be appropriate for the Court to stretch the definition of holding given the Court’s unique
role in judicial administration. Because the Court sits at the apex of numerous pyramidically
structured judiciaries and must make and clarify law through a relatively small number of cases,
the Court might require greater latitude than other courts in determining the scope of its
holdings.347 This might provide a normative justification, for example, for allowing Powell
broader flexibility to define the holding in Bakke than would have been the case applying our
general definition. We have focused on the application of the normative factors that we have
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For example, justiciability doctrines in the federal courts are often said to emanate from the requirements of Article III. See,
e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) (considering justiciability doctrine specifically for the federal courts). We thus agree with Dorf, supra
note x, that Article III similarly may have implications for the appropriate distinction between holding and dicta.
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Michael Solimine has noted that the size of the Supreme Court’s docket could affect the Court’s ability to monitor inferior
courts’ compliance with Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in
the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 358-59 (2002) (noting, however, that the Court has managed to control the state
courts by considering only a very small percentage of state cases). If the Court encountered difficulty controlling the lower
courts, whether because of increasing caseloads or increasing defiance, there might be an argument for a broader definition of
“holding” for the Supreme Court. Alternatively, however, the Court’s need to monitor courts while maintaining a small docket
might call for broad deference to Supreme Court dicta. See infra note 410.
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identified to courts in general, rather than to particular courts, and we leave to future analysis
whether these factors have different implications for particular courts.
1. Actually Decided
We turn now to the question of what it means for an issue to be actually decided. Within
the context of a chosen decisional path, the requirement that a proposition be actually decided
includes within a case’s holding conclusions that courts explicitly reach. When an issue is
actually decided along a chosen decisional path, the possibility of an alternative path does not
undermine the status of those issues actually decided along that chosen path. Unlike the
reconciliation approach, our definition credits as holding conclusions that a court does in fact
reach, even if the court might have resolved a case by taking fewer paths or by choosing a
narrower ground. Thus, alternative possible justifications, alternative justifications, and breadth
do not provide bases for classifying issues actually decidedas dicta.
As long as a judicial opinion reports a summary of facts and the disposition, the opinion
provides at a least a facts-plus-outcome or reconciliation-based holding.348 Even in the absence of
any reasoning on a particular issue, a case at least stands for the proposition that under certain
facts, a particular party should prevail on the relevant source of law upon which he or she relies.
We recognize that there may be arguments favoring a limit on the precedential weight of cases
that fail to articulate at least somewhat generalizable propositions. First, such cases may reflect
less careful judicial attention than cases directly addressing propositions of law with clear
applicability to multiple cases.349 Perhaps courts tend toward case-by- case decision making that
fails to result in more generalizable precedents when parties’ briefs do not explore the broader
implications of a case, or when the facts are such that judges deem the case an inappropriate
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A case might not qualify if it fails to meet the minimum conditions of internal consistency. Suppose, for example, the court
acknowledges a general rule that on the facts of a case, a particular result should obtain, but then reaches another result without
providing any justification, such as a factual or legal point, for that result. In this case, a precedent-setting court faces a dilemma:
Is the rule announced by the court the holding, or is the inverse of the rule the holding since that is what the court did? In such a
case, there is a strong reason to conclude that because the reasoning and outcome of the case are in direct opposition, the case
does not clearly produce any holding at all. This is a very rare exception, however. It must be distinguished from the much more
common situation in which a court produces reasons that the court thinks support the outcome it reaches, and a later court
concludes that those reasons are bad or even point in the opposite direction properly conceived. Precedent means that even bad
reasoning may control, so it is only in cases in which the reasoning cannot even be understood that the case fails to produce a
holding.
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Such an argument might help to explain the increasing use of unpublished slip opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals. See COHEN, supra note x, at 72-81 (documenting increased reliance upon slip opinions in Courts of Appeals).
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vehicle through which to consider them.350 Second, narrow fact-based decision making frees
judges to resolve cases where the facts or equities on the one hand and the law on the other pull
strongly in opposite directions or where the law is open and substantial equitable arguments can
be advanced on both sides.351 Providing precedential effect to such decisions might lead to bad
decisions in other cases. This argument reflects the familiar maxim that hard cases make bad
law.352
While these factors counsel in favor of denying precedential effect to decisions with factbased reasoning, other factors pull in the opposite direction. First, granting judges the power to
resolve cases without creating any precedent at all threatens to undermine the rule of law, as
judges may resolve cases based on factors that they would not want to admit serve as the basis of
their decisions. Second, narrow decisions are often more carefully considered and will produce
only narrow precedents, thus leaving considerable leverage for future decision makers.353 When a
court fails to offer any broad propositions for its holding, then a later court can distinguish that
decision on the basis of any difference manifested by the facts. Although precedents will
necessarily constrain deciding courts, facts-plus-outcome holdings leave courts with a great deal
of flexibility.354 In our view, legal policy is best advanced by requiring judges, at least in cases
with precedential value,355 to set precedents, but to give judges flexibility to offer narrow and
easily distinguished precedents.
While our definition allows a court to articulate broad propositions of law or make
narrow holdings with fact-intensive reasoning, we do not suggest that determining which type of
reasoning a court embraced will always be a straightforward task. Judges frequently debate the
scope of past holdings, and whether a case stands for a broad or narrow proposition sometimes
becomes clear only over time. Of course, part of the reason for such debate is that the line
350

Within the Supreme Court, the combined features of docket control and the ability to dismiss certiorari as improvidently
granted (DIGs) reduce this risk relative to courts generally.
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For an illustration, see infra part V.C (discussing Penn Central).
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See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 W & M 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (Ex. of Pleas 1842) (Rolfe, B.) (“Hard cases, it is
frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”). Alternatively, this argument might flip the maxim to suggest the self-evident
proposition that bad law makes cases hard.
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See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the case for judicial minimalism).
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See supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a requirement of reconciling cases is a regime in which generalizations in judicial
opinions never count as holdings).
355
We do not here enter the debate on whether judges should be permitted to label some opinions as not having precedential
value. See, e.g., The Hon. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1999) (listing and
responding to various criticisms of unpublished opinions).
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between holding and dicta is uncertain, and the purpose of this project is to provide more
definitive guidance on that question. But it would be impossible to produce mechanical rules that
would allow for unambiguous classification of every ambiguous judicial statement. Once again,
our project is to classify statements given the resolution of ambiguities. Our project demands not
just the prior resolution of semantic and syntactic ambiguities, but also the resolution of
ambiguities about whether a court actually decided a particular issue, or instead resolved the case
on some other ground.
There may also be ambiguities about when an issue that is not discussed is actually
decided. Consider, for example, a case in which a court resolves the merits without even
mentioning the issue of standing, despite the court’s obligation to consider sua sponte issues of
subject matter jurisdiction.356 The issue is close,357 but we do not think that such an opinion has
actually decided the issue of standing. Although an opinion produces at least one holding on
every issue considered, the court in this example has failed to consider an applicable issue, and
so the only holding in such a case would be the holding on the merits. One might argue that such
a case supports an argument that the plaintiff had standing. The court at least has revealed that it
took for granted that standing existed, and this may make a later argument that would deny
standing seem inconsistent with existing intuitions and understandings. But it would be a stretch
to say that the court held that the plaintiff had standing, and in the Supreme Court, there is
precedent establishing that only decisions that actually address and decide threshold issues create
precedent with respect to those issues.358
“Actually decided” does not mean “expressly stated.” The “actually decided”
requirement is broader in the sense that it includes implicit holdings that a court never quite
explicitly announces. But it is narrower in that it excludes some statements that figure in the
reasoning of the case but that a fair construction of the opinion would not find to lie on the path
from case facts to case disposition. An “actually stated” rule might prove overinclusive—and
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perhaps destabilizing—if construed to turn even high-level abstract reasoning into holdings. The
“actually decided” approach permits a court to engage in abstract reasoning, perhaps even
invoking abstract principles of justice,359 without threatening to enshrine every proposition in that
reasoning into law. A judge who claims analytical consistency with, or inspiration from, the likes
of Aristotle or Kant, or who relies for insight upon such thinkers as Rawls or Dworkin, has not
thereby elevated that philosopher’s observations to the status of law, although any concrete
applications of theory to issues presented can rise to the status of holding provided that they
otherwise meet our definition.
In addition, a judge’s selection of a particular interpretive methodology will not
necessarily credit that methodological choice as a holding. For example, imagine a Supreme
Court statutory interpretation case in which the language of the statute points in one direction,
while the legislative history points in the opposite direction.360 If a majority of five looked to
legislative history in construing the statute, while the remaining four justices in dissent eschewed
reliance on legislative history, does this establish a precedent that judges must consider
legislative history? We do not think so. We do think, however, that the case does at least imply
that where text and legislative point in opposite directions, a court is permitted to consider both
sources and sometimes may choose the interpretation suggested by the legislative history over
that set out in the text.
One might label this more modest conclusion an “implied holding.” The question then
arises how one determines the scope of a holding that is implied rather than expressly stated. Our
view is that when a court selects a particular path from facts to judgment and the resolution of
one step along that path is implied, the proper rule of construction for lower courts is to find, at a
minimum that the court implicitly held on the narrowest proposition needed to render the opinion
internally consistent. While a lower court could construe the implied holding, within the context
of the overall opinion, to be broader, it would be improper for the court to construe the implied
holding more narrowly or in opposite fashion. In addition, because the holding is implied, we do
359
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not believe that it has the same horizontal stare decisis effect on the issuing court as does an
express holding. The issuing court is free to reconsider the impliedly resolved issue
unconstrained by the presumption created in the implied holding in a future case that squarely
presents the issue, even though the implied holding binds lower courts.361
By limiting the scope of implied holdings in this manner, our definition properly
emphasizes the importance of providing judges more flexibility with respect to those holdings
that are actually decided. The “actually decided” approach thus helps to make sense of the
intuition that courts’ explicit statements about what cases hold retain special importance. These
statements come in at least three forms. First, sometimes a court will label a proposition as a
holding.362 We do not think that such a label can transform dicta into a holding, and our proposed
approach provides a means of testing such assertions. When a statement offered as “holding”
does not form an essential step on the path from operative facts to case disposition, then,
consistent with the observed practices regarding the stare decisis norm,363 future courts may
disregard the labeling and treat the assertion as dicta. Assuming that the issue labeled “holding”
does form an essential step on the selected path, however, then the “actually decided” approach
allows the court to select the level of abstraction at which the issue is resolved. Again, consistent
with observed stare decisis norms, this encourages careful articulation of reasoning, thereby
promoting the important objective of doctrinal clarity. And of course our approach invites courts
to use language, such as the magic words “we hold,” to make explicit that it has in fact resolved
an issue. Ambiguity will thus arise only when a court has chosen, intentionally or inadvertently,
not to do so.
Second, a court might explicitly disclaim a proposition as a holding. A common form of
this is for a court to assume arguendo that a particular proposition holds and then resolve the
case on that basis. For example, the Supreme Court might accept a case on only one issue and
then simply assume without deciding that the lower court had made a proper decision on another
361
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issue.364 We cannot turn this assumption into a holding on the theory that the Court could have
arrived at its result only by implicitly approving of the lower court holding. Courts generally
construct assuming arguendo arguments precisely to demonstrate the nondispositive nature of
the identified (and assumed) issue resolution. Sometimes, a court might disclaim any intent to
cover a fact situation beyond that presently before it. For a famous illustration, consider the
following assertion by the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore: “Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally
presents many complexities.”365 Whether or not it was appropriate for the Court to do so,366 we
believe that this conclusion established that the equal protection analysis produced no more than
an easily distinguishable facts-plus-outcome holding.367 Similarly, although he did not do so,
Justice Powell in Bakke might have explicitly disclaimed his analysis of the Harvard plan as
holding simply by indicating that he was not prejudging a future case challenging such a
program, should one be adopted by a state institution of higher learning.368
Third, courts can make statements about the scope of previous courts’ holdings. For
example, a post-Bakke court could make an explicit statement that Bakke held that plus factor
programs are narrowly tailored to advance the goal of diversity. A court might make this
statement regardless of whether the post-Bakke court’s analysis were consistent with the holdingdicta distinction that we advance here. Of course, to be persuasive, such a statement would
require a foundation. A court also might label a proposition in a prior case dicta. These
statements by the precedent-citing courts themselves might count as holding or dicta, depending
on whether they independently satisfy the governing criteria that we set out in this section. But
364
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through this process, courts can over time reduce, even if they cannot eliminate altogether,
ambiguities that the holding-dicta distinction may not entirely resolve.
2. Based on Facts of the Case
For a proposition to be a holding, it must be “based on facts of the case.” More formally,
when a general proposition depends on a particular factual predicate, that factual predicate must
be true on the facts of a case,369 or the factual predicate must be assumed to be true.370 This
requirement should be one of our least controversial. In part, this is because it provides a
straightforward way of formalizing Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition that “dictum” is a
statement “by the way—that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before the court.”371 As a positive matter, when a judicial statement transparently implicates facts
not involved in the case, courts generally take any conclusions drawn from such discussions to
be dicta.372
The most straightforward implication of this requirement is that a court cannot resolve
hypothetical questions,373 or effectively do the same by making broad statements that arbitrarily
string together separate categories of facts,374 and then claim holding status for that resolution.
The Bakke Court, for example, could not have rejected the Davis plan on the ground that it was a
quota and then also held that even a nonquota-based affirmative action program would be
unconstitutional if employed by a public magnet high school. Because Bakke itself did not
involve a public high school, and because it rested on the constitutionally problematic quota,
such a statement would be dicta. A court could, however, base a holding on the absence of a fact,
which of course is in itself a fact. For example, the Bakke Court could have held that if a quota-
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based affirmative action plan did not involve a public high school, then it was unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Bakke Court could create a holding in ruling that because the Davis plan was not a
plus-factor plan, it should count as an unconstitutional quota.
The “based on the facts of the case” requirement thus still affords a court substantial
flexibility. The Bakke Court might reach the public high school case depending upon the chosen
path and the level of abstraction for deciding the case. Had the Court said, for example, that
equal protection prevents any use of race by a government official, and that for that reason the
Davis program is unconstitutional, the now broader holding would presumably bring in our
hypothetical magnet high school. While this suggests that the same result prohibited through
forging distinct categories can be reached by expanding the level of breadth, there is no reason to
fear a tendency toward case resolutions at the broadest levels. Had the Bakke Court resolved the
case in the broadest possible manner, it might have prevented the later Supreme Court from
issuing rulings allowing the benign use of race in government contracting based upon a lower
threshold than strict scrutiny,375 at least without overruling this hypothetical Bakke. While
Adarand v. Pena eventually rejected precedents allowing a threshold lower than strict scrutiny
for challenges to benign federal race-based classifications,376 Justice Powell in Bakke was
unwilling to close the door on allrace -based policies.
3. Leading to the Judgment
The requirement that a statement lead along the decision path of reasoning to the
disposition reinforces the approach that we have adopted for determining whether a statement is
a presumptive holding, namely whether a statement creates a supportive proposition as we have
defined that term.377 We have combined the concept of a path or paths of reasoning with the
phrase “leading to the judgment” to clarify that we mean to include as holdings some
nonsupportive propositions that meet these criteria. As with a traveler who must initially go
south on an eventual northern route, so too jurists frequently must establish nonsupportive
propositions en route to their eventual judgment.
375
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Thus, where a court undertakes a strongly ordered analysis and resolves one proposition
in the opposite direction of the ultimate disposition, we find that proposition to lead, along the
selected path, to the disposition. For example, where a court finds that a plaintiff has standing
and then rejects the plaintiff’s claim on the merits, the standing inquiry leads to the disposition in
the sense that it is a necessary first step to the subsequent inquiry.378 This is so even if finding
standing would not have been necessary had the court selected an alternative decisional path,
including most obviously, basing the judgment directly on the absence of standing. As an
additional example, where a court creates a test in a biconditional statement, and one half of that
biconditional statement is a supportive proposition, we count the biconditional statement as a
whole as leading to the disposition. We believe that combining the notion of a decisional path
with the words “leading to” naturally embraces our earlier resolutions of these admittedly
difficult issues, while still allowing some room for debate.
V. APPLICATIONS

To demonstrate that our definition not only meets our normative concerns, but also
functions well when applied to complex cases, we now revisit Bakke, and then introduce several
additional cases. We have selected this group of cases both because they are familiar to many
readers and because they embrace a range of analytical concerns that test the difficulties of any
proffered definition of holding.
A. Bakke
We turn now to Bakke, the case with which we began our analysis and which we used to
establish the various categories of judicial assertions that helped us explore which should be
credited as holding and which should instead be discounted as dicta. Our definition makes the
analysis of Bakke straightforward, though it does so in part by revealing that certain propositions
in Bakke require subjective judgments before they can be classified as holding and dicta. Our
goal is not so much to convince readers of our ultimate conclusion, as Bakke includes
propositions that are very close to the conceptual line separating holding and dicta, but to
378
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identify the key issues and to offer insights that could be employed in a meaningful analysis of
the most difficult questions that remain.
Continuing to rely upon Justice Powell’s opinion as controlling,379 we conclude that the
vast majority of those articulated propositions that we identified as potential holdings in Bakke
do in fact meet our definition of holding. Consider, for example, Justice Powell’s conclusion that
remedying the present effects of past discrimination is not a compelling interest. Powell
unmistakably actually decided the issue. The issue, moreover, was based on the facts of the case.
Powell’s analysis of the issue implicitly assumed, without deciding, that the program would
remedy the present effects of past discrimination, and we have concluded that when a court
assumes facts based on one party’s argument, that suffices for the resulting legal argument to be
considered based on the facts of the case.380 Finally, the resolution of the issue led to the
disposition, as the issue reflected the court’s choice of a path (focusing on the compelling interest
prong rather than the narrow tailoring prong) to a result that was necessary for the disposition.
Most of the other propositions in Bakke are clearly holding under similar analysis. The
only propositions in Bakke that remain complicated involve Powell’s discussion of the Harvard
plan. Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest counts as dicta under our
definition, because it does not lead to the judgment. That conclusion would point toward the
opposite disposition, and Powell’s decision to resolve it thus does not reflect a decision merely to
pick one or more paths from the case facts to the judgment. This conclusion, however, reflects
our admittedly subjective judgment that strict scrutiny is not a sufficiently ordered test to make
treatment of the compelling interest prong a holding when it points in the direction opposite
Powell’s conclusion. If one were to conclude that the test is ordered, then the identification of a
compelling interest would logically precede the necessary narrow tailoring inquiry, and based
upon that analysis would count as holding. Under our alternative analysis, treating the test as not
strictly ordered, because Powell’s broader conclusion that a plus-factor plan such as Harvard’s
would be constitutional followed from his compelling interest conclusion, that conclusion also
does not lead to the disposition and thus also counts as dicta.
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Powell’s narrow tailoring analysis, however, should count as a holding. The issue appears
to be actually decided, in that Powell has indicated precisely how a Harvard-like plan should be
treated.381 We would reach a different result if Powell had included language suggesting that he
was offering only a possible resolution of a hypothetical issue, or perhaps even if he had left
ambiguous whether the issue was actually decided. Because Powell unmistakably resolved the
issue and defended the resolution by explaining that the use of race in admissions was an issue in
the court below, Powell in fact actually decided the issue. The propositions, moreover, were
based on the facts of the case. We have noted that the absence of a fact itself counts as a fact, and
Powell’s reasoning was based on the implicit conclusion that the Davis plan was not a plusfactor plan. Finally, we have already concluded, although we concede that the issue is close, that
the discussion of the Harvard plan effectively created a test for whether the use of race is
narrowly tailored to the diversity objective,382 and because that test led to the disposition, it
counts as a holding.
In sum, we conclude that Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest is
dicta, but the conclusion that the test for determining narrow tailoring to further diversity based
on whether a plan is a quota or a plus factor should count as a holding. Although we would not
expect courts to employ the more complex system of classification set out in Part II, it is worth
noting that the results here are consistent with those in Table 4, which summarizes that
discussion. The analysis reveals that the problems of alternative possible justifications,
alternative justifications, and of antecedent breadth are readily resolved applying our definition.
The problem of ordered analysis turns out not to apply to the strict scrutiny test. The problem of
biconditionals, meanwhile, means that the inverse statements of holdings count as holdings when
the two are resolved together as a biconditional. And Justice Powell was entitled to issue a broad
holding on narrow tailoring rather than a narrower one.
B. Roe
We will now analyze Roe v. Wade,383 based upon our definitions of holding and dicta.384
Although Roe presents some of the same issues as Bakke, it turns out to be simpler. The analysis
381
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reveals that there are no persuasive reasons to change any propositions from their initial
presumptive status as holding or dicta. This should reinforce that Bakke presents an atypically
high level of difficulty, and even cases with multiple-part holdings ordinarily can be easily sorted
out.
1. Justice Blackmun’s Opinion for the Court
In Roe, Jane Roe, a pseudonym for a pregnant woman who brought a class action lawsuit,
was alone granted standing to challenge a Texas statute that criminalized procuring or attempting
to procure an abortion, unless necessary to save the mother’s life.385 Writing for a majority of
seven, Justice Blackmun not only struck down that statute,386 but proceeded to use the Roe case
as a vehicle with which to articulate a comprehensive approach to assessing state abortion laws.
In Section XI of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun stated: “[t]o summarize and repeat:”,
and then presented the synopsis of his detailed set of rules in outline form, including numbered
parts and subparts.387 Lest anyone doubt the Court’s intent, the sentence following the outline
referred to “[t]his holding.”388
The outline itself spelled out Roe’s famous (or infamous) trimester framework. The Court
began by identifying two legitimate state interests: protecting maternal health and the potential
life represented by the fetus. The Court concluded that the first became compelling only after the
first trimester, the point at which morbidity rates for carrying a fetus to term exceeded those for
the termination of pregnancy through abortion. The Court further concluded that the second
interest became compelling only at the moment of viability, the point at which the fetus is
capable of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.389 After further concluding that the right
to terminate a pregnancy falls within the right of privacy initially articulated in Griswold v.
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Connecticut,390 and extended to nonmarried couples through equal protection in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,391 the Court weighed the two identified two state interests against the woman’s right to
abort. The Court then reached conclusions for each of the three identified trimesters of
pregnancy.
In the first trimester, the right to abortion is absolute: “the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician.”392 In the second trimester, “the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health.”393 Finally, in the third trimester, “the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”394
2. Applying the Definition
The “actually decided” issue is easy to apply to the articulated Roe propositions because
the Court made unmistakably clear that it intended its articulated rules for each of the three
trimesters to count as holdings.395 Ambiguities might remain about other aspects of the opinion,
however, such as the following statement: “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”396 The decision leaves some room for interpretation about whether the Court
conclusively determined that the right of privacy is found in the Fourteenth Amendment. There
is no doubt that the Court endorsed a view that the Fourteenth Amendment houses the privacy
right—the Court’s language “as we feel it is” makes its view clear—but one might argue about
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whether the Court actually decided the issue for purposes of issuing a holding.397 The Court
might have been indicating a tentative view on the issue but not resolved it in the immediate
case, perhaps based upon the intuition that recognizing a right—without regard to its doctrinal
underpinnings—was adequate to the task of resolving the constitutionality of the challenged
Texas abortion statute. Because the classification difficulty stems from the ambiguous wording
of the opinion itself, we do not believe that our analysis resolves this specific question.
Roe might also present a problem under the “based on the facts of the case” prong. The
Court resolved statements about each of the three trimesters of pregnancy, even though Roe
herself must have filed suit during a particular single trimester. On this theory, the court might
issue a single broad holding covering the first two trimesters, which together constitute the
category of pre-viability, but cannot issue a separate holding for each of the three trimesters. We
reject this analysis, however, and conclude that for two different reasons, all three trimesters
were before the Court.
First, Roe was heard and decided after the plaintiff’s pregnancy had ended. Indeed, as a
precondition to resolving Roe on the merits, the Roe Court articulated an exception to general
mootness doctrine. Given the short duration of pregnancy, as compared with the protracted
process of litigation, the Court held that review is proper in an otherwise moot case when the
issues are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”398 Accepting this justification for avoiding
standard mootness doctrine, we can reconceptualize Roe as presenting a single plaintiff who, at
progressive points in her pregnancy, is challenging the state law prohibitions against obtaining an
abortion.399 Second, the Court found its reasoning sufficient to strike down the statute in its
entirety.400 The Court thus implicitly found that Jane Roe presented a facial, rather than an asapplied, challenge to the statute. In a facial challenge, any constitutional defect is potentially
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sufficient to strike down the challenged statute, and, as a result, even hypothetical facts can be
embraced within the facts of the case.401
Even though all three trimesters were properly before the Court, however, not all
conclusions drawn concerning each trimester necessarily constitutes a holding under our
definition. Under the third prong of our definition, to be a holding, a proposition must “lead to
the judgment.” The Roe Court based its decision to struck down the Texas abortion statute on
regulatory defects in the first two trimesters. The Court was certainly able to select more than a
single path, provided each selected path led to the judgment. The difficulty is that Blackmun’s
analysis of the third trimester abortion regulation did not lead to the judgment. The Texas statute
did in fact contain an exception to the prohibition against abortion as needed to preserve the life
or health of the mother. No path of reasoning that the court selected had as an essential element a
finding that one aspect of the Texas abortion statute—in this case the exception for the life and
health of the mother in the final trimester—withstood constitutional scrutiny.402
These conclusions withstand the type of closer analysis that we offered in Bakke. Rather
than treat Roe’s articulated three-part holding on the constitutionality of abortion regulations at
various points in the pregnancy as a handful of holdings, one can break down that decision’s
nuanced test of constitutionality into several discrete propositions.403 This breakdown makes
401
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Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). On this view, a court might strike down a statute based on hypothetical facts, but only
because the plaintiff’s case presents facts that implicate doctrine that necessarily requires that such hypotheticals to be assessed.
402
Of course, the Court’s third trimester analysis might indicate that a hypothetical statute, one unlike the challenged Texas
statute, would be unconstitutional. If so, the analysis fails under an alternative prong of our holding definition because it would
not be based on the facts of the case. See supra Part IV.B.2. Under either analysis, the Court’s resolution of the third trimester
counts as dicta.
403
The propositions are as follows:
(1) Because the right of privacy extends to abortion, a state law restricting abortion must satisfy strict scrutiny to be sustained.
(2) The state’s interest in protecting maternal health is not compelling in the first trimester.
(3) The state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester.
(4) The state’s interest in protecting potential human life represented by the fetus is not compelling in the first and second
trimesters.
(5) The state’s interest in protecting potential human life represented by the fetus is compelling in the third trimester.
(6) Even when the state interest in the potentiality of human life represented by the fetus is compelling, the state may not pursue
that interest at the expense of the life or health of the mother.
(7) In the first trimester, the right to abortion is absolute.
(8) In the second trimester, the state may regulate abortion in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(9) In the second trimester, the state may not regulate abortion in ways that are not reasonably related to maternal health.
(10) In the third trimester, the state may regulate abortion through a statute that provides an exception to preserve the mother’s
life or health.
(11) In the third trimester, the state may not regulate abortion through a statute that does not provide an exception to preserve the
mother’s life or health.
(12) The statute regulates abortion in the first trimester.
(13) The statute regulates abortion in the second trimester in a way that is not reasonably related to maternal health.
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quickly apparent that the Court’s conclusion that the right of privacy extends to abortion is a
presumptive holding,404 as are almost all of the court’s conclusions as to the first and second
trimesters.405 In addition, the exceptions count as a holding based on our resolution of the
problem of biconditional statements.406 The conclusions relating to the third trimester, however,
are nonsupportive propositions.407 Although one might argue that some of the key provisions can
be rescued as inverse propositions to other holdings, we would disagree.408
(14) The statute regulates abortion in the third trimester, but provides an exception to preserve the mother’s life or health.
(15) The statute unconstitutionally regulates abortion in the first trimester.
(16) The statute unconstitutionally regulates abortion in the second trimester.
(17) The statute constitutionally regulates third-trimester abortion.
(18) The statute is unconstitutional.
As before, we recognize that it would be possible to create a more detailed set of propositions, but we believe that we have
included all the statements, some explicit and some implicit in the opinion, necessary to understanding the case. Note that the
presentation above divides biconditional statements into two, so that we can evaluate each half of the biconditional statement
separately. For example, statements (2) and (3) jointly form the biconditional “the interest in protecting maternal health is
compelling if and only if the pregnancy is at a point after the first trimester,” and so too with statements (4) and (5).
404
Statement (1) (right of privacy extends to abortion), is necessary to statements (7), (9), and (11), which identify particular
statutory practices as unconstitutional.
405
Statement (2) (maternal health interest not compelling in first trimester) and statement (4) (interest in protecting fetal life not
compelling in first and second trimesters) are necessary to statement (7) (right to first-trimester abortion is absolute). Statement
(7) and statement (12) (statute regulates first-trimester abortion) are both necessary to statement (15) (statute unconstitutionally
regulates first-trimester abortion), which is sufficient for statement (18) (statute is unconstitutional). Similarly, statement (4)
(interest in protecting fetal life not compelling in first and second trimesters) is necessary to statement (9) (state may not regulate
second-trimester abortion for reasons other than maternal health). Statement (9) and statement (13) (statute regulates abortion in
the second trimester in a way that is not reasonably related to maternal health) are both necessary to statement (16)
(unconstitutionally regulates second-trimester abortion), which is also sufficient for statement (18) (statute is unconstitutional).
406
Statement (3) (state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester) is necessary to statement (8)
(state may regulate second-trimester abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health). Statement (8) is a nonsupportive
proposition, because it does not justify any other statement in the opinion or affect the need for any additional analysis, but it is
the inverse of statement (9), and the two together create a test in the form of a biconditional statement. Statement (3) should thus
count as a holding as well.
407
Now, we can consider the propositions related to the third trimester. Statement (5) (state’s interest in protecting fetal life is
compelling after the second trimester) is necessary to Statement (10) (state may regulate third-trimester abortions if providing an
exception to preserve mother’s life or health). Statement (10) and statement (14) (statute regulates abortion in the third trimester
while providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health) are necessary for statement (17) (the statute constitutionally
regulates third-trimester abortion). Because the Court ultimately strikes down the statute, however, statement (17) is a
nonsupportive proposition. Statement (3) (state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester) and
statement (6) (compelling interest in maternal health trumps compelling interest in fetal health) are both necessary to statement
(11) (state may not regulate third-trimester abortions without providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health). Because
the statute at issue does provide an exception, statement (11) is a nonsupportive proposition.
408
One might seek to label statement (10) (state may regulate third-trimester abortions if providing an exception to preserve
mother’s life or health) as an inverse proposition to a holding, and then statement (11) (state may not regulate third-trimester
abortions if not providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health) as an inverse proposition to a holding. This analysis is
somewhat more complicated, however. The Court effectively endorsed the proposition “if a pregnancy is in the first or second
trimesters, then a ban on properly regulated abortions is unconstitutional.” This entails the narrower proposition “if a pregnancy
is in the first or second trimesters, then a ban on properly regulated abortions not needed to protect the mother’s health or life is at
risk is unconstitutional.” The inverse of this proposition is “if a pregnancy is in the third trimester, then a ban on properly
regulated abortions not needed to protect the mother’s health or life is constitutional,” which implies statement (10). By
rewording the conditional in statement (10), we reach the proposition “if the state provides an exception to preserve the mother’s
life or health, then it may regulate third-trimester abortion.” Note that the inverse of that statement—“if the state does not provide
an exception to preserve the mother’s life or health, then it may not regulate third-trimester abortion” is statement (11). If
statement (10) indeed were a holding, we would agree that statement (11) would be a holding as well, because the Court has
effectively announced a test for the third trimester. But because statement (10) is not part of any biconditional test that the Court
has effectively announced—we can see that it is the inverse of a holding only by noting that the Court has endorsed a holding that
entails a narrower proposition—we would conclude that neither it nor statement (11) should count as a holding.
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We do not mean to suggest that a post-Roe court confronted with a statute containing a
third-trimester prohibition on abortion without an exception to preserve the life or health of the
mother would have acted appropriately if it had glibly concluded that the Court’s assertions were
dicta and proceeded to ignore them. There are two reasons that a court arguably should not do
this. First, even though our analysis suggests that the third-trimester propositions were not
holdings, the Supreme Court’s position at the apex of the judicial hierarchy may give it the
power to define what is a holding and what is not.409 Our analysis may suggest that the Supreme
Court overreached, but a lower court ignoring the Supreme Court’s delineation of holdings
would be overreaching as well. Second, even Supreme Court dicta may have substantial
persuasive influence on lower courts.410 Once the Supreme Court has carefully considered and
resolved an issue, there are strong prudential reasons for lower courts to follow the Supreme
Court’s lead, even when that resolution technically would count as dicta.
C. Penn Central
The definition of holding or dicta is tested when applied to a case in which a court
identifies a set of controlling factors, some pulling in one direction and others pulling in the
opposite direction, and then balances these factors to rule for one side. While this can occur
when legal doctrine points in one direction while the equities point in the other, it is most likely
to occur when doctrine fails to provide clear guidance in the immediate case and when
substantial equitable arguments can be advanced to support either side. The landmark takings
case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,411 illustrates the limited nature of holdings
that arise in such balancing test cases.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court addressed whether applying New York City’s
Landmark Preservation Law412 to designate Grand Central Terminal an historical landmark and
to prevent the construction of a high rise office building above the Terminal constituted a
409

See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
Commentators frequently stress the need for lower courts to give substantial deference even to Supreme Court dicta.
Consider, for example, the following admonition:
A federal Court of Appeals is not bound by dicta in United States Supreme Court opinions, although such expressions
are worthy of serious consideration. Federal appellate courts are, however, bound by the Supreme Court’s considered
dicta, almost as firmly as by the court’s outright holdings, particularly when a dictum is of recent vintage and not
enfeebled by any subsequent statement.
AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 603 (2004).
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411
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438 U.S. 104 (1978).
N.Y. City Admin. Code ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
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“taking” for which just compensation was required.413 Justice Brennan, writing for a majority,
divided the case into two issues.414 Brennan first considered whether the designation constituted a
taking for which just compensation was required because the burdens imposed upon Penn
Central were greater than the generally shared burdens associated with zoning restrictions.

415

Concluding that the differential treatment did not automatically trigger a taking, Brennan then
considered whether the particular burdens were sufficiently substantial to require an “an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’”416 The Court resolved both questions in
the negative and thus found that there was no taking.417
The landmark designation was part of a city-wide scheme, similar to laws in all fifty
states, pursuant to which several hundred historic properties were designated as landmarks and
thus restricted from development without approval of the Landmarks Preservation Commission
(the “Commission”).418 A landmarks designation imposed considerable burdens on the owner
both concerning the maintenance of the property and requiring that any development be
approved by the Commission.419 When the Landmarks Commission rejected each of two
proposed plans to construct a multistory high rise above the Penn Central Terminal,420 appellants,
Penn Central, and its lease partner, UGP Properties, Inc. (“UGP”),421 filed a suit challenging the
application of the landmarks law to it as a taking. 422
413

See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122.
Id. at 136.
415
Id. at 114.
416
Id.
417
Had the Court instead determined that the application of the Lamdmark Preservation Law to Penn Central constituted a
taking, it would then have had to resolve the separate question whether the conferral upon Penn Central of transferable
development rights (TDRs) satisfied the requirement of just compensation. See id.
414

418

See id. at 111.

419

Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 117. Pursuant to the landmarks law, Penn Central and UGP applied for a “certificate of no effect on protected
architectural features,” which required that they demonstrate that the proposed changes “will not change or affect any
architectural feature of the landmark and will be in harmony therewith.” Id. at 112. In addition they applied for a “certificate of
appropriateness,” which required that they prove, based upon “aesthetic, historical, and architectural values,” that the proposed
alternations “would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark.” Id. The Landmarks
Commission denied both permits for each proposed plan. Id. at 117.
421
In January 1968, Penn Central and UGP, a wholly owned subsidiary of Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom
corporation, entered into a 50 year renewable lease and sublease agreement, under which UGP would construct a multistory
office building atop the terminal and would pay Penn Central $1 million per year during construction and at least $3 million per
year thereafter. These rents were intended to offset losses in rentals from concessionaires who would be displaced by the new
building. See id. at 116.
420

422

Penn Central did not seek judicial review of these denials and because Grand Central Station ”remained suitable for its past
and future uses, and was not the subject of a contract of sale,” Justice Brennan explained that “no further administrative remedies
available to appellants as to [these] plans.” Id. at 118.
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Justice Brennan placed the landmarks law between two sets of takings principles. The
Court has generally not required just compensation in cases presenting challenges to zoning laws
because zoning generally imposes approximately equal burdens on landowners, thus ensuring
that a small group of owners are not unduly burdened for a public benefit.423 Conversely, the
Court has found that compensation is required when the nature of the governmental action is
such that the resulting harm undermines the owners’ investment backed expectations.424
Examples include physical invasions of property or regulations that effectively thwart the ability
to use the property in the manner that was anticipated based upon expressly retained rights.425
While the case law is not entirely consistent, the Court has found takings where the state has
engaged in a physical invasion of property,426 and where the challenged regulation entirely
thwarts the expected use of property based upon the reserved rights of the property owner.427
After holding that just compensation was not required any time a landowner is restricted
in his use of property “to a greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning laws,”428
Justice Brennan addressed whether “severity of the impact of the law on appellants’ parcel” was
of such a magnitude as to rise to the level of a taking, thus requiring just compensation. Brennan
resolved the latter issue against Penn Central by applying a balancing test.429
Brennan reasoned that because the landmark designation did not limit the “the present
uses of the Terminal,” it did not undermine “Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the
use of the parcel.”430 Brennan added that the designation not only permits a profit from the
Terminal, but also a “reasonable return” on Penn Central’s investment.431 In addition, Brennan
observed that whatever loss appellants suffered from their inability to construct a high rise above
the Terminal, the conferral of transferable development rights (TDRs), allowing the possibility
423

Id. at 123-24 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 124.
425
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), for example, the Court found a taking where, following the sale of
property that included the reservation of mining rights, the state enacted a law preventing coal mining that caused subsidence of
adjoining property given that the law directly thwarted the owner’s investment-backed expectations. In contrast, the Court did
not find a taking in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), where a group of homeowners were forced to cut down ornamental
red cedars that produced cedar rust fatal to nearby apple trees.
426
Thus, in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court found a taking where the government had allowed flights
directly over claimant's land in a manner that prevented its then present use as a chicken farm.
424

427
428
429
430
431

Id.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
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for similar development on adjoining properties, provided some offsetting value, even if that
value would not rise to the level of just compensation in the event of a taking.432 After
concluding that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law did not effect a taking for
which just compensation is required,433 Brennan added that “our holding today is on the present
record, which in turn is based on Penn Central’s present ability to use the Terminal for its
intended purposes and in a gainful fashion.”434
Applying our definition, Justice Brennan chose a decision path from facts to judgment
that required rejecting either of the two bases for ruling for Appellants, first finding that any
substantial differential treatment among property owners, relative to traditional zoning laws,
automatically constitutes a taking, and second, finding that in the facts of the case, the burdens
were sufficiently severe as to constitute a taking. Because a contrary ruling on either prong
would have produced a judgment for Penn Central, and because each prong was actually decided
based upon the facts of the case, applying our definition, each prong is a holding.
In applying the balancing test, Brennan listed a number of factors that satisfied the Court
that the restrictions imposed were substantially related to promoting the general welfare and
permitted the reasonable beneficial use of the Terminal and other properties. Justice Brennan
identified the following burdens that the designation imposed on Penn Central: (1) the obligation
to maintain the Terminal consistently with the requirements of the landmarks law; (2) the
requirement that any development be approved by the Commission; and (3) the rejection of two
proposals to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal, which would have
enhanced the Terminal’s profitability. Against these burdens, Justice Brennan weighed the
following factors, which counseled against finding that the historic landmark designation
imposed a sufficiently serious burden as to be treated as a taking: (1) that the designation did not
interfere with the Terminal’s primary use; (2) that the restrictions preventing the construction of
the two proposed developments above the Terminal did not prevent a reasonable return on the
owner’s investment; (3) that while the Commission rejected two specific high rise proposals as
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See id. Brennan noted that the TDRs were “transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of
which have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings.” Id. Brennan thus maintained that the TDRs
“undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into
account in considering the impact of [the] regulation.” Id. at 137.
433
434

Id.
Id. at 138.
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inconsistent with the historic designated landmark, nothing in their actions suggested that they
would altogether prevent any development in the airspace above the terminal; and (4) that while
they might not constitute just compensation, the landmark designation included valuable TDRs.
Because the Court does not place weights on any of the factors that it identified in its
analysis, it is possible that in a case with any difference in the identified factors or even with
factors that were entitled to somewhat different weights based upon the particular facts might
produce a different result. As a result, articulating the second Penn Central holding requires
qualification based on both the identified factors and the emphasis attributed to those factors
based upon the specific case facts. For example, it is possible that on otherwise indistinguishable
facts, the Court wouldfind a taking if the Commission had prevented a substantially more
modest construction in the air space or if the TDRs were less plausibly useful in adjoining
properties.
We do not wish to suggest that any distinction would be sufficient for a contrary result. A
case with otherwise identical facts, but a proposal for a building only slightly less ambitious than
those submitted would appear insufficient to warrant a contrary result. Of course, courts do
sometimes devise disingenuous distinctions, and balancing test cases might simply make that
task easier. To the extent that the test is intended to have meaning, however, we argue that an
implicit substantiality requirement arises in efforts to distinguish future cases based upon
differences in the weights attached to those factors that a court identifies in announcing a
balancing test. And certainly over a group of cases, courts will give those factors more meaning,
and that will help to guide future courts.
Finally, it is worth considering whether the direction of any identified factors itself
constitutes a holding. If for example a case presented otherwise identical facts except that the
restriction involved a more ambitious construction plan, it would be hard to reconcile a holding
that the new presented a taking with Penn Central, which found no taking based upon a less
restrictive imposition on the landowner. The converse proposition, however, does not hold. In a
case that is otherwise indistinguishable from Penn Central, but in which the owner of the
designated property did not receive any TDRs (which favor the property owner), it would be
possible to rule either way without running afoul of Penn Central. Finding no taking would
simply mean that the TDRs were relevant but not controlling in Penn Central, while finding a
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taking would mean that Penn Central was sufficiently close that changing this one factor
changed the outcome. Because this factor goes against the Penn Central judgment, we know its
direction, but based solely on Penn Central, we cannot know whether its absence would be
determinative of the outcome.
Thus, where a factor in the balancing test weights in favor of the result (the presence of
TDRs weights in favor of the result of finding no taking), future courts can reconcile the same or
an opposite outcome in a case in which that factor is removed. Conversely, where a factor
moves against the result (the extent of the restriction on construction in the airspace weighs
against finding no taking), a future court could not reconcile opposite holding in a case in which
the weight of that factor is exacerbated. As a result, the direction and weight of those factors that
operate against the judgment in a balancing test case might themselves constitute a form of
holding.
D. Blakely
The holding-dicta distinction often arises when a court must consider two cases from a
higher court that are in tension with each other.435 Consider, for example, a debate in the
aftermath of Blakely v. Washington,436 the recent case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines system. Immediately after the issuance of
Blakely, commentators recognized that there was a strong argument that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines also violated the Sixth Amendment under the Supreme Court’s
reasoning.437 The question remained, however, whether lower courts should have considered
themselves free to consider the issue. Lower courts are required to follow all Supreme Court
precedents, even when manifestly inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court doctrine, unless
and until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules its earlier precedent.438

435

In addition, it often arises when a court must consider two of its own cases that are in tension with one another. For example,
in a recent case concerning whether U.S. district courts had habeas jurisdiction over detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the
Justices debated whether the Court had previously implicitly overruled a prior case. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2693-95
(2004) (arguing that Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), implicitly overruled Johnson v. Eistrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950)), with id. at 2702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority). Case B can be thought of as overruling
case A if a holding of case B and a holding of case A are inconsistent. Explicit application of the holding-dicta distinction that we
develop here could discipline analysis in cases like Rasul.
436
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
437
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2004).
438
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); supra note 111.

135

The government took the position that this principle meant that the lower courts should
not reconsider the constitutionality of the Federal Guidelines in the wake of Blakely.439 There had
been numerous Supreme Court cases applying the Sentencing Guidelines, and litigants in one
such case, Edwards v. United States, even raised Sixth Amendment issues.440 The Supreme Court
in Edwards did not mention the Sixth Amendment, but did state that “we need not, and we do
not, consider the merits of petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims.”441 In a Seventh
Circuit case considering this argument, Judge Posner concluded that Edwards did not create a
holding on the Blakely issue, noting, “[a]n assumption is not a holding.”442 As Judge Posner’s use
of the word “holding” reflects, a lower court faced with an apparent tension in the jurisprudence
of a higher court must examine the higher court’s case law to identify what holdings the higher
court has reached. As long as an earlier case does not contain a holding inconsistent with a later
case’s holding, the lower court faces no dilemma about which case to follow.
We agree not only with Judge Posner’s recognition that the case presented a question of
what counts as a “holding,” but also with his conclusion that there was no holding in Edwards
that Blakely can be seen even to have implicitly overruled. In dissent, Judge Easterbrook thought
that Edwards did bind the Seventh Circuit to continue to follow the Guidelines. “The Court’s
opinion in Edwards acknowledged that constitutional contentions had been advanced,”
Easterbrook argued. “Edwards held that a judge nonetheless may ascertain (using the
preponderance standard) the type and amount of drugs involved, and impose a sentence based on
that conclusion, as long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.”443 Under our
definition, however, a court must actually resolve an issue for the case to create a holding, and
when a court explicitly says “we need not, and we do not, consider the merits of petitioners’
statutory and constitutional claims,” any subsequent explanation that the claims do not seem
strong must count as dicta. Under our analysis, then, lower courts remained free even before
Blakely to rule that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional for Sixth Amendment
reasons.
439

Memorandum to All Federal Prosecutors from James Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., July 2, 2004, available at
http://talkleft.com/dojmemojuly2.pdf.
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Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998); see also Brief for Petitioners at 30-32, 1997 WL 793079, Edwards (No. 968732).
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523 U.S. at 515.
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United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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That does not necessarily, however, justify Judge Posner’s decision to find the
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, even assuming that this is the logical import of the
Blakely decision.444 There may be prudential reasons for a lower court to honor Supreme Court
dicta,445 and there may be even stronger prudential reasons for a lower court to honor the takenfor-granted assumptions of higher courts. There were at least signals in Supreme Court cases that
the Justices did not think the Sixth Amendment argument against the Sentencing Guidelines
meritorious. On the other hand, federal courts are obligated to honor a convicted defendant’s
constitutional rights even if in dong so they effectively force the Supreme Court’s hand in the
resolution of an issue that it previously assumed had no merit. What matters for our purposes is
that our definition provides a way of determining when a lower court has the power to follow the
logical implications of recent Supreme Court decisions over seemingly inconsistent earlier
decisions. That issue does not resolve when a lower court should exercise the power if it exists.
E. Grutter and Gratz
While the recent Grutter446 and Gratz,447 each issued by majorities, effectively remove
any doctrinal significance from the inquiry whether Justice Powell’s independent analysis in
Bakke was dicta or holding, the holding-dicta distinction remains important for affirmative action
law. Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutterthat “[w]e expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.”448 Is this bold assertion holding or dicta? One problem in answering this
question is that it is not at all obvious even what Justice O’Connor’s assertion means. It might
even have been purposely ambiguous.449 It might not be surprising therefore that Justices
Ginsburg450 and Thomas451 disagreed as to O’Connor’s meaning.
444

At least one circuit court reached the issue of the Sentencing Guidelines’ constitutionality but found that they were
constitutional despite Blakely. See United States v. Piniero, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004).
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See supra note 410.
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539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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539 U.S. 244 (2003).
448
539 U.S. at 342.
449
Justice O’Connor may have wanted to send a signal stronger than a mere expression of hope, yet recognized that the Supreme
Court, unlike Congress, does not provide bright-line sunset provisions. See Vikram David Omar & Evan Caminker,
Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter , 30 HASTINGS L.Q. 541, 554 (2003) (asserting that
“[w]hile Congress occasionally enacts sunset provisions into its work product, the Supreme Court usually does not.”).
450
“From today’s vantage point,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s
span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.” 539
U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). By casting the uncertainty as whether we can forecast the end of a need for affirmative
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Our analysis of holding and dicta can, however, help determine the consequence of any
suggested interpretation. If, for example, the sentence is interpreted to mean that affirmative
action survives for twenty-five years and no more, then O’Connor might be attempting to issue a
biconditional statement that transforms an “if, then” assertion into an assertion that “if and only
if a Michigan Law School-like affirmative action program is in place no later than 2028, is it
constitutional.” This, however, would seem to be a biconditional statement that provides an endrun around the exclusion of hypotheticals from holding, so there is a strong argument that the nolater-than-2028 restriction is not based on the facts of the case and counts as dicta. If, meanwhile,
O’Connor’s statement is interpreted as a mere personal hope or prophesy, then the issue is not
actually decided. What is a holding today should remain so in 2028, and the statement setting out
a time limit itself should be relegated to the status of dicta. Such dicta, of course, may have
inspirational but not precedential effect.
VI. CONCLUSION

Our own hope for the future is more modest. In this Article, we have argued that the
distinction between holdings and dicta helps to prevent judges from evading the principle of
stare decisis. If judges were uniformly to adopt our definition and our proposed resolution of
particular problems, courts would apply the holding-dicta distinction more consistently and in a
manner more faithful to the underlying function of the distinction. Uniform adoption is unlikely
at best, however, and many courts will likely continue to cite the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of the distinction. We recognize too that the more definitions of the distinction that
exist, the easier it will be for courts to find one that suits its purposes. Nonetheless, we hope that
because we have exposed the structural issues inherent in the distinction between holding and
dicta, the courts at least will consider those issues directly. Over time, such consideration can

action or merely hope for such an end, Ginsburg signals that she does not view O’Connor’s remarks as providing for an end to
affirmative action regardless of the developments in the interim.
451
Justice Thomas made his interpretation of Justice O’Connor’s comment patent: “I agree that in 25 years the practices of the
Law School will be illegal,” adding, “No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic
credentials will disappear in 25 years. Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be unconstitutional in 25 years
made contingent on the gap closing in that time.” 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also seizes on a
quotation included in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, that the “the acid test of [affirmative action preferences’] justification will be
their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences at all.” Id. at 342-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting, citing
Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to
Professional Schools, 58 CHICAGO BAR REC. 282, 293 (May- June 1977)).
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only clarify the holding-dicta distinction and further the decisionmaking discipline that the
distinction can provide.
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